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The nascent “critical legal research” movement applies the 
constellation of critical theory to the American legal research regime. 
Work in this discourse has unpacked the means through which commercial 
print and online legal resources (e.g., Westlaw and Lexis) insidiously 
channel the efforts of legal researchers, essentially predetermining 
research outcomes. Although legal research is commonly conceived as a 
normatively neutral paradigm, such commercial homogenizing agents 
(paired with traditional methods of legal analysis) in fact reflect and 
perpetuate society’s dominant interests. 
As grounded in the existing literature, this Article outlines novel 
strategies that may together constitute one potential version of a critically 
reconstructed legal research process. The overarching aim of this 
reconstructed process is to jumpstart the development of progressive law 
reform initiatives. Such key strategies include a more targeted utilization of 
commercial and non-commercial legal resources, an increased practitioner 
reliance upon a wide range of theoretical materials (i.e., as potential 
touchstones for innovation), and the cultivation of synergistic 
brainstorming sessions involving grassroots activists and other diverse 
2
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constituents. 
This Article explores the critical legal research process in the specific 
context of Appalachian law reform efforts. Currently, mountaintop removal 
mining is wreaking social, economic, and environmental devastation on the 
region. In applying the critical research process to the sociolegal 
framework governing mountaintop removal, it becomes clear that core 
feminist methodologies—and the ecofeminism movement, in particular—
may yet offer crucial insights that can contribute greatly to reform efforts. 
This illustrative application of critical research strategies demonstrates the 
transformative potential of the novel reformist practice. 
 
[F]ind your place on the planet. Dig in, and take responsibility from 
there. . . . Even while holding in mind the largest scale of potential 
change. Get a sense of workable territory, learn about it, and start acting 






Legends of dogwood 







 It is little understood that a critical approach to the resources and 
methodologies associated with the contemporary legal research process can 
serve as a crucial vehicle for progressive sociolegal change—otherwise 
known as normative reconstruction.  However, through the work of such 
scholars as Richard Delgado, Jean Stefancic, and Jill Anne Farmer, the 
outlines of such critical legal research strategies can be discerned, and may 
                                                          
 1.  GARY SNYDER, Four Changes, in TURTLE ISLAND 91, 101 (1974).  A noted 
Buddhist poet and activist, Gary Snyder in his “programmatic manifesto ‘Four 
Changes’ . . . outlines the kind of enterprises he believed the country needed in order to 
maintain ecological diversity and make salutary changes as a culture.”  See Aaron K. 
DiFranco, Gary Snyder, in THE OXFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LITERATURE 61, 
63 (Jay Parini ed. 2003).  
 2.  Barbara Smith, Appalachian April, in APPALACHIA INSIDE AND OUT: CONFLICT 
AND CHANGE 185, 185 (Robert J. Higgs et al. eds., 1995).  Barbara Smith, author, 
historian, and retired Chair of the Division of Humanities at Alderson-Broaddus 
College, Philippi, West Virginia, is widely celebrated for her efforts “to improve 
quality of life in Southern Appalachia.”  Id.  
3
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assist reformist-minded attorneys in achieving such change.
3
  The 
overarching crux of the modern critical legal research process is that 
attorneys ought to look beyond the deeply problematic “ready-made body 
of developed law,” and should instead think “outside the box” in 
“reinventing, modifying, flipping, and radically transforming legal 
doctrines and theories imaginatively.”
4
 
Although a definitive encapsulation of such a process is elusive (due to 
its multifaceted and necessarily ever-evolving nature), prominent examples 
of critical legal research strategies to date include the following: a more 
nuanced use of premier and alternative legal research databases, based in 
part on a critical deconstruction of database structure and functionality;
5
 a 
newfound practitioner reliance upon theoretical resources as potential 
touchstones for innovation, as compared to more traditional legal resources 
in a vacuum;
6
 and a rediscovery of the profound importance of 
“unplugged” brainstorming sessions as a means for achieving genuine legal 
innovation.
7
  Much may be achieved in terms of progressive law reform by 
utilizing such critical techniques in conjunction with the more traditional 
legal research process. 
In this Article, such critical research strategies are explored and then 
examined in the specific context of the Appalachian legal research 
landscape.  As has been well documented, the Appalachian region of the 
United States faces unique, and often pronounced, socioeconomic and 
environmental challenges.
8
  Prominent among these issues include rural 
                                                          
 3.  See generally Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Why Do We Ask the Same 
Questions? The Triple Helix Dilemma Revisited, 99 L. LIBR. J. 307, 308 (2007) 
[hereinafter Revisited]; Jill Anne Farmer, A Poststructuralist Analysis of the Legal 
Research Process, 85 L. LIBR. J. 391, 391-92 (1993); Jean Stefancic & Richard 
Delgado, Outsider Jurisprudence and the Electronic Revolution: Will Technology Help 
or Hinder the Cause of Law Reform?, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 847, 853-54 (1991); Steven M. 
Barkan, Response to Schanck: On the Need for Critical Law Librarianship, or Are We 
All Legal Realists Now?, 82 L. LIBR. J. 23, 35 (1990); Richard Delgado & Jean 
Stefancic, Why Do We Tell the Same Stories: Law Reform, Critical Librarianship, and 
the Triple Helix Dilemma, 42 STAN. L. REV. 207, 209 (1989) [hereinafter Triple Helix 
Dilemma]; Virginia Wise, Of Lizards, Intersubjective Zap and Trashing: Critical Legal 
Studies and the Librarian, LEGAL REFERENCE SERV. Q. 7, 12 (1988); Steven M. 
Barkan, Deconstructing Legal Research: A Law Librarian’s Commentary on Critical 
Legal Studies, 79 L. LIBR. J. 617, 624 (1987) [hereinafter Deconstructing].  
 4.  See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 3, at 328. 
 5.  See id., at 318-25; Farmer, supra note 3, at 396-403. 
 6.  See Farmer, supra note 3, at 403. 
 7.  See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 3, at 328. 
 8.  See Bryan C. Banks, High Above the Environmental Decimation and 
Economic Domination of Eastern Kentucky, King Coal Remains Firmly Seated on Its 
Gilded Throne, 13 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 125, 126-27 (2006) (“[T]hose [who] live at the 
4
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poverty, joblessness, uneven economic development,
9
 sociopolitical 
inequities and disenfranchisement (with special problems pertaining to 
race, gender, and class subordination),
10
 inadequate infrastructure and 
services,
11
 and, lastly, environmental and public health concerns associated 
with the natural resource extraction industry.
12
 
Much has been written about these issues—however, in regard to 
concrete strategies for law reform in Appalachia, what remains as a fertile, 
untapped resource is the potentially transformative power of the critical 
approach to legal research.  With this transformative potential in mind, this 
Article applies the evolving framework of the critical research process, in a 
preliminary sense, to an area of law in need of desperate reform in 
Appalachia (and one that exists at the intersection of the issues broached 
                                                          
intersection of America’s eastern coalfields still struggle with abject poverty, high 
unemployment, an inadequate infrastructure. . . . [and] environmental devastation.”).  
 9.  See APPALACHIAN REG’L COMM’N, Strategies for Economic Improvement in 
Appalachia’s Distressed Rural Counties 14-16 (May 2012), available at 
http://www.arc.gov/assets/research_reports/StrategiesforEconomicImprov 
ementinAppalachiasDistressedRuralCounties21.pdf; see also id. at 3 (“While many 
parts of Appalachia have shown significant improvements in income, public, health and 
quality of life, others still languish”). 
 10.  See SUZANNE E. TALLICHET, DAUGHTERS OF THE MOUNTAIN: WOMEN COAL 
MINERS IN CENTRAL APPALACHIA 9-18 (2010) (“I expanded [a gender- and class-based] 
interpretation to include race and the colonization process whereby working-class 
residents of the Appalachian region were further exploited and subordinated by outside 
capitalist interests, both economically and culturally.”); Debra Henderson & Ann 
Tickamyer, The Intersection of Poverty Discourses: Race, Class, Culture, and Gender, 
in EMERGING INTERSECTIONS: RACE, CLASS AND GENDER IN THEORY, POLICY AND 
PRACTICE 50, 56 (Bonnie Thornton Dill & Ruth Enid Zambrana eds., 2009) (“[W]e 
argue not only do the negative stereotypes fostered in Appalachia serve to control poor 
rural White women, but they sustain a broader system of welfare racism that impacts 
poor minority women.”); Dan Manning-Miller, Racism and Organizing, in FIGHTING 
BACK APPALACHIA: TRADITIONS OF RESISTANCE AND CHANGE 57, 63 (Stephen L. 
Fisher ed., 1993) (“However grim the assessment of the power of racism, this is not a 
perspective that lacks faith in the ability of the southern or Appalachian white to 
change—to understand her or his self-interest in terms of unity with black people.”). 
 11.  See APPALACHIAN REG’L COMM’N, Economic Assessment of Appalachia 14-15 
(June 2010) (“[M]any significant challenges remain before the Region’s infrastructure 
is at full parity with the rest of the nation . . . .”). 
 12.  See Sam Evans, Voices from the Desecrated Places: A Journey to End 
Mountaintop Removal Mining, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 521, 523–29 (2010). For the 
greater climate change implications of global coal combustion, see Patrick C. 
McGinley & Judge Charles H. Haden II, Climate Change and the War on Coal: 
Exploring the Dark Side, 13 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 255, 310 (2011) (“Worldwide concern 
about climate change has awakened the public to one of the major externalities of 
coal—the fuel contributes 20% of global greenhouse gas emissions and 41% . . . of 
global carbon dioxide emissions, the most common greenhouse gas.”). 
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above): the law governing mountaintop removal mining. This tentative 
application will demonstrate that critical legal research strategies may serve 
as a powerful reform tool in the embattled Appalachian region. 
This Article is divided into three parts: Part I provides an overview of the 
legal publishing industry, Part II introduces the critical analysis of the 
American legal research regime, and Part III applies that analysis to the 
framework governing mountaintop removal mining.  Part I itself is divided 
into three subparts.  In Part IA, the historical development of the legal 
publishing industry is summarized, demonstrating that, first, the ascendant 
producers of commercial legal resources—West Publishing, most 
notably—have exercised a century-long marketplace hegemony.
13
  Seismic 
shifts within the contemporary legal publishing industry have only 
exacerbated this state of affairs. That is, in confluence with the rise of free 
market globalization, a triumvirate of legal publishers (i.e., Thomson 
Reuters, Reed-Elsevier, and Wolters Kluwer) have neutralized most third-
party competitors, thereby creating a transnational legal publishing 
oligopoly.
14
  That commercial legal resources constitute the most egregious 
agents of homogenization for research outcomes is due—in no small 




Part IB tracks the market transition to online legal resources, and 
thereafter Part IC provides a comparative analysis of the print and online 
research mediums.  This analysis demonstrates that, contrary to popular 
perception, the transition to the online medium has not revolutionized the 
legal research paradigm because commercial resources and search tools, as 
rendered in online formats, continue to perpetuate the publishers’ 
channeling influence on research outcomes.
16
  Part ID details the 
traditional, or unreconstructed, legal research process, revealing its 
Langdellian formalist underpinnings, and thus its emphasis on a classic 
search for the “one right answer” or “correct” ratio decidendi.
17
  
Historically, legal research has been viewed as a normatively neutral 
enterprise, wherein discrete legal queries are matched formulaically with 
supposed binding precedent. 
Part II is divided into five subparts. Part IIA and IIB introduce the 
                                                          
 13.  Robert C. Berring, Legal Research and Legal Concepts: Where Form Molds 
Substance, 75 CAL. L. REV. 15, 20–22 (1987).  
 14.  Ian Gallacher, “Aux Armes, Citoyens!” Time for Law Schools to Lead the 
Movement for Free and Open Access to the Law, 40 U. TOL. L. REV. 1, 51 (2008).  
 15.  See Farmer, supra note 3, at 397-99. 
 16.  See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 3, at 318-25. 
 17.  See Deconstructing, supra note 3, at 619-20; Triple Helix Dilemma, supra note 
3, at 316. 
6
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emerging discourse on critical legal research.  This movement applies 
critical theory to the institution of American legal research: that is, to the 
commercial resources and systemic methodologies associated with the 
research process, as taught as a cohesive pedagogy in the law school 
curriculum and utilized in practice.
18
  This Part demonstrates that the core 
insights proffered by the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement and its 
theoretical progeny—i.e., that legal doctrine is incoherent and 
indeterminate, and that categorizations of law are inherently problematic—
are conceptually inseparable from the formalist-based institution of legal 
research.
19
  Through this critical lens, traditional legal research is revealed 
as a wholly subjective process, and moreover, largely perpetuates the 
political and ideological dictates of society’s dominant interests.
20
 
Part IIC and IID unpack the multitudinous aspects through which legal 
research, both print and online, furthers socially conservative ends.  The 
West Topic and Key Number system, the preeminent legal categorization 
scheme, is instrumental in print legal research—and through its subjective 
taxonomy of legal concepts, serves to reify the dominant ideologies of 
Western liberalism.
21
  Online research, although supposedly freeing to the 
researcher, in fact insidiously predetermines research outcomes through the 
following mechanisms: search algorithms embedded with such features as 
automated input from West categorization and citation systems, in addition 
to crowdsourcing attributes;
22
 enhanced citation systems that crosslink 
primary authority to editorially selected, brand-based analytical materials;
23
 
the online medium’s facilitation of mere fact-based searching;
24
 and the 
pitfalls of free Internet sources, including, most alarmingly, West’s 
success—through its legal-conceptual hegemony—in pervasively 
influencing research outcomes regardless of the resource used.
25
 
Part IIE details strategies that may together constitute one potential 
version of a critical-based, reconstructed legal research process.  As 
introduced above, central to such a critical process is searching outside the 
“system box” of commercial legal databases—and then in adopting ever-
creative approaches to law reform, through such methodologies as 
                                                          
 18.  See sources cited supra note 3. 
 19.  See Deconstructing, supra note 3, at 632-37. 
 20.  See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 3, at 308-09. 
 21.  See Triple Helix Dilemma, supra note 3, at 314-22. 
 22.  Ronald E. Wheeler, Does WestlawNext Really Change Everything? The 
Implications of WestlawNext on Legal Research, 103 L. LIBR. J. 359, 365-68 (2011). 
 23.  See Farmer, supra note 3, at 401; Alan Wolf & Lynn Wishart, Shepard’s and 
KeyCite Are Flawed (or Maybe It’s You), N.Y. ST. B.A. J. 24, 25 (2003).  
 24.  See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 3 at 323. 
 25.  See id. at 310. 
7
Stump: Following New Lights
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2015
 
580 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW  [Vol. 23:4 
synthesizing, as applicable, existing legal concepts, emerging policy needs, 
critical theory, and so on.
26
 
Part III, which is divided into two subparts, applies the critical legal 
research process, as envisioned in this Article, to the law governing 
mountaintop removal mining.  Part IIIA provides an overview of the 
Appalachian coal extraction industry and then of mountaintop removal 
mining specifically.  Through the phenomenon known as the natural 
resource curse, the coal extraction industry long has wrought 
environmental, social, and economic devastation on the Appalachian 
region.
27
  Moreover, in recent decades, mountaintop removal mining has 
emerged in Appalachia as a dominant (and singularly destructive) form of 
surface mining.
28
  Legal strategies to halt mountaintop removal mining 
have focused on the complex federal and state regulatory scheme involving 
the Surface Mining and Control Reclamation Act (SMCRA), the Clean 




Specifically, environmental plaintiffs have sought federal court 
enforcement of these Acts.
30
  Although the plain language of the CWA and 
NEPA, in particular, overwhelmingly favors such plaintiffs, the Fourth 
Circuit has ruled nearly without exception for the coal extraction industry.
31
  
Potential common law remedies in tort, including negligence and nuisance 
actions, also remain largely undeveloped against mountaintop removal 
operations, due in large part to unfavorable political and sociolegal 
conditions in the region.
32
 
Part IIIB applies critical research strategies to mountaintop removal law.  
First, this Part provides a discussion on how a hypothetical researcher may 
locate such law through the traditional, concept-based legal research 
                                                          
 26.  See id. at 328. 
 27.  See Joyce. M. Barry, STANDING OUR GROUND:  WOMEN, ENVIRONMENTAL 
JUSTICE, AND THE FIGHT TO END MOUNTAINTOP REMOVAL 23 (2012) [hereinafter 
STANDING OUR GROUND]. 
 28.  Mark Baller & Leor J. Pantilat, Comment, Defenders of Appalachia: The 
Campaign to Eliminate Mountaintop Removal Coal Mining and the Role of Public 
Justice, 37 ENVTL. L. 629, 631 (2007). 
 29.  Evan Barret Smith, Implementing Environmental Justice in Appalachia: The 
Social and Cultural Context of Mountaintop Removal Mining As Seen Through the 
Lenses of Law and Documentaries, 4 WM. & MARY POL’Y REV. 170, 179 (2012). 
 30.  See id. at 181–85. 
 31.  See id.  But see S. Appalachian Mountain Stewards v. A & G Coal Corp., 758 
F.3d 560, 569 (4th Cir. 2014) (ruling in favor of environmental plaintiffs). This 
decision is discussed infra Part III(A)(2).  
 32.  Sara Gersen, Note, The Potential of State Coal-Purchasing Legislation to 
Decrease Mountaintop Removal Mining, 18 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 455, 477 (2011). 
8
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process.  Second, an analysis demonstrates how the premier legal databases 
channel the researcher’s efforts in locating the existing mountaintop 
removal legal framework.  In terms of the West Topic and Key Number 
system, West editors engage in subjective legal classifications of the points 
of law at issue in prominent mountaintop removal cases like Ohio Valley 
Environmental Coalition v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
33
  Research 
outcomes also are influenced through the publishers’ practice of editorially 
selecting and then crosslinking brand-based analytical resources through 




What is more, the WestSearch algorithm uses automated input from the 
West categorization and citation systems for all keyword searches 
performed on the database—and thus every mountaintop removal search 
performed on the database necessarily is filtered through such West 
homogenizing agents.
35
  Finally, as the Langdellian curriculum was in fact 
explicitly modeled after the legal-conceptual hierarchies of the West Topic 
and Key Number system,
36
 the hypothetical researcher, as trained in the 
American law school system, has the West conceptual framework 
epistemologically “inscribed” on her mind—throughout all aspects of the 
research process, and no matter the resource used.
37
 
Part IIIB next provides a concrete example of searching beyond the 
“system box” of commercial legal databases, in locating critical sources of 
inspiration for novel mountaintop removal law reform initiatives.  The 
environmental justice movement, which details how minority and low-
income populations share disproportionately in environmental harms, has 
been an active discourse both in mountaintop removal primary authority 
and in legal-analytical treatment of the mining practice.
38
  However, a 
dedicated feminist analysis of the law governing mountaintop removal 
mining is wholly absent from the law and discourse.  But in using cross- 
and multidisciplinary resources, the researcher discovers that non-legal 
scholars, such as Women’s Studies Professor Joyce M. Barry, have indeed 
applied a feminist analysis to the Appalachian mountaintop removal 
                                                          
 33.  Ohio Valley Envt’l Coal v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’r, 883 F. Supp. 2d 627, 
628-29 (S.D.W. Va. 2012) aff’d, 716 F.3d 119 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 34.  See, e.g., 33 U.S.C.A. § 1344 (2014) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 113-209). 
 35.  See Wheeler, supra note 22, at 369. 
 36.  Carol M. Bast & Ransford C. Pyle, Legal Research in the Computer Age: A 
Paradigm Shift?, 93 L. LIBR. J. 285, 287 (2001). 
 37.  Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 3, at 310. 
 38.  See generally Patrick C. McGinley, From Pick and Shovel to Mountaintop 
Removal: Environmental Injustice in the Appalachian Coalfields, 34 ENVTL. L. 21, 23-
24 (2004) [hereinafter Pick and Shovel]. 
9
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As advised by Delgado and Stefancic, the researcher may then “unplug” 
and engage in brainstorming sessions, in applying the feminist insights of 
Barry and others to existing mountaintop removal law.  In particular, 
feminist-inspired law reform initiatives broached (tentatively) in Part IIIB 
revolve,
40
 in part, around the extent to which women may share 
disproportionately in the harms wrought by mountaintop removal mining.  
Such disproportionate harms include quantifiable social and economic 
hardships borne more egregiously by Appalachian women than men, in 
addition to potentially increased susceptibility to toxins released in the 




New law reform initiatives may involve explicitly accounting for such 
disproportionate harms in the public interest review requirements mandated 
                                                          
 39.  See generally STANDING OUR GROUND, supra note 27.  
 40.  It is incumbent to acknowledge that while I am a lifelong Appalachian 
resident, I also am writing this Article from the privileged perspective of a white man.  
I, therefore, share Verchick’s view that “[a]s both feminism and environmental justice 
emphasize the importance of people speaking for themselves, I do not presume in this 
Article to speak for either environmental justice activists or for women.  Rather, I offer 
my arguments and analysis as, to use Mari Matsuda’s term, a ‘theoretical co-
conspirator.’”  Robert R.M. Verchick, In A Greener Voice: Feminist Theory and 
Environmental Justice, 19 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 23, 27 (1996) [hereinafter Greener 
Voice] (quoting Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and 
Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 348 (1987)).  But see Devon W. 
Carbado, Straight Out of the Closet, 15 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 76, 84 (2000) 
(“Proponents of the ‘impossibility thesis’ seem to suggest that quite apart from what we 
might want, it must be so: the impossibility of men’s relationship to feminism stems 
from the very different (unequal) social reality men and women live.”).  Unpersuaded 
by the impossibility thesis, Carbado posits that “male feminism need not reflect male 
epistemological dominance” and that moreover it can be said that “feminism is more 
about ideology and political commitment than it is about male or female identity per 
se.”  Id. at 85.  We such allies, though, ought to proceed with the utmost caution—and 
in a consciously limited fashion: Male heterosexuals who participate in discourses on 
gender and sexuality should avoid creating “the (mis)impression that, because they are 
outsiders to the subordinating effects of patriarchy and heterosexism, their critiques of 
patriarchy and/or heterosexism are more valid than those offered by lesbians, straight 
women, and gay men.”  Id. at 124.  There remains the “ever-present danger of 
overstating the male role in the feminist struggle.”  Corey Rayburn, Why Are You 
Taking Gender and the Law?: Deconstructing the Norms That Keep Men Out of the 
Law School’s “Pink Ghetto”, 14 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 71, 80 (2003). 
 41.  See generally STANDING OUR GROUND, supra note 27; Joyce M. Barry, 
Mountaineers Are Always Free?: An Examination of The Effects of Mountaintop 
Removal in West Virginia, 29 WOMEN’S STUD. Q. 116 (2001) [hereinafter 
Mountaineers]. See also infra Part III(B)(3).  
10
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under the CWA permitting scheme for mountaintop removal.
42
  
Concurrently, in line with feminist methodologies pertaining to contextual 
reasoning and consciousness-raising,
43
 such public review processes—in 
addition to other socio-institutional sites of change, such as the public 
health complex—may be infused, to a greater extent, with a reliance upon 
personal experiences of environmentally-affected subordinated groups.
44
  
Such reform strategies as toxic tort litigation and legislative compensation 
schemes also are discussed in this section. 
Part IIIB concludes with a brief vision of more transformative reform 
initiatives (i.e., initiatives targeting the systemic forces of patriarchal 
liberalism at work in Appalachia), based predominantly on the core insights 
of the ecofeminism movement.  Such reforms may entail—beyond merely 
halting mountaintop removal mining—radically restructuring the social and 
economic landscape of the Appalachian region along ecofeminist lines.
45
 
II. THE LEGAL PUBLISHING INDUSTRY 
A. Historical Overview 
The West Publishing Company was the foundational commercial 
producer of print legal resources in the United States.  West Publishing has 
been in existence for over a century, providing such products as the 
National Reporter system, which revolutionized the dissemination of case 
law, and the West Digest system, an organizational scheme that classifies 
all areas of American case law into categories (and discrete sub-categories) 
known as the West Topic and Key Number system.
46
  Prior to the advent of 
these West resources, the reporting of American law was “unsystematic 
and disorganized,”
47
 as attorneys experienced difficulty in locating 
decisions without such standardizing agents.  So successful were West’s 
products in providing order to the then-chaos of case law dissemination, 
that the ABA eventually endorsed both systems, effectively granting West 
a “semi-official status” that it still maintains to this day.
48
 
                                                          
 42.  See Greener Voice, supra note 40, at 33 (“Where underlying gender 
differences are real, feminists seek to discredit not the assumption of differences, but 
the assumption that differences justify policies burdening women more than men.”). 
 43.  See id. at 43-53. 
 44.  See id. at 39. 
 45.  STANDING OUR GROUND, supra note 27, at 149. 
 46.  Triple Helix Dilemma, supra note 3, at 314; see also Robert C. Berring, Chaos, 
Cyberspace and Tradition: Legal Information Transmogrified, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
189, 191 (1997) [hereinafter Chaos]. 
 47.  Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 3, at 313.  
 48.  See id. For a more comprehensive overview of the history of West Publishing 
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By the mid-twentieth century, West Publishing had vastly expanded its 
print offerings, producing many of the core materials associated with the 
modern legal publishing industry.  West became entrenched as the leading 
commercial producer of the full array of primary and secondary print legal 
resources on the market, including the United States Code Annotated, the 
federal and state West Reporters, the West Digests (with the attendant 
headnotes schema), the Corpus Juris Secundum legal encyclopedia, 
practice books, and so on.
49
  Thus, the so-called print story of 
contemporary legal research resources has its firm genesis with the West 
Publishing Company. 
The print story of the legal publishing industry also involves the early 
competitors to West Publishing.  A significant example is the Lawyers 
Cooperative Publishing Company, West’s first substantial rival.
50
  Unlike 
West Publishing, the Lawyers Cooperative deployed a more selective 
publishing strategy, disseminating only a limited number of decisions in 
conjunction with its Total Client-Service Library (i.e., an integrated system 
of legal reference works).
51
  The Lawyers Cooperative also published the 
American Jurisprudence legal encyclopedia (in answer to West’s Corpus 
Juris encyclopedia) and the United States Supreme Court Digest, Lawyers’ 
Edition, among other notable titles still in print today.
52
 
Other salient examples of early West competitors abound.  The Michie 
Company, established in the late nineteenth century, published a wide 
range of print legal materials, such as the United States Code Service and 
various state legislative codes.
53
 The Shepard’s Company produced the 
pioneering and now-ubiquitous citator service, a product allowing 
practitioners to determine the validity of found legal authority.
54
 Final 
examples of still-relevant historic publishers include Anderson Publishing, 
the Matthew Bender and Company, Callaghan and Company, and the 
Bureau of National Affairs, all of which emerged as prominent producers 
                                                          
see, e.g., ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 
1850S TO THE 1980S, 132-33 (1983); Ross E. Davies, How West Law Was Made: The 
Company, Its Products, and Its Promotions, 6 CHARLESTON L. REV. 231, 232-44 
(2012); Robert C. Berring, Full-Text Databases and Legal Research: Backing into the 
Future, 1 HIGH TECH. L.J. 27, 29-37 (1986). 
 49.  See Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Open Access in A Closed Universe: Lexis, 
Westlaw, Law Schools, and the Legal Information Market, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 
797, 822 (2006).  
 50.   See id. at 822. 
 51.  See KENDALL F. SVENGALIS, LEGAL INFORMATION BUYER’S GUIDE & 
REFERENCE MANUAL 8 (2014) [hereinafter LEGAL INFORMATION]. 
 52.  See id.  
 53.  See id. 
 54.  See id. 
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of specialized treatises, looseleafs, and related analytical resources.
55
 
The legal publishing industry in the latter half of the twentieth century 
has been marked by the ascendance of three transnational firms: Thomson 
Reuters, Reed-Elsevier, and Wolters Kluwer.
56
  The relaxation of antitrust 
laws in the 1980s and 1990s resulted in the formerly diverse legal 
publishing market to rapidly transition towards oligopolistic 
consolidation.
57
  Perhaps most notably, in 1996, the Canadian-based 
Thomson Corporation acquired the West Publishing Company—proceeded 
by Thomson’s acquisition of Reuters a decade later, resulting in the rise of 
the now-dominant Thomson Reuters Corporation.
58
  Throughout the 1990s, 
Thomson Reuters also acquired dozens of additional publishers (e.g., the 




In a similar fashion, a handful of competing transnational firms have 
acquired, leased, neutralized, or otherwise eliminated most third parties in 
the legal publishing market.  Significantly, the English-Dutch publishing 
conglomerate Reed-Elsevier acquired LexisNexis, the Michie Company, 
and the Shepard’s Company in the mid-to-late 1990s, thus emerging as the 
contemporary rival to Thomson Reuters.
60
  Likewise, Wolters Kluwer, a 
Dutch-based corporation, acquired such publishers as the Commerce 
Clearing House (CCH), Wiley Law Publications, and Aspen Publishers, 
Inc., and now occupies a second-tier position behind Thomson Reuters and 
Reed-Elsevier.
61
  In more recent years, Bloomberg L.P. acquired the 
Bureau of National Affairs (BNA), propelling Bloomberg L.P. to a market 




Much of the prior three decades has been defined by a veritable 
explosion of primary, secondary, and related legal information resources, 
most of which were consolidated and eventually, developed by the few 
ascendant global legal publishers.
63
  In the information commerce context, 
                                                          
 55.  See id. 
 56.  See Gallacher, supra note 14, at 51. 
 57.  See Arewa, supra note 49, at 821 (“The organization of the legal information 
industry more generally has certain oligopolistic characteristics, including industry 
concentration and interdependence among several firms in which members have at 
times adopted intensely competitive behavior.”). 
 58.  See Chaos, supra note 46, at 198; LEGAL INFORMATION, supra note 51, at 9. 
 59.  See LEGAL INFORMATION, supra note 51, at 8. 
 60.  See id. at 9. 
 61.  See id. at 8-9. 
 62.  See id. at 14. 
 63.  See Arewa, supra note 49, at 825. 
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in which legal resources are indeed prized commodities, this legal 
publishing saga, played out on a global, multibillion-dollar scale, is an 
example of deregulated, post-industrial late capitalism in its most potent 
form.
64
  As is discussed in Part II of this Article, the homogenizing 
influence of contemporary legal resources, as produced by the legal 




B. Transition to Online Legal Resources 
Since the latter portion of the twentieth century, legal research, in both 
the academic and commercial markets, has transitioned from a print-based 
enterprise to one dependent primarily on the use of the legal research 
databases of Westlaw, LexisNexis, Bloomberg Law, and the growing 
contingent of commercial and non-commercial online alternatives.
66
  The 
legal publishing industry has been the principal player in this transition 
period, earning historic high profit margins while putting forth evolving 
lines of online legal products and services.
67
 
The transition to online legal resources began some forty years ago.  By 
the late 1970s, both West Publishing and Mead Data Central (the originator 
of LexisNexis) had introduced the first incarnations of electronic legal 
research terminals, constituting the birth of Westlaw and LexisNexis, as 
such.
68
  The last three decades have been marked by the steady advance of 
the various computer-assisted legal research products as put forth by the 
competing corporations (e.g., CD-ROM-based products, the Internet-based 
Westlaw and LexisNexis “classic,” WestlawNext and Lexis Advance, 
Bloomberg Law, etc.) and a corresponding decrease in the use—if not yet 
                                                          
 64.  See Kendall F. Svengalis, Globalisation and Commercial Legal Publishing, in 
THE IALL INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF LEGAL INFORMATION MANAGEMENT 243-45 
(Richard A. Danner & Jules Winterton eds., 2012) [hereinafter Globalisation] 
(detailing the rise of the transnational legal publishing oligopoly and its problematic 
market aspects). 
 65.  See Farmer, supra note 3, at 401. 
 66.  See generally AM. BAR ASS’N, 2013 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION LEGAL 
TECHNOLOGY SURVEY REPORT (Joshua Poje ed., 2013) [hereinafter 2013 SURVEY]; 
Laura K. Justiss, A Survey of Electronic Research Alternatives to LexisNexis and 
Westlaw in Law Firms, 103 L. LIBR. J. 71, 73-74 (2011).  
 67.  See Globalisation, supra note 64, at 244.  
 68.  See Arewa, supra note 49, at 816; see also William G. Harrington, A Brief 
History of Computer-Assisted Legal Research, 77 L. LIBR. J. 543, 544 (1985) (“By the 
early 1960s, there was much talk in the legal profession about the geometric rate of 
increase in [legal information] . . . . What about those huge, mysterious, and 
temperamental machines, computers?  Could they somehow be programmed to do 
some of the work of legal research?”).  
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the production—of print legal resources.
69
  The utilization of print legal 
materials certainly persists, but the most recent surveys (and the 
overwhelming evidence apparent to any casual observer) indicate that the 
vast majority of contemporary researchers increasingly rely on online legal 
research resources.
70
  Online legal research has become the status quo in 
the industry, whereas print legal research has waned.
71
 
The premier legal research databases of WestlawNext, Lexis Advance, 
and Bloomberg Law are not mere amalgamations of digitized legal 
resources.
72
  Such high-end legal databases contain a range of integrated 
products, services, and software tools, including legal content 
(supplemented by news, market, and industry analytical materials), 
proprietary search protocols (or search algorithms) paired with online 
indexing systems, and online citator services that now provide diversified 
functionality, among other features.
73
  Therefore, the major legal 
publishers, through these premier databases, now offer integrated platforms 
that constitute more than mere digital warehouses of traditional legal 
content. 
In more recent years, alternatives to the high-end legal research 
databases also have emerged and taken root among practitioners.
74
  The 
first category of such resources consists of alternative legal research 
resources per se, such as the commercial (but low cost) legal databases of 
Loislaw and Fastcase.
75
  Also included in this category are freely available 
online legal resources such as the well-regarded Cornell Legal Information 
Institute and governmental websites like GPO FDsys.
76
  These free and low 
cost alternatives are steeply pared down versions of Westlaw and Lexis, in 
providing only unannotated primary sources, limited or no secondary 
resources, and rudimentary software services and tools (e.g., such resources 
                                                          
 69.  See LEGAL INFORMATION, supra note 51, at 3.  
 70.  See Kristen E. Murray, Say Goodbye to the Books: Information Literacy As the 
New Legal Research Paradigm, 38 U. DAYTON L. REV. 117, 125 (2012) (“The 2011 
ABA Legal Technology Survey shows that 98% of the respondents conduct legal 
research online, a number that has grown each year of the survey . . . . While print 
materials have not been abandoned altogether, it is clear that they are used less 
frequently”); Sanford N. Greenberg, Legal Research Training:  Preparing Students for 
A Rapidly Changing Research Environment, 13 LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING 
INST. 241, 242 (2007). 
 71.  See Murray, supra note 70, at 125.   
 72.  See LEGAL INFORMATION, supra note 51, at 4; Chaos, supra note 46, at 197-
99. 
 73.  See Murray, supra note 70, at 125. 
 74.  See Justiss, supra note 66, at 84-85. 
 75.  See id. at 75-76. 
 76.  See Arewa, supra note 49, at 836-38. 
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lack citator services and advanced search algorithms).
77
 
A second category consists of free, online repositories of legal 
periodicals. Notable examples are the Social Science Research Network 
(SSRN) and the Bepress Law Review Commons, which collectively make 
available tens of thousands of law review articles.
78
  As the name suggests, 
SSRN houses scholarship not just in the legal field, but also across all 
disciplines encompassed by the social sciences; the greater Digital 
Commons performs an analogous function.
79
  Such online legal scholarship 
repositories have been a boon for practitioners and scholars alike because 
online repositories often contain cutting edge scholarship not yet available 
in the standard legal databases,
80
 and because law review articles posted in 




A third category is an online catch-all: any free Internet resources not 
covered in the two categories above.  Legal researchers increasingly rely on 
the Internet at large in conducting legal research (i.e., Internet resources 
that are not legal-specific) through search engines such as Google, user-
generated resources like Wikipedia, and so on.
82
  Indeed, a recent ABA 
                                                          
 77.  Id. See Greg Lambert, Casemaker Unique Among Legal Research Providers, 
89 MICH. B.J., 54, 54-56 (2010); Nick Farris, Free and Reduced Cost Legal Research 
Options for Minnesota Lawyers, MINN. STATE BAR ASS’N  (April 22, 2015, 8:12 PM), 
http://mnbenchbar.com/?s=free+and+reduced+cost+legal+research&cat=0.  
 78.  See Arewa, supra note 49, at 811-12. Legal repositories are representative of 
the broader open access movement. See James M. Donovan & Carol A. Watson, 
Citation Advantage of Open Access Legal Scholarship, 103 L. LIBR. J. 553, 557 (2011) 
(“In its most elemental form, open access can be defined as providing free access for all 
Internet users to materials that have traditionally been published in scholarly 
journals.”); Joseph S. Miller, Forward: Why Open Access to Scholarship Matters, 10 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 733, 733-35 (2006); see also JOHN WILLINSKY, THE ACCESS 
PRINCIPLE 5 (2006) (“[A] commitment to the value and quality of research carries with 
it a responsibility to extend the circulation of this work as far as possible, and ideally to 
all who are interested in it and all who might profit by it.”).  Free online access to 
primary legal authority also is crucial in contemporary democracies—one thinks of Lon 
Fuller’s procedural requirement to “publicize, or at least to make available to the 
affected party, the rules he is expected to observe.”  LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF 
LAW 39 (rev. ed. 1969).  But see Benjamin R. Dryden, Technological Leaps and 
Bounds: Pro Se Prisoner Litigation in the Internet Age, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 819, 836 
(2008) ([W]e are merely witnessing the infancy of free legal research on the Internet. It 
is hardly an overstatement to predict that an age of regular judicial citation to Internet 
resources . . . is just around the corner.”). 
 79.  See Arewa, supra note 49, at 811-12. 
 80.  See Ian Ramsay, SSRN and Law Journals—Rivals or Allies?, 40 INT’L J. 
LEGAL INFO. 134, 141 (2012).  
 81.  See id. at 135. 
 82.  See Jootaek Lee, Gatekeepers of Legal Information: Evaluating and 
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survey indicates that thirty-seven percent of all contemporary attorneys 
now begin the legal research process with general Internet searching.
83
  
Thus, in addition to the high-end legal databases, both commercial and 
non-commercial online resources have become standardized within the 
profession. 
C. Print and Online Legal Research Compared 
Much remains controversial in the rich and varied discourse pertaining to 
the transition from print to online legal research.
84
  However, a largely 
uncontroversial divergence between print and online legal research, as 
commonly understood, hinges not on the substance of the resources—nor 
even necessarily on the nature of the legal research process itself—but 
rather, on the functionality of the research tools, or finding aids, associated 
with the two mediums.
85
  This divergent functionality,
86
 alternatively 
                                                          
Integrating Free Internet Legal Resources into the Classroom, 17 BARRY L. REV. 221, 
224 (2012). 
 83.  See 10 Technology Trends Shaping the Legal Industry, YOUR ABA (May 19, 
2014), http://www.a mericanbar.org/news/abanews/aba-news-
archives/2014/05/10_technology_trends.html (citing 2013 SURVEY, supra note 66); 
Ruth S. Stevens, Using Google for Legal Research, 93 Mich. BUS. L.J. 56, 56 (2014) 
(“[A]s more high-quality resources become available for free on the web, Google, with 
its advanced search capabilities, becomes a useful and cost-effective tool for 
conducting legal research.”).  
 84.  See generally Katrina Fischer Kuh, Electronically Manufactured Law, 22 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 223, 226 (2008); Ellie Margolis, Surfin’ Safari—Why Competent 
Lawyers Should Research on the Web, 10 YALE J.L. & TECH. 82, 85-86 (2007); Paul 
Hellyer, Assessing the Influence of Computer-Assisted Legal Research: A Study of 
California Supreme Court Opinions, 97 L. LIBR. J. 285, 285 (2005); Lee F. Peoples, 
The Death of the Digest and the Pitfalls of Electronic Research: What Is the Modern 
Legal Researcher to Do?, 97 L. LIBR. J. 661, 665 (2005); Allan Hanson, From Key 
Numbers to Keywords: How Automation Has Transformed the Law, 94 L. LIBR. J. 563, 
589–92 (2002); Carol M. Bast & Ransford C. Pyle, Legal Research in the Computer 
Age: A Paradigm Shift?, 93 L. LIBR. J. 285, 287 (2001); Robert C. Berring, Legal 
Information and the Search for Cognitive Authority, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1673, 1703-04 
(2000) [hereinafter Cognitive Authority]; ETHAN KATSH, THE ELECTRONIC MEDIA AND 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF LAW 45-46 (1998); Molly Warner Lien, Technocentrism and 
the Soul of the Common Law Lawyer, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 85, 85-86 (1998); Frederick 
Schauer & Virginia J. Wise, Legal Positivism as Legal Information, 82 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1080, 1082-83 (1997); Robert C. Berring, On Not Throwing Out the Baby: 
Planning the Future of Legal Information, 83 CAL. L. REV. 615, 635 (1995); Peter C. 
Schanck, Taking Up Barkan’s Challenge: Looking at the Judicial Process and Legal 
Research, 82 L. LIBR. J. 1, 22 (1990). 
 85.  See Kuh, supra note 84, at 241-42. 
 86.  The term “functionality” is associated with online resources almost exclusively 
and can be defined as how a program or software tool (literally) functions or works for 
the user. See, e.g., A.H. Rajani, Davidson & Associates v. Jung: (Re)interpreting 
17
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termed the “mechanical difference” in accessing the competing mediums,
87
 
is in essence the what and the how of locating legal information. 
The implications of this divergence may make all the difference.  An 
important aspect of the critical project involves determining which varieties 
of tools and functionality best succeed in allowing the researcher to 
produce novel research results, often in the form of new or synthesized 
progressive remedies.
88
  In fact, as will be discussed, leading critical 
commentators posit that traditional research methodologies for both print 
and online mediums fail to adequately spur genuine legal innovation, 
despite the supposed advantages of computer-assisted legal research in 
particular.
89
  Nevertheless, the basic mechanics of two mediums are 
covered here, in a preliminary sense, in order to provide a functional 
framework for the subsequent sections in this Article. 
1. Print Resources 
Although now in its twilight period, the vastly influential West Digest 
system is the preeminent tool for print case law research.
90
  The West 
classification system for the Digests, comprised entirely of editorially 
prepared case law headnotes, functions via a massive taxonomic scheme 
known as the West Topic and Key Number system.
91
  In this taxonomic 
scheme, West editors have divided all areas of American case law into over 
four hundred macro legal categories such as Criminal Law, Fraud, 
Property, etc.
92
  These macro categories constitute the “topics.” Then, 
within each of the topics, the West editors have further devised thousands 
of micro categories, or “key numbers,” which in turn cover sub-areas of 
law within each topic.
93
  For example, sub-areas within the Fraud topic, as 
selected by West, include False or Deceptive Advertising and Fraud on 
Government, each of which are assigned respective key numbers.
94
  West 
                                                          
Access Controls, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 365, 374 (2006).  But for convenience’s 
sake—and because the cross-usage seems etymologically sound—”functionality” here 
is used in the context of print resources as well (i.e., how a print resource mechanically 
functions for the researcher).  
 87.  See Kuh, supra note 84, at 227-28.  
 88.  Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 3, at 308-09. 
 89.  See id. 
 90.  See Hanson, supra note 84, at 569. 
 91.  See id. at 568-69. 
 92.  WESTLAW NEXT, SEARCHING WITH TOPIC AND KEY NUMBERS 5-8 
(2013) available at http://lscontent.westlaw.com/images/content/kns-quick-ref-guide-l-
361255.pdf [hereinafter Key Number System].  
 93.  See id. 
 94.  See id.  
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editors may further divide these key numbers into ever-more specific sub-
categories, assigning additional key numbers accordingly. 
In terms of the overall editorial process, the discrete points of law from 
state and federal judicial opinions, as published in the West Reporters, are 
classified in the Topic and Key Number system and organized within the 
state, regional, federal, and national West Digests.  After a judicial opinion 
is handed down, West editors extract what they deem to be the individual 
points of law from the case.
95
  These points of law become headnotes that 
oftentimes are restated in the editors’ own words.
96
  The guiding principle 
behind the system is that West assigns identical topics and key numbers to 
headnotes that express synonymous legal concepts, regardless of 
jurisdiction—this practice then allows researchers to locate all on-point 
mandatory and persuasive judicial authority for a specific issue.
97
  As West 
determines that the courts have adopted new legal concepts, so too are new 
topics and key numbers eventually generated for the system.  At present, 
there are over one hundred thousand key numbers, each of which 
represents, in West’s estimation, a unique point of American case law.
98
 
As for the functionality of these print West systems, researchers locate 
opinions by subject matter via the classification scheme.  To retrieve 
relevant cases, researchers rely on West Digest subject indexes, wherein 
West editors list key terms alphabetically and assign relevant topics and 
key numbers to those terms.
99
  Researchers then use the found topics and 
key numbers to peruse headnotes in the appropriate West Digests, and from 




The remaining print resources use more streamlined research tools. For 
statutes, regulations, and core secondary resources (e.g., legal 
encyclopedias, the American Law Reports, etc.), common starting points 
include either an editorially prepared subject index or tables of popular 
names and laws.
101
  Like with West Digest subject indexes, researchers 
move from on-point index selections to the corresponding statute or 
                                                          
 95.  See Bast & Pyle, supra note 84, at 289. 
 96.  See id.; Susan Nevelow Mart, The Relevance of Results Generated by Human 
Indexing and Computer Algorithms: A Study of West’s Headnotes and Key Numbers 
and LexisNexis’s Headnotes and Topics, 102 L.LIBR. J. 221, 223 (2010). 
 97.  See Bast & Pyle, supra note 84, at 290. 
 98.  See generally Key Number System, supra note 92, at 5-8. 
 99.  See Bast & Pyle, supra note 84, at 291-92. 
 100.  See id. at 291. 
 101.  William A. Hilyerd, Using the Law Library: A Guide for Educators Part IV: 
Secondary Sources to the Rescue, 34 J.L. & EDUC. 273, 274, 287 (2005). 
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secondary resources entry.
102
  And for latter stages of the print research 
process, practitioners may rely upon annotations, cross-references, and 
Shepard’s citator tables—all of which, like the West Topic and Key 




A much-touted byproduct of print legal research is “browsing,” or the 
ability to somewhat serendipitously locate on-point materials through their 
proximate location to the researcher’s actual, found authority.
104
  An 
example of browsing occurs when a print researcher uses a subject index to 
locate a pertinent citation in a Digest, but by scanning the page, discovers a 
more suitable entry above or below.  Browsing also comes into play when 
serendipitous discoveries are made through the use of tables of contents, 
section outlines, annotations, etc., or through locating related materials via 
a proximate arrangement of subject-specific monographs on shelves.
105
  
Logically, a researcher’s success in locating relevant authority is 
constricted by the accuracy of the predicted keywords, but print browsing 
allows the researcher to control for—and in some ways, to transcend—the 
limitations of predicted key terms.  Browsing is believed to be a more 




2. Online Resources 
Since the mid-1990s, Internet-based, commercial legal databases (e.g., 
Westlaw and Lexis) have captured the market.
107
  As discussed above, 
these high-end databases integrate legal content with niche analytical 
materials and sophisticated software services.
108
  However, the text of the 
                                                          
 102.  See id. at 279–80. 
 103.  See Paul D. Callister, The “Science” of Citation Analysis?, 91 ILL. B.J. 473, 
473-74 (2003).  
 104.  See Kuh, supra note 84, at 244; see also RONALD E. RICE ET AL., ACCESSING 
AND BROWSING INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION 174 (2001) (“Browsing is a 
specific subject for research in the library literature and can be traced back to the 
Project Intrex in the mid-1960s, when experiments on browsing were suggested . . . to 
[explore how the technique may] foster unplanned discovery”).  
 105.  See Kuh, supra note 84, at 244. 
 106.  Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 3, at 320-21. 
 107.  Cognitive Authority, supra note 84, at 1701-03; see also Lynn Foster & Bruce 
Kennedy, Technological Developments in Legal Research, 2 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 
275, 281-82 (2000) (“During the 1990s, the invention and development of the World 
Wide Web . . . became another electronic medium for legal publishing. LOIS, LEXIS, 
and Westlaw moved to the Web, accompanied by most print legal publishers.”). 
 108.  See LEGAL INFORMATION, supra note 51, at 4.  The average commercial 
subscription to premier legal databases (e.g., for small- to medium-sized firms) likely 
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core legal content on these databases has remained fundamentally 
unchanged.
109
  That is, despite the obvious differences in the medium of 
print and online legal products, the actual texts of core online resources are 
digital duplicates of the texts from print analogs.
110
 
To qualify this assertion, a preliminary caveat can be added.  To the 
extent to which the transition to online resources has altered the 
presumably shared epistemological state of legal researchers (i.e., how 
researchers intellectually process and thus “know” legal texts
111
), this shift 
has been of little benefit, in terms of practical research outcomes, to critical 
law reform efforts.
112
  Indeed, as is discussed in Part II, the transition to the 
online medium in fact has likely degraded such a shared research state,
113
 
                                                          
excludes the newer varieties of niche analytical content like market and industry 
reports.  Off-the-record comments by legal publishing representatives support this 
assertion—but confirmatory statistics are pointedly not made available; a concrete 
definition of an “average” commercial subscription to Westlaw or Lexis then is 
somewhat elusive. Telephone interview with Westlaw Reference Attorney, Thomson 
Reuters (Oct. 6, 2014); telephone interview with Lexis Advance Reference Attorney, 
Reed-Elsevier (Oct. 6, 2014); Ian Gallacher, Forty-Two: The Hitchhiker’s Guide to 
Teaching Legal Research to the Google Generation, 39 AKRON L. REV. 151, 196 
(2006) (“Costs for these services are difficult to determine because of the variety of 
pricing packages offered by legal information publishers.”); see also Justiss, supra note 
66, at 83 (demonstrating that the 2008 financial crisis has incentivized firms to cut back 
on research resources and to otherwise pursue alternative resources). 
 109.  Core legal content denotes the primary authority and the classic canon of 
secondary resources (e.g., legal encyclopedias, treatises, law review articles, etc.) as 
variously made available in average commercial subscriptions to the premier legal 
databases.  
 110.  See Kuh, supra note 84, at 228 (“[T]he content of the law is largely 
unchanged, regardless of whether a researcher finds a hard copy of a case in a reporter 
volume after using a print digest or reviews it in electronic form on a computer screen 
after locating it using an electronic database search.”).  But in terms of core legal 
content on legal databases (and in limited print resources, like the Federal Appendix) 
one content addition is the availability of “unpublished as well as published cases.  
These unpublished cases were completely inaccessible in the past, when they were 
undisseminated and unindexed.”  Foster & Kennedy, supra note 107, at 282–83 
(emphasis added).  
 111.  See id. at 229 (“Medium theory posits that the medium by which information 
is communicated . . . is not neutral. Instead, it significantly shapes how the conveyed 
information is understood.”).  In broadly applying medium theory to legal resources, 
Kuh makes the following conclusion:  “This Article has sought to demonstrate that the 
shift to electronic research is likely shaping the law in little-noticed, but nonetheless 
significant, ways . . . . Although we presently lack data to identify the precise contours 
of these impacts, this Article advocates that the academy and the profession recognize” 
such developments and further investigate them. Id.  
 112.  Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 3, at 325-28. 
 113.  See infra Part II(C) & (D). It is overly reductive to assume—as I do here—that 
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in that online researchers appear to be less capable and creative than their 
predecessors, to the obvious detriment of the law reform movement. 
In returning to the textual duplication of print and online resource 
analogs, a few examples may better illustrate this phenomenon.  A 
retrieved Westlaw decision from the Southeastern Reporter is textually 
indistinguishable from the decision published in the corresponding print 
volume.  The same holds true for statutes, administrative regulations, 
municipal ordinances, or any other conceivable primary resource.  The 
evolving canon of secondary resources, such as Restatements of the Law, 
practice books, treatises, legal encyclopedias, law review articles, and 
looseleafs have remained fundamentally unchanged in terms of core textual 
content following the transition to the online medium.
114
  Finally, the text 
of West headnotes and the West Topic and Key Number system is also 




This seemingly self-evident observation is important, in a foundational 
sense, from the critical perspective, wherein the perceived benefits of 
online legal research are systematically unveiled as either largely inflated 
or completely erroneous.
116
  In sum, the core world of textual legal content 
available to the researcher on WestlawNext and Lexis Advance is not 
materially different from the legal content relied upon by practitioners in 
the past.
117
  With this foundation in place, the focus now can shift towards 
the more practical mechanics of online legal research. 
Although rarely recognized as such, high-end legal databases in fact rely 
on most of the paradigmatic, commercial research tools associated with the 
print legal medium, albeit in enhanced, online formats, including the West 
Topic and Key Number system, annotations, editorially selected cross-
references, and citator services.
118
 
As an online legal-conceptual organizational system, the West Topic and 
Key Number system continues to perform its age-old function on 
WestlawNext in classifying all points of case law.
119
  Online citator 
services (e.g., West’s KeyCite, Shepard’s on Lexis, etc.) also are integrated 
                                                          
a truly universalized print or online research “state” exists for all attorneys. This 
simplified characterization is used for expediency’s sake, but a future, more subtle 
unpacking is required in the literature. 
 114.  See Kuh, supra note 84, at 228.  
 115.  See Mart, supra note 96, at 229; Wheeler, supra note 22, at 368. 
 116.  See infra Part II(C).  
 117.  See Kuh, supra note 84, at 228. 
 118.  See Mart, supra note 96, at 229; Wheeler, supra note 22, at 368; Wolf & 
Wishart, supra note 23, at 24-25.  
 119.  See Mart, supra note 96, at 225-27. 
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on the commercial databases.
120
  Online citators still function to update the 
law, but while the print Shepard’s service operated exclusively to confirm 
the validity of judicial opinions, online citator systems now offer a far more 
diversified functionality in allowing researchers to locate a full array of 
citing primary and secondary authorities as selected by the publishers.
121
 
The definitive functionality driving online research is keyword 
searching.
122
  Although contemporary database researchers may make use 
of digitized subject indexes (i.e., for limited resources such as annotated 
codes), and although, as discussed below, online “browsing” is at least 
somewhat comparable to the print browsing experience,
123
 keywords are 
indeed the defining search functionality in the online medium.  For a 
keyword search, the practitioner formulates words or phrases similar to the 
initial predicted key terms that are generated and thereafter applied to a 
subject index for print research.
124
  The researcher then types those terms 
into an online legal database, and the system’s search algorithm, in most 
instances, returns results based on a relevancy calculation.  Factors 
considered in relevancy calculations traditionally include frequency and 
proximity of keywords in the searched documents, citation counts, and 
pertinent document metadata such as title, author, etc.
125
 
                                                          
 120.  See Wolf & Wishart, supra note 23, at 24-25. 
 121.  See id. at 25 (“Citation services perform a number of important tasks for a 
specified case, such as checking its subsequent history and finding later citing cases 
and secondary sources.”); Wheeler, supra note 22, at 372 (“KeyCite is designed to give 
you both analysis and links to all of the documents that cite to your original 
authority . . . . A recent study that compared results [from] KeyCite and Shepard’s 
revealed not only that the two systems yield different results, but also that both systems 
yield incomplete results.”).  
 122.  See Hanson, supra note 84, at 564. 
 123.  See Thomas Keefe, Books in Space—Online Versions of Print Publications If 
the “New” Realm of Electronic Legal Research Is Foreign Territory, Take Heart. Your 
Familiar Print Resources Are Probably Online, Where They’re More Powerful Than 
Ever, 93 ILL. B.J. 42, 43 (2005).  
 124.  Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 3, at 310. 
 125.  See Bast & Pyle, supra note 84, at 294-95; see, e.g., James F. Bauerle, 
Fighting Fire with Fire: Technology As Antidote to Excessive Subprime Lending, 124 
BANKING L.J. 714, 722 (2007) (“[T]he credit reporting industry offers no publicly 
available resource that explains the credit scoring algorithms used to determine 
consumer scores. Nor is there any legal requirement that credit reporting agencies 
disclose their rating methodology or validate its accuracy before a neutral body.”); see 
also Eric Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy in Internet Trademark Law, 54 EMORY 
L.J. 507, 535 (2005) (“Regardless of which relevancy algorithms search engines use, 
their importance to [online searching] cannot be overstated. As a practical matter, 
relevancy algorithms determine the results that searchers see and investigate. Searchers 
do not generally look at search results beyond the first page or two . . . .”). Proprietary 
algorithms are demonstrably problematic in other contexts as well. 
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While the basic relevancy factors remain largely unchanged on Lexis 
Advance and Bloomberg Law, the WestSearch algorithm on WestlawNext 
deploys new factors.  Significantly, the West Topic and Key Number 
system provides automated input on all WestlawNext relevancy 
calculations—and thus on all WestlawNext keyword searches.
126
 Similarly, 
the WestSearch algorithm receives input from the KeyCite citator service 
and select West secondary resources.
127
  Because the Topic and Key 
Number system in particular performed a more peripheral role in earlier 
incarnations of Westlaw databases,
128
 this is indeed an historic 
enhancement. 
In detailing the key role that the West Topic and Key Number system 
and KeyCite now perform in WestSearch, Ronald Wheeler reports: 
“WestSearch really is revolutionary . . . I have not yet discovered an 
instance where relevant and important cases that share a particular topic 
and key number fail to display within a search result designed to retrieve 
the issue covered by said topic and key number.”
129
  If so desired, a 
researcher retains the ability to search within an interactive version of the 
Topic and Key Number system, or to use topics and key numbers in 
“found” cases to find cases similarly categorized.
130
  However, as Wheeler 
demonstrates, every search on WestlawNext now depends on the automated 
input of the West Topic and Key Number system, regardless of the 
choice—or even the knowledge—of the researcher.
131
 
Yet another groundbreaking addition in WestSearch relevancy 
calculations is the integration of crowdsourcing.  In the legal database 
context, crowdsourcing essentially harnesses the collective expertise of 
West-selected users.
132
  Through crowdsourcing attributes, WestSearch 
analyzes the pertinent research patterns of commercial (i.e., non-academic) 
users deemed expert, and factors those patterns into relevancy 
calculations.
133
  For example, if WestSearch determines that commercial 
users view, save, folder, or print certain legal documents based on selected 
keywords, the expert user-targeted documents thereafter are ranked higher 
in the relevancy results when future researchers use synonymous 
                                                          
 126.  See Wheeler, supra note 22, at 368.  
 127.  Id. at 360-61.  
 128.  See Kuh, supra note 84, at 246-47.   
 129.  Wheeler, supra note 22, at 368.  
 130.  Robert A. Mead, A Eulogy for New Mexico Reports: The Evolution of 
Appellate Publication from 1846 to 2012, 42 N.M. L. REV. 417, 457 (2012). 
 131.  See Wheeler, supra note 22, at 369.  
 132.  See id. at 365. 
 133.  See id. 
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keywords.
134
  Similar to the inclusion of the West Topic and Key Number 
system, the end result of the crowdsourcing enhancement is that every 
search performed on WestlawNext now depends on the automated input of 
West-selected users. 
Keyword searching may be further divided into two categories: (1) 
Boolean operator searching, and (2) natural language searching.
135
  As for 
Boolean operators (known alternatively as terms and connectors), the 
researcher generates a syntactical calculus that dictates to the system, at 
least to a degree, what results are to be returned.
136
  For example, the 
Boolean search “mountaintop removal” w/s “valley fill” asks the system to 
retrieve documents that contain the exact phrase “mountaintop removal” 
within the same sentence as “valley fill.”
137
  Natural language searching 
eschews a syntactical calculus, instead relying on plain, Google-like search 
phrases that are processed according to the search algorithm’s dictates.
138
  
The following constitutes a natural language search: valley fill from 
mountain top removal operations. 
Agency on the part of the researcher traditionally has been maximized 
through the command-like control of syntactical calculi.
139
  However, 
commentators are uncertain whether the newest generation of legal search 
algorithms, like WestSearch, fully obeys the commands of Boolean 
operators because “a WestlawNext Boolean search is still subject to 
WestSearch and its incorporation of key numbers.”
140
  Therefore, the once-
clear distinction between Boolean operators and natural language has 
blurred due to the WestSearch algorithm enhancements. 
D. Traditional Legal Research Process 
The paradigmatic print legal research process can be said to proceed in 
                                                          
 134.  See id.  
 135.  See Keefe, supra note 123, at 42.  
 136.  See Symposium, The Sedona Conference Best Practices Commentary on the 
Use of Search and Information Retrieval Methods in E-Discovery August 2007 Public 
Comment Version, 8 SEDONA CONF. J. 189, 222 (2007).  
 137.  See Keefe, supra note 123, at 42; Jason R. Baron, Toward A Federal 
Benchmarking Standard for Evaluating Information Retrieval Products Used in E-
Discovery, 6 SEDONA CONF. J. 237, 240 (2005). 
 138.  Ian Gallacher, Cite Unseen: How Neutral Citation and America’s Law Schools 
Can Cure Our Strange Devotion to Bibliographical Orthodoxy and the Constriction of 
Open and Equal Access to the Law, 70 ALB. L. REV. 491, 511 (2007) (“Both 
LexisNexis and Westlaw have also introduced ‘natural language’ search engines that 
do not require the researcher to determine the relational context of the key terms.”). 
 139.  See Keefe, supra note 123, at 42.   
 140.  Wheeler, supra note 22, at 370. 
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four steps. The first step in a fact-based legal research query is to examine 
the presented facts and to predict which legal categories likely control those 
facts, known historically as the search for the ratio decidendi, or the law 
determining the case.
141
  In the second step, a researcher formulates key 
terms based on the pertinent facts paired with the predicted, controlling 
legal categories.
142
  For the classic research process, an attorney unfamiliar 
with the predicted topical area then might apply the formulated key terms 
to (1) the West Topic and Key Number system, or (2) the commercial 
canon of secondary resources, so as to acquire background information on 
the topic.
143
  Alternatively, a researcher comfortable with the area may 
begin the process with known primary authorities such as specific statutory 
sections within an annotated code.
144
  Third, from these starting points, 
researchers may then modify the scope of the query through alternate 
keywords, annotations, cross-references, etc.
145
 Fourth, the researcher 
updates found authority via the Shepard’s citator service.
146
  Locating 
primary mandatory authority and primary persuasive authority, as required 
is commonly understood to be the terminal objective of the classic legal 
research process. 
The transition to the online medium has precipitated a variation on the 
traditional research process.  In theory, an online researcher may begin the 
research process by keyword searching within secondary resources, as 
available in each database.  Through WestlawNext, a researcher even may 
perform a search within the online West Topic and Key Number system. 
However, studies indicate that online researchers tend to eschew these 
techniques, instead initiating the research process by performing keyword 
searches within targeted primary sources (e.g., a case law sub-database),
147
 
or else by keyword searching across the entirety of a database’s resources 
simultaneously.
148
  Thereafter, online researchers negotiate the results 
                                                          
 141.  See Barkan, supra note 3, at 622. 
 142.  See id. at 623-24.  
 143.  See id. at 624.  
 144.  See id.  
 145.  Richard A. Danner, Legal Information and the Development of American Law: 
Writings on the Form and Structure of the Published Law, 99 L. LIBR. J. 193, 213 
(2007).  
 146.  See Kuh, supra note 84, at 242. 
 147.  See Stefan H. Krieger & Katrina Fischer Kuh, Accessing Law: An Empirical 
Study Exploring the Influence of Legal Research Medium, 16 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 
757, 789 (2014). 
 148.  Robert J. Ambrogi, Westlaw’s Great Leap Forward More Than A Makeover, 
70 OR. ST. B. BULL. 15, 15 (2010) (explaining that the WestlawNext main page 
resembles Google in encouraging the user to conduct a search without first selecting a 
sub-database). 
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pages (directing attention to case law, especially),
149
 before updating found 
primary authority via online citator services. 
E. Legal Research Process Viewed as Normatively Neutral 
Regardless of such variations, the legal research process has historically 
been viewed and taught as a normatively neutral enterprise.
150
  Legal 
research commonly is understood to be something of a positivistic science, 
devoid of any political or ideological influences.
151
  Tellingly, in such 
seminal legal research textbooks as How to Find the Law and 
Fundamentals of Legal Research (and in the newer generation of such 
textbooks) authors “present legal research as a search for ‘authority’ or the 
‘the law’ that determines the result of a particular legal problem.”
152
  Legal 
research textbooks then “reflect a tendency to talk about law as preexisting 
and given . . . something that can be found.”
153
 
The dominant, historical view is that legal research is mechanical.  Each 
legal query is perceived as an input that can be entered into commercial 
legal resources via predicted keywords. Thereafter, the legal research 
resources return an output—the accompanying “one right answer” to the 
query—in the form of binding precedent, the “correct” ratio decidendi.
154
  
When Arthur Langdell spoke of the library as a laboratory of law, this then 
was his meaning: that legal research is an objective science wherein 
correct, binding law is discovered. 
                                                          
 149.  Krieger & Kuh, supra note 147, at 789.  
 150.  See Barkan, supra note 3, at 619-21.  
 151.  See id. 
 152.  Id. (quoting J. MYRON JACOBSTEIN & R. MERSKY, FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL 
RESEARCH  9 (1987)); AMY E. SLOAN, BASIC LEGAL RESEARCH: TOOLS AND 
STRATEGIES 303-05 (5th ed., 2009); Peggy Copper Davis, Casebooks, Learning 
Theory, and the Need to Manage Uncertainty, in LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE DIGITAL 
AGE 230, 239 (Edward Rubin ed., 2012) (“Few among us speak clearly or coherently to 
our students about indeterminacy, and many of us postpone the discussion until 
students have been entrapped by illusions of certainty.”).  But see Sarah Valentine, 
Leveraging Legal Research, in VULNERABLE POPULATIONS AND TRANSFORMATIVE 
LAW TEACHING: A CRITICAL READER 145, 158 (Soc’y of Am. Law Teachers & Golden 
Gate Univ. Sen. of Law eds., 2011) (“Restructuring legal research around a public 
interest framework allows schools to leverage an overlooked course into one that 
actively nourishes students’ social justice aspirations during the first year of law 
school.”).  
 153.  See Barkan, supra note 3, at 620.  
 154.  David Wolitz, Indeterminacy, Value Pluralism, and Tragic Cases, 62 BUFF. L. 
REV. 529, 578 (2014) (“Those who deny legal indeterminacy, such as Dworkin, usually 
argue that because the law rationally determines one right answer, the judge’s duty is to 
reason to that uniquely correct answer.”). 
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III. CRITICAL LEGAL RESEARCH 
A. Critical Legal Research Theory 
The very notion of a critical approach to the legal research process is 
grounded in the decades-old school —or collective movement —known as 
critical legal theory.
155
  As opposed to a discrete framework, contemporary 
critical legal theory perhaps is best defined as a diverse and inclusive canon 
of “literature or ideas,”
156
 including such schools as feminist legal theory, 
critical race theory, critical race feminism, LatCrit, queer legal theory, 
disability theory, law and socioeconomics, and critical examinations of 
environmental law
157
—the theoretical underpinnings of which were 
influenced by such foundational movements as legal realism, neo-Marxism, 
post-structuralism, and deconstruction.
158
  As a unifying force, modern 
critical legal theory arguably offers a “radical, left-oriented critique of 
contemporary law and jurisprudence,”
159
 based on the normative premise 
that “social class stratification and hierarchical power distributions, as they 
exist in our society, are inherently unjust.”
160
  Critical legal theory tends to 
have a liberatory agenda; thus, the overarching aim is to pursue “‘human 
                                                          
 155.  Id. at 578.  
 156.  RICHARD W. BAUMAN, IDEOLOGY AND COMMUNITY IN THE FIRST WAVE OF 
CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 175l (2002).  
 157.  See Victoria Ortiz & Jennifer Elrod, Construction Project: Color Me Queer, in 
CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY 258-67 (2011) 
[hereinafter Construction]; Robert Rubinson, Mapping the World: Facts and Meaning 
in Adjudication and Mediation, 63 ME. L. REV. 61, 71 (2010); see also Nick J. Sciullo, 
“This Woman’s Work” in A “Man’s World”: A Feminist Analysis of the Farm Security 
and Rural Investment Act of 2002, 28 WHITTIER L. REV. 709, 723 (2006) (“Postcolonial 
theory and feminist theory share several important intersections. Both often reject 
nationalist structures. Both often reject masculinized structures. Often, both also seek to 
resist various forms of oppression and restore some sense of freedom to individuals. 
These connections provide ample room for the theories to develop together . . . .”); 
Karen Morrow, Not So Much A Meeting of Minds As A Coincidence of Means: 
Ecofeminism, Gender Mainstreaming, and the United Nations, 28 T. JEFFERSON L. 
REV. 185, 188-94 (2005) (discussing ecofeminism in the context of international 
human rights).  
 158.  See, e.g., Michael M’Gonigle & Louise Takeda, The Liberal Limits of 
Environmental Law: A Green Legal Critique, 30 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 1005, 1027 
(2013); Nick J. Sciullo, A Whale of A Tale: Post-Colonialism, Critical Theory, and 
Deconstruction: Revisiting the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling 
Through A Socio-legal Perspective, 12 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 29, 42 (2008); Elizabeth M. 
Iglesias, LatCrit Theory: Some Preliminary Notes Towards A Transatlantic Dialogue, 
9 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 7 (2001); Edward L. Rubin, On Beyond Truth: A 
Theory for Evaluating Legal Scholarship, 80 CAL. L. REV. 889, 947 (1992). 
 159.  Barkan, supra note 3, at 618.   
 160.  Rubinson, supra note 157, at 947. 
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emancipation’ in circumstances of domination and oppression,”
161
 and to 
generally promote democratic and egalitarian principles.
162
 
1. Doctrinal Incoherency and Indeterminacy 
The first wave of critical legal theorists introduced a range of interrelated 
notions that sparked the genesis of critical work on the institution of legal 
research specifically.
163
  The following are principles associated with the 
pioneering literature of the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement per se 
(active in the 1970s and 1980s). 
First, legal doctrine is “incoherent and indeterminate,” as opposed to 
being formalistic, or a science, because any given body of precedent—, no 
matter how comprehensive—, is incapable of covering all conceivable fact 
situations.
164
  More specifically, an application of the tenets of 
deconstruction to legal texts yields the conclusion that all doctrine is open 
to innumerable interpretations, and that thus no discrete body of precedent 
can constrain judicial decisions.
165
 
Second, legal reasoning largely is a myth.  There exists no neutral mode 
of rationality through which “correct” law is discovered and applied 
through stare decisis.
166
  Instead, the enterprise is driven predominantly by 




Third, and finally, all categorizations of law are inherently subjective.  
Moreover, like the myth of legal reasoning, such categorizations serve the 
dominant, homogenous interests of society at the expense of subordinated 
groups.  Taken as a whole then, these three principles demonstrate “the 
                                                          
 161.  Caroline Bettinger-Lopez et. al., Redefining Human Rights Lawyering Through 
the Lens of Critical Theory:  Lessons for Pedagogy and Practice, 18 GEO. J. ON 
POVERTY L. & POL’Y 337, 348 (2011) (quoting James Bohman, Critical Theory, in 
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2005), available at 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/critical-theory/).   
 162.  See Barkan, supra note 3, at 618. 
 163.  See id.  But see Construction, supra note 157, at 262 (“What is often missing 
from CLS works is the acknowledgment that our experiences of the same 
circumstances may be very, very different . . . .  CLS as a critique of the legal system—
without addressing the needs of the multiply diverse disempowered, without providing 
concrete, practical solutions—was, like Marxism, not sufficient.”). 
 164.  Id. at 626. 
 165.  See id. at 627-28. 
 166.  See id. at 629. 
 167.  See id. at 629-31; Jason E. Whitehead, The Labor Exemption from Antitrust As 
an Ideological Antinomy, 32 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 881, 915 (1996) (“[T]he flaw with 
legal reasoning is that of a very specific historical, economic, and social system: 
capitalism and the liberal individualist ideology that supports it.”). 
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need for radical change” in the mold of progressive thought.
168
 
In more recent years, such early insights proffered by the CLS 
movement have been qualified somewhat and refined.  Mark Tushnet 
explores such shifts in Critical Legal Theory (without Modifiers) in the 
United States: “claims that all results were underdetermined were replaced 
by [claims] that many results were underdetermined, or that results in many 
interesting cases were, or . . . that enough results were underdetermined to 
matter.”
169
  Thus, although subsequently refined, the theoretical progeny of 
the core CLS tenets remain vital in the contemporary critical discourse.  As 
Tushnet writes, “[o]ne or another of these revised versions of the 
indeterminacy argument is, I think, accepted by nearly every serious legal 
scholar in the United States.”
170
  Contemporary critical scholars also 
continue to maintain that “[t]hrough indeterminacy, the legal system allows 




As Charles Barkan argues persuasively in the seminal essay 
Deconstructing Legal Research, the foundational insights proffered by the 
CLS movement in addition to subsequent discourse refinements are 
innately applicable to—and in fact, are inseparable from—the longstanding 
institution of the American legal research process.
172
 As Barkan elucidates: 
 
A CLS analysis of legal research might start with the impression that 
there is something fundamentally wrong with the way modern legal 
thinking responds to social problems, and that the traditional methods 
and materials of legal research contribute to that unsatisfactory state of 
affairs. In CLS critiques of legal doctrine, legal reasoning, and legal 




The unreconstructed legal research process demands that the attorney 
discover the discrete precedent controlling a given fact pattern.  For an 
issue of first impression, the researcher must discover the ratio decidendi, 




                                                          
 168.  Rubinson, supra note 157, at 948. 
 169.  Mark Tushnet, Survey Article Critical Legal Theory (without Modifiers) in the 
United States, 13 J. POL. PHIL. 99, 105, 108 (2005). 
 170.  Id. 
 171.  John Hagan et. al., Collaboration and Resistance in the Punishment of Torture 
in Iraq: A Judicial Sentencing Experiment, 28 WIS. INT’L L.J. 1, 10 (2010).  
 172.  See Barkan, supra note 3, at 618. 
 173.  Id. at 625.  
 174.  See id. at 622; Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, Paratexts, 44 STAN. L. 
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However, critical principles reveal the sometimes impossibility, and 
indeed very often the preposterousness, of this conception. For the legal 
researcher, there might be no objective ratio decidendi to discover—as 
indeterminacy dictates that novel fact patterns potentially could be 
“controlled” by a veritable sea of competing (and oftentimes conflicting) 
precedent.
175
  In making such selections, “a wide variety of interpretations, 
distinctions, and justifications are available,” in that judges and researchers 
are potentially free to choose among a plethora of competing arguments, 
authorities, and so on.
176
  Ultimately then, law indeed is politics by another 
name, and the notion of neutral, objective doctrine, devoid of the subjective 
ideological preferences of judges, is mere fantasy, albeit one in service to 
society’s dominant interests.
177




2. Legal Categories 
Like the critical analyses pertaining to indeterminacy and the myth of 
legal reasoning, the problematic nature of legal categorizations is deeply 
enmeshed in the institution of legal research.
179
  This insight in fact persists 
as the most penetrating critique of both print and online research 
mediums.
180
  For this reason, an extended treatment of legal categorizations 
is provided here. 
Due to the indeterminacy of legal doctrine, categorizations of law are 
necessarily subjective social constructs—as opposed to objective 
renderings of doctrinal truth.  One might wonder, how could a 
categorization scheme accurately represent legal doctrine, when the critical 
analysis demonstrates that doctrine is, at least partially, indeterminate?
181
  
                                                          
REV. 509, 533 (1992) (“[T]he very notions of ‘binding precedent’ and ‘supremacy of 
law’ are premised on the extraction of a ‘rule’ from a past account of legal reality (i.e., 
a past account of legally recognized facts and reasons) in order to control a future 
account [sic] of legal reality.”); Barkan, supra note 3, at 628 (stating that the theory of 
deconstruction conflicts with the notion that legal research is a search for a preexisting, 
findable law as expressed in the writings of courts, legislatures, or agencies. If the 
meanings of legal texts are created as much by researchers as by the institutions that 
produce them, judicial opinions, statutes, legislative history materials, regulations, and 
other resources [may be] indeterminate).   
 175.  See Barkan, supra note 3, at 629; Triple Helix Dilemma, supra note 3, at 216. 
 176.  Barkan, supra note 3, at 626.  
 177.  See id. at 630-32.  
 178.  Id. at 630.  
 179.  See id. at 631. 
 180.  See id; Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 3, at 318; Wheeler, supra note 22, at 
368.  
 181.  Barkan, supra note 3, at 626. 
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As succinctly stated by Duncan Kennedy, “all such schemes are lies,” and 
in fact the “very existence of historically legitimated doctrinal categories 
gives the law student, the teacher, and the practitioner a false sense of the 
orderliness of legal thought,” effectively masking law’s indeterminacy.
182
 
What is more, legal categorization schemes, through their political, 
historical, and economic underpinnings, reflect the normativity of the 
societal status quo.  Legal categories “are created and perpetuated by 
society’s dominant interests,”
183
 in that white, patriarchal, heteronormative, 
ableist, ageist, anthropocentric, atomistic-capitalist, etc. values are 
reflected—and advanced—through such schemes.
184
  Therefore, “[legal] 
classification systems can also be biased or insensitive because they may 
reflect Eurocentric or other dominant ideologies and values and ignore 
other cultures, races, genders, etc.,” and “[t]he end result is that 
standardized categories may ultimately affect a client’s justice.”
185
 
Jill Anne Farmer writes more on this point from a leftist, socioeconomic 
perspective in A Poststructuralist Analysis of the Legal Research 
Process.
186
  So states Farmer: “Because meaning is socially constructed, 
the groups that control the economic and cultural apparatus of a given 
society largely determine which meanings are considered most important.  
Moreover, the cultural process is shaped increasingly by fewer 
transnational corporations,” wherein “profit and ideological conformity” 
are the controlling interests.
187
  To be sure, the legal publishing industry 
exemplifies this phenomenon, as there exists a “unique concentration of 
publishing in the hands of only a few companies.”
188
 
Any doctrinal categorization system then is informed by and arguably is 
a principal player in, our contemporary late capitalist mode.
189
  Rather than 
constituting objective doctrinal truth, legal categories instead embody the 
                                                          
 182.  Id. at 631 (quoting Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone’s 
Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 209, 215 (1979)). 
 183.  Id. at 632. 
 184.  See Richard Haigh, What Shall I Wear to the Computer Revolution? Some 
Thoughts on Electronic Researching in Law, 89 L. LIBR. J. 245, 261 (1997).  
 185.  Id. 
 186.  See Farmer, supra note 3, at 394-95. 
 187.  Id.  
 188.  Id. at 397. 
 189.  See Stephen A. Smith, Taking Law Seriously, 50 U. TORONTO L.J. 241, 251-52 
(2000) (“[A] functionalist explanation of law’s organizational claims is the argument 
that the traditional legal categories are an inevitable product of the relations of 
production in a capitalist society; more specifically, that the traditional categories exist 
to fulfill the necessary function of obscuring the exploitative nature of capitalism 
behind an elegant neutral façade.”).  
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subjective values characteristic of the dominant groups, interests, and 
systems of modern Westernism.
190
 
The West Topic and Key Number system, as the seminal legal 
categorization scheme, is the supreme exemplar of such normative 
biases.
191
  Commentators have agreed universally that West categories 
evolve slowly: “The topic ‘Labor’ received a heading in the 1950s, and 
until [the 1980s] West classified ‘Workers’ Compensation’ under ‘Master 
and Servant’ law.”
192
  Delgado and Stefancic also have identified numerous 
instances of problematic race- and sex-based categorizations in the West 
system.
193
  Finally, one need only skim the West Topic and Key Number 
outline, as it currently exists, to discern its conservative ideological bias—
e.g., that West has classified numerous same-sex marriage points of law 
under the topic “Husband and Wife” is no small irony.
194
  Therefore, 
through such doctrinal categorizations, the West Topic and Key Number 
system indeed perpetuates “dominant ideologies and values” while 
subordinating “other cultures, races, genders, etc.”
195
 
But what of the practical mechanics of West’s influence vis-à-vis 
doctrinal categories—and thus on research outcomes?  A researcher 
navigating the print West Digest system relies entirely on the Topic and 
Key Number scheme.
196
  Predicted keywords are matched to West’s subject 
index terms, and then “the digests, along with their topic and key numbers, 




The argument, however, is not that West doctrinal categories expressly 
“control, or cause change in, the law.”
198
  Through more insidious means, 
West legal categories “reinforce and reify dominant ideologies, can narrow 
perspectives, and can make contingent results seem inevitable.”
199
  For 
                                                          
 190.  Haigh, supra note 184, at 261.  
 191.  See id.; Triple Helix Dilemma, supra note 3, at 215-20.  
 192.  Triple Helix Dilemma, supra note 3, at 215-16. 
 193.  See, e.g., id. at 217-20. 
 194.  See, e.g., Charron v. Amaral, 889 N.E.2d 946 (Mass. 2008). 
 195.  Haigh, supra note 184, at 261. 
 196.  See infra Part I(C)(1). 
 197.  Kuh, supra note 84, at 244. 
 198.  Spencer L. Simons, Navigating Through the Fog: Teaching Legal Research 
and Writing Students to Master Indeterminacy Through Structure and Process, 56 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 356, 359 (2006). 
 199.  Id.; see also Smith, supra note 189, at 251 (“But rather than supposing that 
legal actors consciously misrepresent their motives, a functionalist explanation 
supposes that legal actors are motivated and controlled by external forces. These 
external forces are unacknowledged; indeed, the legal actors typically are unaware of 
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instance, when attempting to classify novel fact situations, the range of 
legal-doctrinal possibilities available to the researcher necessarily is 
constricted by the established boundaries of West’s doctrinal categories—
when the fact situation instead may call for innovation.  As stated elegantly 
by Delgado and Stefancic: “[C]ategories contained in current indexing 
systems are like eyeglasses we have worn a long time.  They enable us to 
see better, but lull us into thinking our vision is perfect and that there may 
not be a still better pair.”
200
 
West’s influence vis-à-vis the Topic and Key Number system 
unsurprisingly has been characterized as a “virtual conceptual tyranny over 
access.”
201
  Delgado and Stefancic liken the system to that of DNA, as 
West’s categories “enable the current system to replicate itself endlessly, 
easily, and painlessly.  Their categories mirror precedent and existing law; 
they both facilitate traditional legal thought and constrain novel approaches 
to the law.”
202
  In conducting research directly through this subjective set of 
West-created principles and concepts then, the West Topic and Key 
Number system serves to perpetuate existing legal thought. 
 B. Foundations of the Critical Research Process 
To achieve genuine legal innovation, the sine qua non of the critical 
researcher is to “break free” of traditional doctrinal categories embodied in 
the West Topic and Key Number system and elsewhere.
203
  In Why Do We 
Tell the Same Stories: Critical Librarianship, Law Reform, and Triple 
Helix Dilemma, Delgado and Stefancic put forth the seminal articulation of 
how, in a macro sense, such progressive innovation is achieved. 
 
Categories in the principal legal indexing systems are explicit. . . .  If we 
examine them, we will see an outline of the structure of traditional legal 
thought.  That structure will reveal what previous courts and writers have 
recognized and what indexers have faithfully recorded.  By inspecting 
this record, we may gain a glimpse of the very conceptual framework we 
have been wielding in scrutinizing and interpreting our societal order.  
We may then inquire whether that framework is the only, or the best 
means of doing so.  We may turn that system on its side and ask what is 
                                                          
them.”). West editors, as legal actors in a very real sense, are likely similarly unaware 
of the channeling effect of West’s doctrinal categories; but this lack of intent makes the 
channeling effect on research outcomes no less a reality.   
 200.  Triple Helix Dilemma, supra note 3, at 209.  
 201.  Farmer, supra note 3, at 399. 
 202.  Triple Helix Dilemma, supra note 3, at 209.  
 203.  Id. at 217.  
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With more force, Delgado and Stefancic later describe these sweeping 
methodologies as “reinventing, modifying, flipping, and radically 
transforming legal doctrines and theories imaginatively.”
205
 
This is a tall order, for “[g]oing beyond standard legal categories” is a 
daunting proposition, “even when we are going for moderate, incremental 
reform.”
206
  A reformist-minded attorney then must take nothing as given—
law’s potential indeterminacy, after all, demands such an approach: she 
must interrogate traditional legal categories, as embodied in the West 
system and elsewhere, and determine how they might best be synthesized, 




Delgado and Stefancic offer a concrete example of such a transformative 
research approach in their early work.  At that time, West provided a Topic 
and Key Number category for race-based employment discrimination and a 
separate category for sex-based discrimination—but not a third category 
based on a synthesized race- and sex-based claim.
208
  As a result, when 
“Black women wish[ed] to sue for job discrimination directed against them 
as a Black woman,” researchers operating within the West Topic and Key 
Number classifications were limited to pursuing causes of action based on 
the existing race- and sex-based doctrinal categories.
209
  These existing 
West categories were insufficient. Claims brought through each category 
proved unsuccessful if the employer evinced that it had “a satisfactory 
record for hiring and promoting women generally (including white women) 
and similarly for hiring Blacks (including Black men).”
210
 
To transcend these categories, attorneys articulated a novel cause of 
action that synthesized the two existing categories of race- and sex-based 
discrimination.  Such a synthesized category was inspired in part by 
intersectionality, a then-new critical notion.
211
  Thus, through the help of 
                                                          
 204.  Id. at 223-24.  
 205.  Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 3, at 328.  
 206.  Triple Helix Dilemma, supra note 3, at 225.  
 207.  See id. at 222–24. 
 208.  See id. at 219. 
 209.  Id.  
 210.  Id. at 220.  
 211.  Intersectionality involves the proposition that “race and sex are not ‘mutually 
exclusive categories of experience and analysis.’” Alyssa A. DiRusso, Testacy and 
Intestacy: The Dynamics of Wills and Demographic Status, 23 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 
36, 72 (2009) (quoting Kimberlè Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race 
and Sex:  A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, 
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critical discourse, attorneys turned the West system “on its side and ask[ed] 
what is missing,” in interrogating—and then in transcending—the mutually 
exclusive race- and sex-based categories that existed in the West system.
212
 
Delgado and Stafancic put forth a number of additional examples to 
illustrate the potentially transformative power of the critical approach.  The 





Many new legal ideas come about . . . by turning a thought structure 
around and asking a novel question. In race relations law, the duty to 
make reparations to Latinos for stolen lands or blacks because of slavery 
appeared frustrated by the simple passage of time. But what if one 
imagined a world where the duty to make good for old injuries increased, 
rather than decreased, over time because of interest-compounding; or one 
where mixed causation and indeterminacy in the plaintiff class was 
handled by prorating harms, not declaring them noncompensable? What 
if one imagined a world where outsiders did not need to “cover” or 





Such examples capture the very essence of the critical research project. 
Through creatively engaging with existing doctrinal categories and 
theories, attorneys indeed may imagine new worlds—and then endeavor to 
make such worlds a reality. 
C. Critique of Online Legal Research 
Since the dawn of the computer-assisted legal research era, 
commentators have posited that electronic searching would free researchers 
from age-old restraints, resulting in doctrinal creativity and perhaps, in law 
reform.
215
  This widespread belief is based on such broad assertions that 
                                                          
and Anti-Racist Policies, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, at 139 (1989)); see Nancy Levit, 
Separate Silos: Marginalizing Men in Feminist Theory and Forgetting Females in 
Masculinities Studies 17 (Oct. 22, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
https://law.ubalt.edu/downloads/law_downloads/Feminist_2010_levit.pdf  
(“[F]eminists and critical race theorists have built on intersectionality ideas . . . . 
[through examining models that] consider[] individuals and their identity 
characteristics, their environments, and normative practices and institutions, across 
time and cultures.”). 
 212.  Triple Helix Dilemma, supra note 3, at 224.  
 213.  Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 3, at 322.  
 214.  Id.  
 215.  See, e.g., ETHAN KATSH, LAW IN A DIGITAL WORLD 70-73 (1995); Barbara 
Bintliff, From Creativity to Computerese: Thinking Like a Lawyer in the Computer 
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computerized legal research is “more flexible than the traditional kind, that 
it is deeper and more comprehensive, and that it is more creative than what 
came before.”
216
  From the law reform perspective, the transition to 
computerized legal research has been heralded as a veritable paradigm shift 
that may go so far as to “render the law more humane,”
217
 by “burst[ing] 
the bonds of conservatism and generat[ing] a dynamic that will breathe new 
life into the common law.”
218
  Computerized legal research then has been 
commonly characterized as a transformative technology that has the 
potential to effect progressive law reform. 
The rationale for this belief stems from the mechanical differences in the 
two mediums’ search functionality.  A print researcher must make 
conscious, intensive use of the West Topic and Key Number system: West 
explicitly channels the researcher’s efforts.
219
  But online legal research 
instead is driven by keyword search functionality, wherein the researcher 
supposedly “may frame any type of search query” through the selection and 
combination of words and phrases.
220
  In other words, through keyword 
searching on databases, the researcher need not consciously engage with 
the West Topic and Key Number system—a researcher may simply type 
terms, without conscious reference to West categories.
221
  Because the 
researcher supposedly exercises great agency over the results retrieved vis-
à-vis full-text keyword searching in databases, the argument goes that 
online research then “free[s] [the researcher] from the filters of categorical 
reasoning.”
222
  Unfortunately, for an array of interconnected reasons, 
computerized legal research has failed utterly to achieve such ends.
223
  




                                                          
Age, 88 L. LIBR. J. 338, 345 (1996); Bast & Pyle, supra note 84, at 286-89; Robert C. 
Berring, Collapse of the Structure of the Legal Research Universe: The Imperative of 
Digital Information, 69 WASH. L. REV. 9, 29 (1994); Ethan Katsh, Law in a Digital 
World: Computer Networks and Cyberspace, 38 VILL. L. REV. 403, 477-79 (1994). 
 216.  Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 3, at 315. 
 217.  Id. at 317. 
 218.  Hanson, supra note 84, at 580. 
 219.  See infra Part I(C)(1). 
 220.  Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 3, at 316.  
 221.  See Kuh, supra note 84, at 246-47.  But see Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 3, 
at 318-19 (explaining that regardless of the resource used, West Topic and Key 
Number categories are inscribed in our minds due to such factors as standardized 
American legal education).   
 222.  Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 3, at 316. 
 223.  See id. at 317-26. 
 224.  See id. at 325-28. 
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1. Search Algorithms 
A fundamental flaw in the assertion that online research transcends legal 
categories is that, as covered above, legal categories are now critical 
components of legal database search algorithms: WestlawNext is the 
epicenter of such search algorithm innovation.
225
  Because every search 
performed on WestlawNext now requires automated input from the West 
Topic and Key Number system (i.e., as the system is embedded in the 
WestSearch algorithm),
226
 the age-old “conceptual tyranny” of the West 
categorizing scheme has reemerged—albeit in a more insidious form.
227
  
While once the “most obvious difference between print indexing and 
CALR indexing is that the latter is constructed by the researcher rather than 
by the publisher,” this no longer holds true.
228
  West’s doctrinal 




This recent melding of legal categorization systems with database search 
algorithms was not an unforeseen development.  As Delgado wrote more 
than two decades go: “Ironically, a number of observers suggest adding 
subject indexing to the LEXIS and WESTLAW systems, thus interposing 
another human being’s subjective judgment between researcher and text—
the very thing that computer-assisted legal research was designed to 
replace.”
230
  In a more general sense, Robert Berring too warned against 
this eventuality: 
 
[E]ach step in the research process that is carried out automatically by 
the front end system, is a step taken away from the purview of the 
researcher. Each decision that is built into the system makes the human 
who is doing the search one level further removed from the process. If 
each user of information was aware of these steps, if each user 
understood what was being done for her and could monitor results with a 
skeptical eye, the danger would not be so great. But the whole point of 
these systems is to work automatically. . . . Most researchers do not 
understand how to critically evaluate search results. The emphasis from 
the vendors of high-end information will be to lessen that critical 




                                                          
 225.  See Wheeler, supra note 22, at 368.  
 226.  See id. at 370.  
 227.  Farmer, supra note 3, at 398. 
 228.  Bast & Pyle, supra note 84, at 292. 
 229.  See Wheeler, supra note 22, at 370.  
 230.  Triple Helix Dilemma, supra note 3, at 221-22.  
 231.  Chaos, supra note 46, at 210.  
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West’s doctrinal categories, as automatically—and thus invisibly—
applied to each database search is perhaps a more grievous state of affairs 
than West’s formerly explicit channeling influence.  In the print medium, 
researchers at least had the benefit of better seeing West’s modes of 
constraint.
232
  Therefore, through now more insidious, but perhaps no less 
potent means, West’s categories embedded in the WestSearch algorithm 




Crowdsourcing too is a deeply troubling enhancement of WestSearch.  
By applying the research patterns of editorially selected expert users to 
each search, crowdsourcing, like the West Topic and Key Number system, 
is an agent of homogenization for research outcomes.
234
  Ron Wheeler 
already has taken issue with West’s reliance on crowdsourcing.  As 
Wheeler writes, reformist-minded attorneys often are “looking to find the 
stone left unturned, the less popular result,” and for these “creative thinkers 
[who] write about changing the law. . . .  The desired results for these sorts 
of research inquiries may not fall within the collection of results considered 
useful by the masses.”
235
  Crowdsourcing then likely inhibits law reform. 
2. Citation Systems 
The “remarkable sameness” of the law is also perpetuated through other 
features of commercial legal databases.
236
  Like the West Topic and Key 
Number system, “citation systems are based upon the subjective judgments 
of human beings.”
237
  This inherent bias applies to the historic citator 
function of classifying the law’s validity,
238
 but also to the newer citator 
functionality of cross-referencing selected, citing analytical materials.
239
  
On this latter point, publishers always have displayed “policies of 
referencing and other publications,” thus perpetuating the “cumulative, 
self-perpetuating” nature of commercial research resources.
240
  That the 
                                                          
 232.  See Kuh, supra note 84, at 243.  But see Construction, supra note 157, at 265 
(noting that there are “recurrent, and often inadvertent, examples of ableism is the very 
language of critical discourse . . . ‘visible’ and ‘invisible’ are used as metaphors 
[prominently in OutCrit literature] . . . . Notice how these metaphors privilege 
seeing.”).  
 233.  Triple Helix Dilemma, supra note 3, at 208.  
 234.  Wheeler, supra note 22, at 365. 
 235.  Id. at 366. 
 236.  Triple Helix Dilemma¸ supra note 3, at 207. 
 237.  Callister, supra note 103, at 472.  
 238.  Id.  
 239.  See Wolf & Wishart, supra note 23, at 25. 
 240.  Farmer, supra note 3, at 401.  
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In a more general sense, “patterns of citation inclusion, omission, and 
emphasis” in legal databases have been of benefit to society’s dominant 
interests.
242
  The legal field has an overall high valuation of citations (one 
might say, an obsessive fixation), and the consequences of this 
phenomenon are far reaching.
243
  But in the legal database context, a 
concrete example is telling: documents with higher citation counts are 
deemed more relevant by search algorithms.
244
 Likewise, in the 
crowdsourcing context, documents with more user “views” are deemed 
more relevant. And radical, or otherwise marginalized scholars, whom in 
some circumstances have demonstrably lower citation counts or views (i.e., 
as compared to other scholars within the same discourse), therefore 
produce articles ranked less relevant by search algorithms.
245
  The end 
result is that such articles with lower relevancy rankings are less likely to 
be discovered by researchers. 
3. Free Internet Searching 
Non-commercial Internet resources used by attorneys similarly exhibit 
biases.  For example, in the crowdsourcing context, the notion that a system 
should “capitalize[] on the wisdom of its users” has long been applied in 
the preeminent, free Internet resources, “including wiki creation (e.g., 
Wikipedia) and web searching (e.g., Google).”
246
  Although commonly 
misperceived as something of a normatively neutral modern wonder, on 
search engines such as Google, “popular, mainstream and middle of the 
road ideas will almost certainly find a voice; one that is likely to be very 
loud.  However, the unpopular, unique, and minority points of view will 
not.”
247
  Additionally, “search engines wishing to achieve greatest 
                                                          
 241.  See Wheeler, supra note 22, at 368.   
 242.  Farmer, supra note 3, at 401 (quoting Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Articles 
from The Yale Law Journal, 100 YALE L.J. 1449, 1457 (1991)). 
 243.  See id.  
 244.  Telephone interview with Westlaw Reference Attorney, Thomson Reuters 
(Oct. 1, 2014) (indicating that the number of citation counts for law review articles on 
WestlawNext is one factor, among many, in relevancy calculations via WestSearch).  
 245.  See Farmer, supra note 3, at 401; Wheeler, supra note 22, at 366 
(“WestlawNext’s search algorithm may rank seldom-viewed documents lower than 
frequently viewed documents, which may require the user to scroll down significantly 
to locate such items. Perhaps these esoteric items will not display at all.”). 
 246.  Wheeler, supra note 22, at 365.  
 247.  AMANDA SPINK & MICHAEL ZIMMER, WEB SEARCH: MULTIDISCIPLINARY 
PERSPECTIVES 17 (2008) (citing MANUEL GONZALEZ & RICHARD DELGADO, THE 
POLITICS OF FEAR (2006)). 
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popularity. . . . tend to cater to majority interests’. . . . According to 
Google’s founders, this bias was by design.”
248
  Like commercial legal 
databases, free Internet resources then also exhibit a subjectivity bias and 
channel the efforts of legal researchers accordingly. 
4. Fact-Based Searching 
Such are the flaws of leading, contemporary online legal research 
resources; but even prior to the advent of WestSearch and Google, 
computerized legal research yielded little in the way of progressive law 
reform.
249
  What accounts for this failing?  For one, the shift to 
computerized legal research, with its dependence on keyword searching, 





An attorney researching online typically does a word search, looking for 
cases containing the same facts. If the search retrieves a number of cases 
with similar facts, the attorney may be satisfied with the outcome. 
However, a search that discovers factually similar cases does not also 
offer a theory of law as its natural result. Additional work and creative 
energy on the part of the researcher are required to formulate a legal 
theory. . . . The attorney may not consider the importance of the context 
of the facts or the role that fairness or justice might play in making a 
persuasive case for the client. The attorney may remain at the factual 




Of course, before an attorney can de- and reconstruct legal categories, 
the supposedly controlling doctrinal categories must first be discovered.  
Rather than interrogating and critically reconstructing existing legal 
categories, online keyword searching instead encourages researchers to 
drown “in a sea of facts.”
252
 
Online legal research also inhibits browsing, and without browsing, the 
researcher exhibits a “tendency to remain at a factual-level analysis.”
253
  
                                                          
 248.  Id. (quoting Lucas D. Introna & Helen Nissenbaum, Shaping the Web: Why the 
Politics of Search Engines Matters, 16.3 THE INFO. SOC’Y, 169, 176 (2000)); see also 
Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 3, at 324 (“Most material on the Internet comes 
arranged in order of frequency of use . . . . This ‘popularity contest’ approach to listing 
information builds in a structural bias in favor of commonplace items that have found 
wide use. Heretical or new ideas [can be more difficult to locate].”).  
 249.  See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 3, at 325-28.  
 250.  Krieger & Kuh, supra note 147, at 789-90. 
 251.  Bast & Pyle, supra note 84, at 297-98. 
 252.  Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 3, at 319.  
 253.  Bast & Pyle, supra note 84, at 298; see also Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 
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The print medium traditionally provides a rich, expansive environment in 
which to engage with legal texts imaginatively.
254
  For instance, a print 
researcher may swiftly and tactilely flip through multiple pages, intuitively 
switching from text, to section outline, to new volume, etc.  Also, a print 
researcher using print indexes and West Digests is likely to at least glance 
at adjacent, tangential categories on the page.
255
  These strategies are 
important for law reform because “browsing encourages the development 
of analogical or metaphorical reasoning and legal arguments,” allowing the 
researcher to “stretch existing theories to cover new factual settings.”
256
  In 
short, print browsing facilitates law reform as it provides ample 
opportunities to creatively engage with legal concepts. 
Online legal research, on the other hand, traditionally has restricted 
browsing.  Computers and legal database interfaces “generally only allow[] 
a small amount of information to be accessible on each screen,” thus 
limiting the online researcher’s browsing environment.
257
  Stated otherwise, 
tangential, browse-worthy data are scarce on commercial legal databases, 
reducing the potential for serendipitous discoveries.
258
  For example, online 
cases are retrieved predominantly via fact-based keywords—not through 
lists of browsable legal categories on West Topic and Key Number subject 
index pages.
259
  Moreover, locating and using browse-friendly tools such as 
digitized subject indexes and tables of contents remains a difficult prospect 
due to interface limitations.
260
  The online medium then has historically 
constricted browsing, and thus the “development of analogical or 
metaphorical reasoning” that law reform often requires.
261
 
5. West’s Hegemony 
The issues discussed thus far involve the problematic aspects of online 
legal research resources per se.  However, perhaps the most devastating—
and enduring—critical insight is that, regardless of the resource utilized, 
                                                          
3, at 318; Krieger & Kuh, supra note 147, at 782-83.  
 254.  See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 3, at 320-21; Haigh, supra note 184, at 
261 (“[S]ince computer research discourages analogical reasoning and browsing, the 
researcher wandering the stacks of a library is much more likely to have intuitive 
flashes leading to intellectual discovery than someone sitting at a terminal.”).  
 255.  See id.  
 256.  See id. at 320. 
 257.  Bast & Pyle, supra note 84, at 298. 
 258.  See id. 
 259.  Krieger & Kuh, supra note 147, at 789-90. 
 260.  See Julie M. Jones, Not Just Key Numbers and Keywords Anymore: How User 
Interface Design Affects Legal Research, 101 L. LIBR. J. 7, 18-19 (2009). 
 261.  Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 3, at 320. 
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It is perhaps no longer common knowledge that the West Topic and Key 
Number system formed the very architecture of the Langdellian law school 
curriculum.  As is readily apparent from the West system outline: “The 
first-year courses Langdell established at the Harvard Law School track the 
digest classification scheme.  The major digest classifications—property, 
contracts, torts, and crimes—are the subject matter of introductory law 
school courses.  Individual digest topics are the subject matter of other law 
school courses.”
263
  Understanding this, one can hardly overstate the 
pervasive influence of the West Topic and Key Number system on 
American legal culture.
264
  In learning and understanding our law—in 




The direct research implications of the West system’s influence on the 
American law school curriculum are clear.  Contemporary researchers 
seldom make use of West’s bound Digest volumes—but West’s channeling 
effect on research outcomes extends far beyond the printed page. 
 
The very categorical structure that limited paper-and-pencil searching, 
building in a bias for the status quo, appears in a new form—the 
straitjacket of conventional categories now limits the questions one may 
ask the computer and the searches one may devise. The terms and 
concepts—familiar from the old digest and index categories and 
reinforced by disciplinary habits, bar examination requirements, and the 
legal curriculum—that formerly steered searchers in predictable 
directions reappear in more insidious form. Now inscribed in our minds, 




The “conceptual tyranny” of the West system extends to any resources—




When formulating a keyword search on Fastcase, the Cornell Legal 
Information Institute, Google, etc., the researcher’s words and phrases do 
not materialize spontaneously from a tabula rasa-like legal 
                                                          
 262.  Id. at 318. 
 263.  Bast & Pyle, supra note 84, at 287. 
 264.  Id. 
 265.  Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 3, at 310. 
 266.  Id. at 318. 
 267.  Farmer, supra note 3, at 398. 
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consciousness.
268
  Such terms are derived from long immersion within 
West’s legal universe.
269
  As Berring writes: “those who use the system 
tend to conceptualize in terms of the system and, as a system matures, it 
becomes authoritative, the classification system simply describes the 
universe.  Researchers mature using it, organize their thoughts around it, 
and it then defines the world of ‘thinkable thoughts.’”
270
  For the American 




D. Stalled Law Reform Movement 
The inherent flaws of the online medium, while problematic for a 
researcher in any circumstance, are in fact exceptionally exacerbated for the 
attorney pursuing law reform initiatives.
272
  Online search methodologies 
are “least useful where one needs them most—when trying to take the 
measure of a new legal problem or issue.”
273
 
The individual elements required for a new theory may “lie somewhere 
in a database.”
274
  However, a legal database is incapable of perceiving 
social injustices and transforming legal categories accordingly.  Our 
machines are smart, but not that smart: “[t]he decision to put [legal 
concepts] together in a novel way must come from a human researcher.”
275
  
                                                          
 268.  See Haigh, supra note 184, at 261 (“Many researchers will likely adopt 
standard legal forms of classification learned through textbooks or from lawyers with 
certain ideas about the organization and structure of law.”).  
 269.  Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 3, at 318. 
 270.  Robert C. Berring, Legal Research and the World of Thinkable Thoughts, 2 J. 
APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 305, 310-11 (2000) [hereinafter Thinkable Thoughts].  
 271.  Id; see also Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 3, at 309-10.  
 272.  See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 3, at 18. 
 273.  Id.  
 274.  Id. at 321.  
 275.  Id.  To disrupt notions of human exceptionalism, we also might begin to think 
seriously about how law reform—as an ontological practice—might be approached 
from non-human modes of being.  See, e.g., Maneesha Deckha, Property on the 
Borderline: A Comparative Analysis of the Legal Status of Animals in Canada and the 
United States, 20 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 313, 316 (2012) (“‘[A]nimal-
friendly’ [law reform efforts to date] are still anthropocentric, as they are often 
animated by the value placed on human relationships with animals (and thus focus on 
humans), rather than the value of animals themselves.  The logic of human domination 
and hierarchy is not questioned in these cases and statutes.”).  Obviously, this is a 
daunting proposition.  For an influential work on the potential impossibility of such an 
enterprise, see Thomas Nagel, What Is It Like to Be a Bat?, 83 THE PHIL. REV. 435 
(1974); see also Steven W. Teppler, Testable Reliability: A Modernized Approach to 
ESI Admissibility, 12 AVE MARIA L. REV. 213, 255 (2014) (citing A. M. Turing, 
Computing Machinery and Intelligence, 59 MIND 433, 433-34 (1950)) (“The Turing 
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But for the prior three decades, such critical strategies have not been 
cultivated: “[m]indless computerized searching” has become the status quo 
to the profound loss of the progressive liberatory movement.
276
  The online 
medium then “has not been a godsend for legal reformers,” and instead has 
“actively impeded the search for new theories and remedies.”
277
 
As demonstrated by Delgado and Stefancic, “the pace of law reform 
seems to have slowed since [electronic searching] arrived in the early 
1980s.”
278
  Before the computerized research era, there stretched a long 
period of “legal ferment” wherein attorneys devised progressive reforms in 
such areas as civil rights, consumer’s rights, and environmental 
protection.
279
  But in the online research era, such reforms stalled. 
 
Color-blind jurisprudence has slowed the pace of racial reform, and 
when legislators imposed tort reforms limiting the ability of consumers 
and victims of medical malpractice to recover for their injuries, the tort 
bar had little response. Similarly, when conservative judges and 
legislators began limiting consumer remedies, for example, by insisting 
that patients mediate their claims against HMOs and doctors who 
committed malpractice, lawyers responded with no new legal theories, 




Although the transition to online legal research was, of course, only one 
factor among many that slowed the pace of law reform,
281
 Delgado and 
Stefancic make a convincing case for its role.  Thus, due in part to the 
factors surveyed above, the doctrinal breakthroughs of the 1950s and 1960s 
largely waned following the so-called computer revolution. 
                                                          
Test is a proposal for a test of a machine’s capability to demonstrate thought. . . . It 
proceeds as follows: a human judge engages in a natural language conversation with 
two other parties, one a human and the other a machine; if the judge cannot reliably tell 
which is which, then the machine is said to pass the test.”); F. Patrick Hubbard, “Do 
Androids Dream?”: Personhood and Intelligent Artifacts, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 405, 473 
(2011) (“In terms of intelligent artifacts, the questions are: What can we do, in 
changing ourselves, in changing animals, and in developing ‘thinking’ machines? What 
should we do?”) (emphasis added).  
 276.  See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 3, at 321. 
 277.  Id. at 328. 
 278.  Id. at 317. 
 279.  See id. at 325–28. 
 280.  Id. at 327. 
 281.  See id. at 327-28  (“[M]any factors—conservative Republican administrations, 
a backlash against the ‘wild’ sixties and seventies, and globalization—may have played 
a part in slowing the pace of law reform, at least of the progressive kind.”).  
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E. Contemporary Critical Research Process 
For the contemporary attorney pursuing progressive law reform 
initiatives, a number of critical strategies are perhaps uniquely suited for 
our online age.  An overview of such strategies is not and could not be 
definitive.  Legal research technologies change daily (Moore’s Law 
apparently governs now as well as ever),
282
 and critical research, as an 
inherently creative process, by its very nature resists a formulaic 
application.
283
  However, based on the insights proffered by luminaries 
within the discourse to date, the following critical strategies may function 
admirably as starting points for the researcher pursuing legal innovation.  
Most aptly, the strategies below may be characterized as just one potential 
version of a reconstructed legal research process. 
1. Internalize Critical Insights 
A researcher ought to internalize the central, critical analysis of the 
research process, as discussed above in this Article and covered fully in the 
broader literature.  Such familiarization is imperative, as the researcher 
must establish a background foundation upon which to contextualize and to 
thereafter deploy more concrete critical strategies.  For example, the critical 
research project depends upon a willingness to imaginatively de- and 
reconstruct legal concepts,
284
 an endeavor legitimized, in part, by the 
understanding that refined notions of doctrinal indeterminacy are no longer 
radical notions—but instead are the increasingly accepted norm.
285
 
Additionally, a reformist-minded attorney ought to familiarize herself 
with the historical development of the legal publishing industry.  That a 
transnational triumvirate of legal publishers almost exclusively controls the 
means of commercial legal resource production, and that West in particular 
has held a century-long hegemony over legal categorizations, is 
extraordinarily pertinent to the attorney attempting to transcend existing 
systems of legal-conceptual constraint.
286
 
The researcher must also be fluent in the precise mechanics through 
which contemporary legal resources perpetuate the societal status quo.  One 
must be aware of the West Topic and Key Number system’s continued (and 
                                                          
 282.  John O. McGinnis & Steven Wasick, Law’s Algorithm, 66 FLA. L. REV. 991, 
1013 (2014) (“The main driver of continuing legal search improvement is Moore’s 
law. . . . Moore noticed that the number of transistors on an integrated circuit had 
roughly doubled every year over the previous seven years. With uncanny consistency, 
the exponential growth Moore identified has continued over the past forty-six years.”). 
 283.  See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 3, at 222. 
 284.  See id. 
 285.  See Tushnet, supra note 169, at 108. 
 286.  See Gallacher, supra note 14, at 51. 
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multifaceted) ascendency, problematic search algorithm enhancements, the 
closed loop effect of brand-based resource cross-referencing, and so on.
287
  
To be sure, a reformist-minded attorney must understand just how legal 
research databases continue to function as agents of homogenization for 
research outcomes. 
2. Concept-Based Research 
With such a background foundation established, an attorney may then 
engage in a traditional, concept-based legal research process.  Using 
databases or print legal resources, if available, the researcher should 
determine how the given fact pattern likely will be characterized within the 
existing unreconstructed legal landscape (i.e., the classic hunt for the 
supposed ratio decidendi).
288
  The researcher should cultivate concept-
based legal research methodologies, as opposed to purely fact-based 
methods, to locate such “controlling” legal categories that will serve as 




There are a number of concept-based research methodologies.  These 
may include the usage of a wide range of secondary resources, which 
naturally function to categorize areas of law, and the West Topic and Key 
Number system (e.g., as embedded in online West headnote 
functionality).
290
  An additional concept-based methodology includes 
reading all found authorities in full—as opposed to mere selective 
skimming, which online research likely encourages.
291
  The researcher 
should consider using print legal resources when possible to maximize 
browsing opportunities, and thus also maximize analogical reasoning.
292
 
3. Alternative Legal Resources 
When searching online for doctrinal legal content, an attorney may 
consider using such alternative resources as Fastcase, the Cornell Legal 
Information Institute, and GPO FDsys.
293
  While any online resource is 
                                                          
 287.  See Part II(C).  
 288.  See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 3, at 319–21.  
 289.  See id.  
 290.  See Bast & Pyle, supra note 84, at 294. 
 291.  See, Ian Rowlands et al., The Google Generation: The Information Behaviour 
of The Researcher of The Future, 60.4 ASLIB J. OF INFO. MGMT., 290, 294 (2008) (“In 
general terms, this new form of information seeking behaviour can be characterised as 
being horizontal, bouncing, checking and viewing in nature. Users are promiscuous, 
diverse and volatile. . . . “).  
 292.  See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 3, at 310.  
 293.  See generally Justiss, supra note 66 (discussing that large law firms do not 
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inherently biased,
294
 these alternative resources at least are devoid of many 
of the explicit commercial channeling agents endemic to the premier legal 
databases.
295
  Alternative resources may provide more neutral avenues 
through which to view the law. 
4. Legal Scholarly and Multidisciplinary Research 
After researching the existing doctrinal landscape, a next step may 
involve mining legal scholarly and related cross- and multidisciplinary 
resources.  As Farmer writes, “often we fail to look outside the system box 
in which we are conceptually housed.”
296
  Searching “outside the system 
box” is an enterprise traditionally reserved for legal theorists alone, and so 
“practitioners are often insulated from external questions.”
297
  Thus, 
practitioners pursuing systemic change ought to go “beyond the usual” 
legal resources and should “join legal theorists” in using “materials that 
reflect on social, political, and cultural theory.”
298
 
For the attorney searching for law reform ideas vis-à-vis scholarly texts 
within the commercial legal databases, law review articles, as a selected 
source or sub-database, are the obvious starting places.  Delgado and 
Stefancic, for example, reference “recent law review articles by critical 
race feminists” as inspirational sources for a novel “intersectional 
discrimination” cause of action.
299
  Thousands of contemporary law review 
                                                          
mandate the use of primary source alternatives to Westlaw and Lexis).   
 294.  See supra text accompanying note 248.  
 295.  See Farris, supra note 77, at 27–28.  
 296.  Farmer, supra note 3, at 403.  
 297.  Id.  
 298.  Id. See also Julie Krishnaswami, Critical Information Theory: A New 
Foundation for Teaching Regulatory Research, in THE BOULDER STATEMENTS ON 
LEGAL RESEARCH EDUCATION: THE INTERSECTION ON INTELLECTUAL SKILLS AND 
PRACTICAL SKILLS 175, 175 (2014) (“[I]n legal research instruction, students are rarely 
exposed to interdisciplinary research methods or perspectives that will help them 
consider the more profound and complex aspects of legal information resources.”); 
Nisha Agarwal & Jocelyn Simonson, Thinking Like A Public Interest Lawyer: Theory, 
Practice, and Pedagogy, 34 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 455, 459 (2010) (“While 
the Carnegie Report discusses the legal profession as a whole, some scholars have 
suggested that its emphasis on integrating theory, practice, and morality has special 
significance for those committed to public interest law, given the inherently normative 
character of public interest legal practice . . . .”); Julie A. Su & Eric K. Yamamoto, 
Critical Coalitions: Theory and Praxis, in CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW 
CRITICAL RACE THEORY 379, 387 (Francisco Valdes et al. eds., 2002) (exploring the 
role of “activist lawyers as theorists” through asking such questions as “how can civil-
rights lawyers draw more deeply from the well of critical race insights to energize and 
sometimes refocus efforts in the trenches?”).  
 299.  Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 3, at 320.  
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articles from most legal journals can be found in commercial legal 
databases. 
However, not all commercial firm plans provide complete access to legal 
periodicals, and the most recent articles and niche legal journals are often 
absent from the commercial databases entirely.
300
  For access to such 
scholarship, researchers should make use of the free, online repositories 
such as SSRN and the Bepress Law Review Commons.
301
 
To truly “search outside the system box,” researchers also may seek out 
cross- and multidisciplinary materials.
302
  Online repositories make 
available scholarship across all disciplines—not just law; leading 
repositories include SSRN, Digital Commons, and JSTOR “Register & 
Read.”
303
  Google Books, a repository containing millions of scanned 
books (including academic monographs) also may constitute a useful 
research resource.
304
  An attorney may seek out relevant interdisciplinary 
materials through local academic libraries. 
5. Unplugging and Brainstorming Sessions 
After such resource-gathering methods have been exhausted, an attorney 
may engage in (more purely) analytical strategies.  Perhaps most 
importantly, the critical researcher should, at this point, consider 
unplugging.  For Delgado and Stefanicic, unplugging is indeed a key 
component of the contemporary critical process: 
 
One possibility that we must entertain is that when searching for a new 
legal remedy, we should turn our computers off. Lawyers interested in 
representing clients who (unlike corporations) do not find a ready-made 
body of developed law in their favor need to spend time with the 
computer shut down, mulling over what an ideal legal world would look 
like from the client’s perspective. . . . In this exercise, the free 




The endgame of the critical project—”radically transforming legal 
                                                          
 300.  See Ramsay, supra note 80, at 141, n. 18. 20.   
 301.  See Arewa supra note 49, at 808-9. 
 302.  Farmer, supra note 3, at 403-4.  
 303.  See Arewa supra note 49, at 809-10; see also Andrée J. Rathemacher, 
Developing Issues in Licensing: Text Mining, MOOCs, and More, 39.3 SERIALS REV. 
205, 207 (2013). 
 304.  Giancarlo F. Frosio, Google Books Rejected: Taking the Orphans to the 
Digital Public Library of Alexandria, 28 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 
81, 84 (2011). 
 305.  Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 3, at 328. 
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doctrines”—has remained fundamentally unchanged in the online era.
306
  
But as doctrinal innovation ultimately depends upon people, not computers, 
cultivating a people-based analytical methodology is essential for 
genuinely effective law reform.
307
  Brainstorming sessions with diverse 
perspectives at play is a particularly apt strategy for law reform, because 




Researchers contemplating law reform strategies and their collaborators 
need not be members of the elite intelligentsia or the greater progressive 
status quo.
309
  Perhaps the very opposite is preferable.  As Delgado and 
Stefancic write, few attorneys successfully “break free from the constraints 
of preexisting thought” and proffer “effective new approaches.”
310
  But 
such thinkers who do often are “individuals whose life experiences have 
differed markedly from those of their contemporaries.  They may be 
members of marginal groups, or persons who are in other ways separated 
from the mainstream.”
311
  Individuals from all corners of the legal 
profession may have much to add to the law reform landscape.  So too, 
may non-lawyer citizens and activists: to be sure, “[i]nvolving the 
community can assist in effective law reform strategies.”
312
  For instance, 
“synergies between activists working for social change and lawyers seeking 
law reform”
313
 may produce the most dynamic sociolegal change, in that 
                                                          
 306.  Id.  
 307.  See id. at 321. But see Maneesha Deckha, Property on the Borderline: A 
Comparative Analysis of the Legal Status of Animals in Canada and the United States, 
20 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 313, 316 (2012). 
 308.  See Sumi Cho & Robert Westley, Historicizing Critical Race Theory’s Cutting 
Edge: Key Movements That Performed the Theory, in CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A 
NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY 51 (Francisco Valdes et. al. eds., 2002) (“Synergism is a 
vitally important possibility for a project, such as CRT, that attempts to affect the 
political world though discursive intervention. Such a project is necessarily collective 
and collaborative, requiring analysis of information and exchange of insights gleaned 
from the experiences of [many] movements . . . .”). 
 309.  See Duncan Kennedy, Political Power and Cultural Subordination, in AFTER 
IDENTITY: READER IN LAW AND CULTURE 95 (Dan Danielsen & Karen Engle eds., 
2013) (noting that the United States still is marked by an “overwhelmingly white legal 
intelligentsia.”).   
 310.  Triple Helix Dilemma¸ supra note 3, at 222. 
 311.  Id. at 223. 
 312.  COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT, GENDER AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE 
COMMONWEALTH: SOME CRITICAL ISSUES FOR ACTION IN THE DECADE 2005-2015 49 
(2004).  
 313.  Stephen Loffredo, Poverty Law and Community Activism: Notes from A Law 
School Clinic, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 173, 203 (2001). 
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“each activity can catalyze and in turn be amplified by the other.”
314
  
Diverse voices then ought to be a vital component of any meaningful law 
reform undertaking. 
IV. APPLICATION OF CRITICAL LEGAL RESEARCH: MOUNTAINTOP 
REMOVAL LAW REFORM 
This Article now has detailed the collective problematic aspects of the 
following: the legal publishing industry, the preeminent print and online 
legal research resources, and the legal research process as traditionally 
conceived.  Based on the insights developed in the existing literature, this 
Article then put forth a loose constellation of strategies that may together 
constitute one reconstructed version of the legal research process—as 
imbued with critical theory and pertinent related discourses.  This Article 
now will pivot, by providing an overview of the law governing 
mountaintop removal mining and the various reform strategies put forth by 
commentators aiming to halt this destructive mining practice.  Lastly, the 
critical research strategies outlined above will be applied to the law 
governing mountaintop removal mining, demonstrating that core feminist 
methodologies may dramatically alter the mountaintop removal law reform 
landscape. 
A. Mountaintop Removal Law 
The central Appalachian region of the United States, after more than a 
century of exploitation at the hands of the coal extraction industry, is 
perhaps a supreme exemplar of the phenomenon known as the resource 
curse.  Alternatively termed the paradox of plenty, the resource curse is “a 
designation that denotes a pattern of social, political, and economic 
problems in areas rich in natural resources.”
315
 
Presumably, such resource-rich regions would boast high standards of 
living; however, outside economic interests—the coal industry, in this 
context—”wield[] power over the [region] at the expense of its citizens and 
the natural environment.”
316
  That the coal industry is perennially aided by 
captured ruling elites (e.g., state politicians, regulatory officials, etc.), and 
has gained the widespread support of the very citizens it subjugates most 
egregiously, are defining characteristics of the Appalachian resource 
curse.
317
  One might say that, in Appalachia, coal controls all: vast 
                                                          
 314.  Id. at 176; see also Steve Bachmann, Lawyers, Law, and Social Change, 13 
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 4 (1984) (arguing that “[o]rganized masses of 
people, not lawyers, play the critical roles” in any progressive reform movement). 
 315.  STANDING OUR GROUND, supra note 27, at 23.  
 316.  Id. at 24.  
 317.  Id. at 24–26.  
51
Stump: Following New Lights
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2015
 
624 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW  [Vol. 23:4 
intersections exist “between environmental problems caused by coal 




Any efforts then to achieve transformative change in Appalachia 
necessarily must involve reform to the sociolegal apparatus governing the 
coal extraction industry: the epicenter of harm.
319
  For the last two decades, 
mountaintop removal mining has emerged as the increasingly dominant 
surface mining practice in the region, due to (1) amendments to the Clean 
Air Act, which have incentivized coal burning plants to favor the low-
sulfur coal endemic to central Appalachia; and (2) advances in pertinent 
mining technology, such as the development of massive excavation 
equipment.
320
  As reported by the Congressional Research Service, 
mountaintop removal mining now has swelled to “an area of approximately 
12 million acres located in portions of Kentucky, West Virginia, Virginia, 
Tennessee, Pennsylvania, and Ohio.”
321
 
Mountaintop removal also ranks among the most destructive mining 
techniques yet devised, scouring Appalachian communities and 
surrounding ecosystems alike.
322
  Thus, from a law reform perspective, 
mountaintop removal jurisprudence is an ideal site from which to pursue 
reform vis-à-vis critical legal research strategies. 
1. Mining Process 
The mountaintop removal mining process is as follows.  Mining 
operations use explosives to blast off mountaintops—up to a thousand feet 
of each peak—revealing rich seams of coal.
323
  After the coal is extracted, 
mining operations may qualify for variances exempting the companies 
from restoration requirements.
324
  In those instances where federal law does 
require the industry to restore the “approximate original contour”
325
 of the 
mountain, the original contour is restored in only a superficial sense, as 
operations meet the requirements by dumping a portion of the blasted 
                                                          
 318.  Id. at 23.  
 319.  Id. at 23–26; see also Isaac Forman, The Uncertain Future of NEPA and 
Mountaintop Removal, 36 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 163, 165 (2011) (“Ever since miners 
battled coal companies for the right to unionize early in the twentieth century, coal and 
politics in West Virginia have been inseparable.”). 
 320.  See Baller & Pantilat, supra note 28, at 631–32.  
 321.  CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21421, MOUNTAINTOP 
MINING: BACKGROUND ON CURRENT CONTROVERSIES 1 (2014). 
 322.  See Baller & Pantilat, supra note 28, at 632–33. 
 323.  Id. at 631.  
 324.  See Gersen, supra note 32, at 458. 
 325.  30 U.S.C. § 1265(b)(3) (2012).  
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materials back on the site. 
326
  That is, through such dumping practices, the 
pre-mined, diverse woodland ecosystems are not restored; monolithic 




The remnants of the blasted peaks, constituting tons of rock and soil, 
known as “overburden” or “excess soil,” are piled permanently in valleys 
adjacent to the mountains.
328
  The dumped materials create valley fills that 
often rise “hundreds of feet high on top of headwater streams.”
329
  Valley 




Indeed, the direct environmental and human health harms of 
mountaintop removal are legion.  Over one thousand miles of crucial, 
headwater streams have been “directly impacted”
331
 and in many instances, 
completely “obliterated”
332
 by valley fill operations.  As the U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Services reports: “the loss of these streams and their associated 
forests may have ecosystem-wide implications.”
333
  Moreover, mountaintop 
removal mining is linked to increased flash flooding, and the affected 
waters downstream from valley fills contain elevated levels of such toxic 
chemicals as selenium, sulfates, aluminum, zinc, and BTEX compounds, 




Mountaintop removal mining also produces elevated levels of “airborne 
hazardous dust,” and demonstrably causes “increased adult hospitalizations 
for lung cancer, heart, lung, kidney disease, and chronic pulmonary 
                                                          
 326.  See Gersen, supra note 32, at 458–59. 
 327.  See id. at 459-61 (“[I]t may never be possible to resurrect an Appalachian 
forest on a blasted mountain because MTR removes the topsoil and drainage features 
that allow native trees to take root.”).  
 328.  Michael Braverman, King of the Hill: Ohio Valley Environmental Coalition v. 
Aracoma Coal Company and the Battle Raging Between the Coal Industry and 
Environmentalists over Mountaintop Mining, 21 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 293, 296 (2010). 
 329.  Isaac Forman, The Uncertain Future of NEPA and Mountaintop Removal, 36 
Colum. J. Envtl. L. 163, 165 (2011). 
 330.  See id. 
 331.  EPA, MOUNTAINTOP MINING/VALLEY FILLS IN APPALACHIA, FINAL 
PROGRAMMATIC EIS 4 (2005), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/region03/mtntop/eis2005.htm.  
 332.  Gersen, supra note 32, at 462. 
 333.  Pick and Shovel, supra note 38, at 57 (quoting U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 
Report to EPA Region III dated September 23, 1998). 
 334.  Forman, supra note 319, at 168; S. Appalachian Mountain Stewards v. A & G 
Coal Corp., 758 F.3d 560, 562 (4th Cir. 2014). 
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disorders; and elevated mortality rates.”
335
  Recent studies also have 
established a link between mountaintop removal and birth defects in 
Appalachia.
336
  These costs ultimately are not borne by the coal industry, 
but instead largely fall on Appalachian coal mining communities, thus 
constituting textbook examples of negative economic externalities.
337
 
2. Regulation Under the CWA and NEPA 
An attorney conducting traditional, concept-based legal research on 
mountaintop removal would discover that a complex schema of federal and 
state law, much of it statutory and regulatory-based, has been held to 
govern the mining practice. 
 
Mountaintop removal, like all mining, is highly regulated. The dangers 
of mountaintop removal can be regulated through the common law of 
torts and property, state statutes, as well as broad federal statutes such as 
the Surface Mine Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA), the Clean 
Water Act (CWA), and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). 
Although not an affirmative source of regulatory authority, the 
Environmental Justice Executive Order (E.O. 12,898) is also relevant to 





Thus, in the search for justice, a wide range of law potentially is 
implicated in efforts to halt or to otherwise internalize externalities caused 
by mountaintop removal operations.  In particular, much of the 
controversial mountain removal litigation to date has focused on federal 
agency action vis-à-vis provisions of these key federal statutes.
339
 
SMCRA, a federal statute that effectively curtailed the worst mining 
practices in Appalachia (i.e., before the emergence of mountaintop removal 
mining) mandates a cooperative federalism schema for surface mining.
340
  
Minimum standards are set at the federal level, and the states then 
                                                          
 335.  Forman, supra note 319, at 168. 
 336.  See Smith, supra note 29, at 175. See generally Melissa M. Ahern et al., The 
Association Between Mountaintop Mining and Birth Defects Among Live Births in 
Central Appalachia, 1996-2003, 111.6 ENVTL. RESEARCH 838 (2011).  
 337.  See generally McGinley & Haden, supra note 12, at 258.  
 338.  Smith, supra note 29, at 179.  
 339.  See Gersen, supra note 32, at 472.  
 340.  30 U.S.C. § 1201(k) (2012); see Pick and Shovel, supra note 38, at 54 (“In the 
quarter century since enactment of SMCRA, the environmental degradation and 
attendant adverse social and economic impacts on coalfield communities continue, 
albeit not at the catastrophic levels that existed in the pre-SMCRA years when coal 
mining was essentially unregulated.”). 
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promulgate comprehensive plans to meet those standards.
341
  SMCRA sets 
the “approximate original contour” standard for mountaintop removal 
mining,
342
 and also makes provision for a buffer zone rule, requiring 
mining operations to meet certain environmental standards when operating 
within one hundred feet of applicable streams.
343
 
SMCRA has a savings clause providing that the Act shall not be 
construed as superseding the CWA,
344
 and the CWA is implicated when 
mountaintop removal operations dump excess spoil into headwaters.
345
  
The CWA requires that valley fill operations obtain permits, which are 
issued through two programs.
346
  The first is the National Pollutant 
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) program, wherein permits are 
issued by the EPA or EPA-approved state permitting authorities under 
CWA § 402.
347
  The second is the dredge and fill permitting program 
administered by the Army Corps of Engineers under CWA § 404.
348
 
The EPA’s role vis-à-vis CWA § 404 bares close scrutiny.  While 
Congress delegated the sole power to grant or deny dredge and fill permits 
                                                          
 341.  30 U.S.C. § 1253(a) (2012); see Jason Rapp, Coal and Water: Reclaiming the 
Clean Water Act for Environmental Protection, 25 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 99, 104–05 (2011). 
 342.  30 U.S.C. § 1265(b)(3) (2012). 
 343.  30 C.F.R. § 715.17(d)(3) (2014); see also 30 C.F.R. § 816.57 (2014) 
invalidated by Nat’l Parks Conservation Ass’n v. Jewell, No. CV 09-00115 (BJR), 
2014 WL 5355048, at *9 (D.D.C. Feb. 20, 2014). The Office of Surface Mining’s 
original buffer zone rule—the 1983 stream buffer zone rule—was revised in 2008. But 
in 2014, the District Court for the D.C. Circuit vacated the 2008 rule. See COPELAND, 
supra note 321, at 7 (“The Obama Administration [sought to return the 2008 rule] to 
the more stringent 1983 rule . . . . In February 2014, the same federal court ruled that 
the 2008 rule had been issued without necessary consultation with federal wildlife 
agencies.”). For a discussion on current efforts to revise the rule, see id. at 10.  
 344.  30 U.S.C. §1292(a)(3) (2012); see Rapp, supra note 341, at 104–05. The CWA 
was passed to “restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of 
the Nation’s waters.” 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012). 
 345.  See Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Aracoma Coal Co., 556 F.3d 177, 190 (4th 
Cir. 2009); Rapp, supra note 341, at 104–05. 
 346.  See Nat’l Min. Ass’n v. McCarthy, 758 F.3d 243, 246 (D.C. Cir. 2014).   
 347.  33 U.S.C. §§1342, 1362(12) (2012), see also Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. 
Aracoma Coal Co., 556 F.3d 177, 190 (4th Cir. 2009) (“States wishing to administer 
their own NPDES program must be approved by the Environmental Protection 
Agency . . . before they can begin issuing § 402 permits.”).  
 348.  33 U.S.C. §1344 (2012), see also Laura Kathryn Bomyea, Note, Dynamite, 
Disaster and Disappearing Options: How the EPA Is Losing the Battle Against 
Destructive Mountaintop Removal Coal Mining Practices, 6 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 224, 
233 (2013) (“[Mountaintop removal mining] also grew exponentially under President 
George W. Bush, due in large part to the Administration’s redefinition of ‘fill material’ 
which exempted ‘mine overburden’ from regulation under the CWA § 402, ensuring 
that the material was regulated exclusively under CWA § 404.”). 
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to the Corps,
349
 CWA § 404 permits must be issued in accordance with the 
standards promulgated by the EPA, which are known as the § 404(b)(1) 
guidelines.
350
  A public interest review also is required prior to permit 
issuances.
351
 Additionally, the EPA is granted, through CWA § 404(c),
352
 
the right “to deny or restrict the use of certain areas as fill disposal sites due 
to environmental concerns.”
353
  The EPA has also exercised advisory roles 
to the Corps via extra-statutory functions.
354
 
NEPA requires agencies “proposing major federal actions ‘significantly 
affecting’ the human environment [to] complete an Environmental Impact 
Statement (EIS) before commencing the project.”
355
  Recent litigation has 
stemmed from the Corps’ failure to prepare an adequate EIS for 
mountaintop removal operations, as required by the CWA.
356
 
Unfortunately, a “history of adverse outcomes for environmental 
plaintiffs” largely has marked the pursuit of “court enforcement of federal 
environmental laws” governing mountaintop removal operations.
357
  A 
plain reading of applicable federal statutes—especially the CWA and 
NEPA—supports most arguments to date proffered by environmental 
                                                          
 349.  33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2012). 
 350.  33 U.S.C. § 1344(b)(1) (2012); see Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. U.S. Army 
Corps of Eng’rs, 479 F. Supp. 2d 607, 624 (S.D.W. Va. 2007) rev’d and vacated sub 
nom. Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Aracoma Coal Co., 556 F.3d 177 (4th Cir. 2009) 
(“The underlying intent behind the 404(b)(1) Guidelines is that dredged or fill material 
should not be discharged if it will result in an unacceptable adverse impact on the 
aquatic ecosystem”). The guidelines are codified at 40 C.F.R. Part 230. 
 351.  See Kentuckians for Commonwealth v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 963 F. 
Supp. 2d 670, 685 (W.D. Ky. 2013) aff’d sub nom. Kentuckians for the Commonwealth 
v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 746 F.3d 698 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing 33 C.F.R. § 
320.4(a)(1) (2014) and Exec. Order No. 12,898, 3 C.F.R. 859 (1995), reprinted in 42 
U.S.C. § 4321 (2012) [hereinafter E.O. 12,898]). Due to its centrality in the illustrative 
reform proposals put forth in this Article, an expanded discussion of the mountaintop 
removal public interest review criteria is provided below in Part III.B.3.a. 
 352.  33 U.S.C. § 1344(c) (2012). 
 353.  Bomyea, supra note 348, at 249 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c) (2012)). 
 354.  See Nat’l Min. Ass’n v. McCarthy, 758 F.3d 243, 249 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“So 
plaintiffs’ objection here is simply to enhanced consultation and coordination between 
two federal agencies. But no statutory provision forbids EPA from consulting with or 
coordinating with the Corps, or vice versa.”). 
 355.  Rapp, supra note 341, at 100 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (2012)); see also 
Forman, supra note 319, at 169–70 (“NEPA is a procedural statute, focused on 
ensuring informed decision-making rather than compelling particular results or 
imposing substantive obligations.”). 
 356.  See, e.g., Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Aracoma Coal Co., 556 F.3d 177, 197 
(4th Cir. 2009). 
 357.  Gersen, supra note 32, at 472.  
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plaintiffs.
358
  Indeed, the Southern District of West Virginia, the venue in 
which most anti-mountaintop removal suits have been litigated, has largely 
ruled in accordance with such claims.
359
  However, time and time again, at 
the appellate level, the “Fourth Circuit’s inclination to defer to permitting 
agencies, and the Court’s unwillingness to enforce the application of 
federal law by state officials,” has resulted in reversals of the Southern 
District.
360
  Thus, “the higher court has resolved the diverging government 
interests . . . in favor of Corps decisions that promote energy extraction,” 
even when the “Corps has granted permits in a manner that directly 




Numerous cases illustrate this longstanding trend.  In Kentuckians for the 
Commonwealth, Inc. v. Rivenburgh, environmental plaintiffs alleged that 
the Corps violated CWA § 404 and its own regulatory definition of “fill 
material” in issuing a mining permit.
362
  The Southern District of West 
Virginia agreed, broadly enjoining the Corps from issuing such overburden 
permits “solely for the purpose of waste disposal” under CWA § 404, 
citing, in support, both the plain language of CWA § 404 and the 
congressional intent of the CWA.
363
  But the Fourth Circuit reversed, 
holding that the injunction was overly broad and finding statutory 
ambiguity in CWA § 404—thus entitling the Corps’ interpretation of “fill 
material” to Chevron deference.
364
  Under the Fourth Circuit’s ruling, the 
end result was that “the Corps could ignore its own regulations defining the 




In Bragg v. Robertson, environmental plaintiffs brought a host of claims 
under SMCRA, NEPA, and the CWA against the Corps and the West 
                                                          
 358.  See Rapp, supra note 341, at 118. 
 359.  See id.  
 360.  Gersen, supra note 32, at 472.  
 361.  Rapp, supra note 341, at 118.  
 362.  Kentuckians for the Commonwealth, Inc. v. Rivenburgh, 204 F. Supp. 2d 927, 
930 (S.D.W. Va. 2002) opinion clarified, 206 F. Supp. 2d 782 (S.D.W. Va. 2002) 
vacated sub nom. Kentuckians for Commonwealth Inc. v. Rivenburgh, 317 F.3d 425 
(4th Cir. 2003) and vacated sub nom. Kentuckians for Commonwealth Inc. v. 
Rivenburgh, 317 F.3d 425 (4th Cir. 2003). An individual permit or a nationwide 
mining (i.e., NWP 21) can be issued under CWA § 404. See COPELAND, supra note 
321, at 3 (“The Obama Administration recently added new environmental restrictions 
on the use of NWP 21 generally, while permanently prohibiting its use to authorize 
discharges to construct valleys fills, such as occurs in the Appalachian region . . . .”). 
 363.  Rivenburgh, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 940, 946.   
 364.  Id. at 927.  
 365.  Rapp, supra note 341, at 110. 
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Virginia Department of Environmental Protection (WVDEP).
366
  Ruling on 
the key issue (that did not settle) at trial, the Southern District enjoined the 
WVDEP from issuing permits without complying with the SMCRA one 
hundred foot buffer zone rule.
367
  The Fourth Circuit, avoiding these 
substantive issues, reversed on sovereign immunity grounds.
368
 
Likewise, in Ohio Valley Environmental Coalition v. U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers, the Southern District held that the Corps violated the CWA and 
NEPA by failing to inter alia (1) comply with the EPA’s § 404(b)(1) 
guidelines, which require the Corps to “assess the effects of the discharge 
on the ‘structure and function’ of the aquatic ecosystem” and;
369
 (2) prepare 
an EIS that adequately assessed the “environmental impact” of the CWA § 
404 fill permits at issue.
370
  Again, the Fourth Circuit reversed, giving 
deference to the Corps and “accusing the district court of [substituting] its 
judgment for that of the agency.”
371
  The Fourth Circuit again “couched its 
approval of extractive activities as judicial deference to Corps expertise.”
372
 
In Kentuckians for Commonwealth v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the 
Western District of Kentucky held that the Corps did not violate the CWA 
or NEPA in issuing a CWA § 404 fill permit.
373
  Environmental plaintiffs 
alleged that the Corps failed to again take a hard look at “environmental 
impacts under NEPA,” and that the Corps did not, in issuing the permit, 
consider adverse effects upon water quality—nor upon human health and 
welfare—as required by the EPA’s § 404(b)(1) guidelines.
374
  Plaintiffs 
also alleged that the Corps failed to properly consider the “needs and 
welfare of the people” in violation of the Corps’ codified public interest 
review requirements.
375
  In making such claims, plaintiffs relied heavily 
upon the recent, groundbreaking “human health studies linking mining to 
                                                          
 366.  See Gersen, supra note 32, at 468. 
 367.  Bragg v. Robertson, 72 F. Supp. 2d 642, 663 (S.D.W. Va. 1999) vacated sub 
nom. Bragg v. W. Virginia Coal Ass’n, 248 F.3d 275 (4th Cir. 2001).  
 368.  Bragg, 248 F.3d at 286. 
 369.  Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 479 F. Supp. 2d 607, 
631, 635-36 (S.D.W. Va. 2007) rev’d and vacated sub nom. Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. 
v. Aracoma Coal Co., 556 F.3d 177 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 230.11 
(2014)). 
 370.  479 F. Supp. 2d at 616, 640–41. 
 371.  Rapp, supra note 341, at 115 (quoting Ohio Valley, 556 F.3d at 198). 
 372.  Rapp, supra note 341, at 118. 
 373.  Kentuckians for Commonwealth v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 963 F. Supp. 
2d 670, 682-86 (W.D. Ky. 2013) aff’d sub nom. Kentuckians for the Commonwealth v. 
U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 746 F.3d 698 (6th Cir. 2014). 
 374.  963 F. Supp. 2d at 674.  
 375.  Id.  
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negative health impacts, including increased birth defects.”
376
  However, 
the Court held that the Corps “‘was only required to address the collective 
and cumulative effects of the authorized discharges.’  The health studies 
were beyond the scope of the COE’s authority and review.”
377
  The Sixth 
Circuit affirmed upon appeal.
378
 
However, in a historic victory, environmental plaintiffs in fact prevailed 
in the most recent Fourth Circuit decision on mountaintop removal.  In 
Southern Appalachian Mountain Stewards v. A & G Coal Corp., the Fourth 
Circuit held that a mining operator violated the CWA in failing to disclose 
its discharge of the pollutant selenium—as was required in its CWA § 402 
permit application.
379
  Although the operator alleged that the “permit 
shield” defense precluded liability, the Court correctly held that this 
defense is unavailable for such a pollutant disclosure failure.
380
  In a 
striking shift in tone, the Court concluded its decision by stating: “To allow 
the defense in these circumstances would tear a large hole in the CWA, 
whose purpose it is to protect the waters of Appalachia and the nation and 
their healthfulness, wildlife, and natural beauty.”
381
 
The A & G Coal Corp. decision perhaps at least partially is explained by 
the recent reshuffling of the Fourth Circuit’s political composition.  As 
illustrated in the pre-A & G Coal Corp. decisions, environmental advocates 
seeking to end mountaintop removal mining traditionally have received 
“favorable district court opinions on the merits, only to be overturned by 
the Fourth Circuit.”
382
  But recent court appointments by President Obama 
likely have disrupted this pattern: 
 
Presidential appointments to the Fourth Circuit may provide the most 
promising opportunity to alter the legal landscape for mountaintop 
mining opponents. The Fourth Circuit is widely perceived to be “the 
nation’s most conservative” circuit court, but the confirmation of Obama 
appointees Judges Andre Davis, Barbara Milano Keenan, and Albert 
Diaz means that for the first time in many years, a majority of Fourth 
                                                          
 376.  CHAPTER 18 - MINING AND MINERAL EXTRACTION, 2013 “ABA Env’t Energy, 
& Resources L.: Year in Rev.” 182, 184 (2013).  
 377.  Id. (quoting U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 963 F. Supp. 2d at 685). 
 378.  U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 746 F.3d at 713. 
 379.  758 F.3d 560, 569. 
 380.  Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1342(k) (2012)).  
 381.  Id.  
 382.  Sara Clark, In the Shadow of the Fourth Circuit: Ohio Valley Environmental 
Coalition v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 143, 143 
(2008). 
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Thus, the Fourth Circuit’s shifting composition indeed may have 
“temper[ed] the court’s apparent hostility to environmental plaintiffs,” 




As regards the EPA’s CWA § 404(c) veto power and its extra-statutory 
guidance prerogatives, the most recent decisions from the District of 
Columbia Circuit Court have also been more favorable for anti-
mountaintop removal advocates.
385
  In Mingo Logan Coal Co. v. U.S. 
E.P.A., the D.C. Circuit held that the EPA acted within the scope of CWA 
§ 404(c) in “withdraw[ing] a disposal site specification post-permit,”
386
 
because the Act confers on the EPA through the “unambiguous language of 




Likewise, in National Min. Ass’n v. McCarthy, the D.C. Circuit held that 
an interagency coordination plan between the EPA and the Corps, in which 
the EPA proffered enhanced, extra-statutory guidance on mountaintop 
mining operations, did not violate the CWA.
388
  The Court also held that 
the EPA’s extra-statutory “final guidance” memorandum, which instructed 
staff members to recommend limitations on state-issued permits via CWA 
§ 402, was also permissible under the CWA—as the memorandum 




These decisions from the Fourth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit constitute 
tangible victories for environmental advocates.  Increased agency 
cooperation during crucial, pre-permit periods, a confirmation of the EPA’s 
CWA § 404(c) veto power, and a more centrist Fourth Circuit may provide 
increased opportunity for meaningful regulation of mountaintop removal 
                                                          
 383.  Forman, supra note 319, at 193. 
 384.  Id.  
 385.  See, e.g., Big Win for EPA in Mountaintop Mining Case, 35 WESTLAW J.  
ENVTL. 1 (2014). 
 386.  Mingo Logan Coal Co. v. E.P.A., 714 F.3d 608, 616 (D.C. Cir. 2013) cert. 
denied, 134 S. Ct. 1540, 188 L. Ed. 2d 557 (2014).  
 387.  Id. at 613. On remand, in considering the mining operator’s remaining APA 
counts, the D.C. District Court granted environmental plaintiff’s motion for summary 
judgment in holding that the EPA properly revoked the permit. Mingo Logan Coal Co. 
Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, No. CV 10-0541 (ABJ), 2014 WL 4828883, at *24 
(D.D.C. Sept. 30, 2014).  
 388.  See Nat’l Min. Ass’n v. McCarthy, 758 F.3d 243, 249 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 389.  Id. at 253. 
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mining. But such developments, while welcome, are not tantamount to 
comprehensive solutions. As one commentator laments: “it would behoove 
all parties involved to come up with a better solution . . . . The Clean Water 
Act, and principles of environmental justice demand it.”
390
 
3. Common Law Remedies 
Turning to common law remedies for mountaintop removal mining, 
commentators have posited that potential claims may arise through such 
actions as negligence, private nuisance, and public nuisance.
391
  
Environmental plaintiffs pursuing such claims could seek injunctions or 
damages, as relevant.
392
  A private nuisance claim, which may be brought 
for any “nontrespassory invasion of another’s interest in the private use and 
enjoyment of land,”
393
 is applicable because mountaintop removal 
“interferes with landowners’ ability to use and enjoy their land . . . by 




A public nuisance is “an unreasonable interference with a right common 
to the general public,” and an action may lie due to public health concerns 
caused by mountaintop removal.
395
  A public nuisance claim will lie so 
long as the “myriad public health consequences stem from aspects of the 
practice that current mining regulations do not specifically authorize,” such 
as negligent groundwater contamination or harms caused outside the scope 
of a permit.
396
  Negligence claims may be brought against mountaintop 




Common law suits, like actions for court enforcement of federal 
environmental laws, have yet to systematically curtail mountaintop removal 
mining practices.  For one, common law actions are normally pursued in 
state court, and historically “state court judges [have been] predisposed to 
rule for coal companies for political reasons.”
398
  Also, in the negligence 
context, causation is difficult to establish in cases involving medical risk 
due to such factors as extended latency periods for diseases caused by toxic 
                                                          
 390.  Bomyea, supra note 348, at 257. 
 391.  See Gersen, supra note 32, at 477–81. 
 392.  See id. at 479. 
 393.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D (1979). 
 394.  Gersen, supra note 32, at 478. 
 395.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1979). 
 396.  Gersen, supra note 32, at 480. 
 397.  See id. at 479. 
 398.  Id. at 477. 
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exposure.
399
  A final problem is that the applicable, established common 
law protects people exclusively—not non-human animals or the greater 
environment.  Such actions “can only protect the environment 
incidentally,” if at all, as mining companies may not be dissuaded from 
halting or altering mining practices due to such human-centered claims.
400
 
That said, in the past decade, environmental plaintiffs in Appalachia 
have achieved a measure of success in pursuing common law remedies—
and joint common law and statutory citizen suit actions.
401
  The caveat is 
that such successes against mining operations have occurred outside the 
specific context of mountaintop removal mining.
402
  In a suit brought 
against A.T. Massey Energy, a combined statutory citizen suit and nuisance 
action resulted in both an injunction and a damages award of nearly half a 
million dollars for West Virginia coalfield residents.
403
  As Patrick C. 
McGinley writes, such victories certainly should embolden environmental 
plaintiffs: 
 
No longer do coal companies go to court with the expectation of 
favorable treatment by judges and juries. The fact that citizen plaintiffs 
are achieving success as they challenge the excesses of the coal industry 
should encourage a second look by plaintiffs’ lawyers whom in the past 




Therefore, much can be achieved through using common law suits or 
“common law and statutory citizen suits in tandem to redress the injuries 




Beyond the context of litigation, many commentators have put forth 
reformist statutory and regulatory strategies for ending mountaintop 
removal mining.  New federal legislation to amend key provisions of the 
CWA may result in greater protections for coalmining communities and the 
environment.
406
  However, such amendments are politically unlikely, as 
“highly motivated interest groups like mining companies [are] able to 
obtain preferred political outcomes.”
407
  Similarly, amendments to 
                                                          
 399.  See id. at 479. 
 400.  Id. at 481. 
 401.  See Pick and Shovel, supra note at 38, at 106. 
 402.  See id. 
 403.  See id.  
 404.  Id. at 103–04. 
 405.  Id. at 106. 
 406.  See Gersen, supra note 32, at 473. 
 407.  Id. 
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SMCRA’s regulatory schema may provide enhanced environmental 
protection through such avenues as stricter buffer zone requirements.
408
  
But again such amendments require favorable political conditions that 
currently appear nonexistent.
409
  A particularly innovative approach 
involves reducing demand for mountaintop removal mining coal through 
state legislation that prohibits power companies from purchasing such 
coal.
410
  While commentators predict that such state acts would be largely 
symbolic, nevertheless these “proposals can raise awareness about 




B. Critical Research Strategies Applied to Mountaintop Removal Law 
Anti-mountaintop removal advocates have made substantial gains 
through extraordinary efforts in recent years.
412
  Furthermore, there is 
promise for future litigation victories insofar as the Fourth Circuit, the 
Court wherein most environmental citizen suits are brought, becomes more 
centrist.  Or perhaps policy oscillation (shifting more firmly in 
environmental advocates’ favor) at last will allow for a stringent regulation 
of surface mining operations.
413
  Although not yet broached in this Article, 
the dramatic market impact of the Marcellus Shale natural gas boom in 
Appalachia—an extraction practice carrying with it its own dire set of 
environmental and public health concerns
414
—may catalyze a post-coal era 
                                                          
 408.  Id. at 476. 
 409.  Id. at 473. 
 410.  Id. at 481. 
 411.  Id. at 506. 
 412.  See, e.g., Baller & Pantilat, supra note 28, at 663 (“Attorneys Joe Lovett, Jim 
Hecker, and Joan Mulhern are working to [end mountaintop removal mining]. While 
the campaign for change has been frustrating and discouraging at times, these attorneys 
are committed for the long-haul . . . . The success of the litigation is a manifestation of 
their determination and perseverance . . . .”). 
 413.  See Braverman, supra note 328, at 321-23. 
 414.  See Kaitlyn R. Maxwell, Note, Eroding the Public’s Right to Clean Air: 
Examination of the Hazardous Air Pollutants Exemption for Natural Gas Drilling 
Under the Clean Air Act, 21 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 153, 157 (2011) (“Environmental and 
public health scientists, scholars, and policymakers have identified two fundamental 
environmental and public health concerns associated with natural gas drilling: (1) 
drinking water contamination caused by hydraulic fracturing used to extract natural 
gas; and (2) reduced air quality due to the release of hazardous air pollutants during 
production.”); John Manuel, Mining: EPA Tackles Fracking. 118.5 ENVTL. HEALTH 
PERSPECTIVES a118, a199 (2010) (“Some of these deposits, such as the Marcellus Shale 
running under the Appalachian Basin, lie beneath watersheds supplying drinking water 
to millions of people. In many locations fracking . . . occurs within hundreds of feet of 
residences that use wells for drinking water.”).  
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sooner than predicted for the region, mixed blessing though that may be.
415
 
Whatever the shifting legal, economic, and ideological landscape may 
be, critical legal research strategies will be of service to the reformist-
minded attorney.  Innovative approaches to law and discourse can be as 
necessary in good times as in the bad, and as discussed below, halting 
mountaintop removal is merely a beginning, and not the end, of easing 
Appalachia’s woes.  The following section then demonstrates through one 
illustration how critical approaches to legal research can assist (i.e., can 
serve as one methodology, among a potential great many) in ultimately 
achieving such change. 
1. Concept-Based Research 
In locating the mountaintop removal primary authority above, a wide 
range of concept-based legal research strategies may have been used by a 
researcher.  When searching on an academic subscription to WestlawNext, 
a search for “mountaintop removal” within all secondary resources 
produces a number of relevant results, many from treatises.
416
  Such top 
treatise results include entries from Public Natural Resources Law, Second 
Edition, Rogers’ Environmental Law, Federal Environmental Regulation of 
Real Estate Law Digest, and so on—all of which, of course, are Thomson 
Reuters products.
417
  These treatise entries then categorize the law at issue, 
listing legal concepts (e.g. “discharges of fill material and other 
pollutants”)
418
 and specific primary authorities (e.g., “In a 2003 decision, 
the Fourth Circuit . . .”)
419
 alike. 
An additional concept-based approach involves using the West Topic 
and Key Number system, as embedded in WestlawNext.  The West 
headnotes assigned to the seminal mountaintop removal cases (i.e., in the 
                                                          
 415.  See, e.g., Sarah Tincher, Report: Market Forces, Not EPA, to Blame for Coal 
Decline, THE STATE J. (Oct. 14, 2014), available at 
http://www.statejournal.com/story/26883400/report-market-forces-not-epa-to-blame-
for-coaldecline; see also Alison Cassady, Complex Market Forces are Challenging 
Appalachian Coal Mining, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Oct. 06, 2014), available at 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/report/2014/1 0/06/98371/complex-
market-forces-are-challenging-appalachian-coal-mining/ (“Appalachia’s coal 
communities are confronting a confluence of market factors that are years in the 
making . . . . including low domestic and international prices for both thermal and 
metallurgical coal, soft natural gas prices, and increased imports—primarily from 
Colombia.”). 
 416.  Westlaw search performed on WestlawNext on Dec. 14, 2014.  
 417.  2 PUB. NAT.RES. L. § 19:17 (West 2015); 2 ENVTL. L. § 4:9 (West 2014); FED. 
ENVTL. REG. OF REAL ESTATE L. DIG. § 5:4 (West 2014). 
 418.  2 FED. ENVTL. REG. OF REAL ESTATE § 5:4 (West 2015). 
 419.   Id.  
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context of court enforcement of federal environmental laws) are mostly 
classified under the topics of Environmental Law, Mines and Minerals, 
Statutes, and Administrative Law and Procedure.  Prominent key numbers 
(or sub-topics) include Coal Mining, Discharge of Pollutants, Permits and 
Certifications, Discharge or Deposit of Dredged or Fill Material, Deference 
to Agency in General, Wisdom, Judgment or Opinion, Permissible or 
Reasonable Construction, Redressability, Cognizable Interests and Injuries, 
and Persons Entitled to Sue or Seek Review.
420
 
These West Topic and Key Number categories then, paired with the text 
of the West-drafted case headnotes, define the “world of ‘thinkable 
thoughts’” (at least to an extent) for the researcher investigating 
mountaintop removal case law.
421
  For one, these West categories in part 
drive the keyword search functionality—i.e., via the WestSearch algorithm.  
Thus, the West-selected headnote and key number terms govern which 




What is more, as researchers select individual cases and read the key 
number and headnote texts which precede the actual opinion, West 
succeeds in framing the issues at stake.  For instance, one is struck by the 
anachronistic strangeness of the sub-topic “Wisdom, Judgment or Opinion” 
in the context of agency discretion.
423
  Are we indeed classifying the 
catastrophic administrative regulation of mountaintop removal mining as 
wise? 
More substantively, the sub-topic “Persons Entitled to Sue or Seek 
Review” is telling.
424
  Already, in terms of redressability, the researcher is 
told that only “persons” are “entitled” to seek relief.
425
  What of non-human 
animals or harms to the greater environment?  As Delgado points out, there 
exists “discussions of novel theories for nontraditional plaintiffs, such 
as . . . animals, indeterminate plaintiffs, or inanimate objects.”
426
  But in 
                                                          
 420.  Westlaw search performed on Dec. 14, 2014. See, e.g., Kentuckians for the 
Commonwealth v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 746 F.3d 698 (6th Cir. 2014); Ohio 
Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Aracoma Coal Co., 556 F.3d 177 (4th Cir. 2009); Bragg v. W. 
Va. Coal Ass’n, 248 F.3d 275 (4th Cir. 2001). The West headnotes are listed prior to 
each decision proper. 
 421.  Thinkable Thoughts, supra note 270, at 311. 
 422.  See Wheeler, supra note 22, at 368.  
 423.  See Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 479 F. Supp. 2d 
607 (S.D.W. Va. 2007) rev’d and vacated sub nom; Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. 
Aracoma Coal Co., 556 F.3d 177 (4th Cir. 2009). ‘ 
 424.  See 556 F.3d at 177. 
 425.  See id. 
 426.  Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 3, at 320; see also Taimie L. Bryant, Animals 
Unmodified: Defining Animals/Defining Human Obligations to Animals, 2006 U. CHI. 
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internalizing the explicit category of “Persons Entitled to Sue”—in 
accepting this as objective truth, not as an arbitrary classification barrier 
that merits de- and reconstruction—such is West’s power in framing, and 
thus in constraining, legal thought.
427
 
The classification of “Cognizable Interests and Injuries” also bares close 
scrutiny.
428
  As a term of art, “cognizable injuries” specifically denotes that 
“some source of law treats the injury as sufficient to confer on the injured 
party the right to bring suit.”
429
  While the term “cognizable” likely carries 
with it an air of rational objectivity,
430
 such judgments are necessarily 
value-based: “deciding which harms are worthy of judicial and societal 
attention is an inescapably subjective exercise, informed by social 
norms.”
431
  The West-deployed term “cognizable” cloaks value judgments 
in a veneer of neutral rationality, effectively masking the subjective norms 
of existing standing doctrine. 
Additional mountaintop removal search strategies include using 
statutory-based methods and related citation systems.  For example, in 
retrieving CWA § 404 on WestlawNext (i.e., 33 U.S.C.A. § 1344), the 
researcher discovers that the statutory section is cross-linked to thousands 
                                                          
LEGAL F. 137, 153-54 (2006) (“Animals’ legal status as potential or current property 
and their lack of legal personhood are the grandparents of all specific legal definitions 
of animals.”). But see Jessica Chasmar, Argentine Court Rules ‘Sandra’ the Orangutan 
has Human Right to Freedom, WASH. TIMES (Dec. 23, 2014), 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/dec/22/argentine-court-rules-sandra-the-
orangutan-has-hum/ (“A 29-year-old orangutan named Sandra is a ‘non-human person’ 
with a right to freedom and will be released from the zoo where she is being held, an 
Argentine court has ruled.”). 
 427.  Doctrinal reconstruction along more unfortunate lines has allowed for the 
historical development of corporate or “artificial persons.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
1325 (10th ed. 2014) (“An entity, such as a corporation, created by law and given 
certain legal rights and duties of a human being; a being, real or imaginary, who for the 
purpose of legal reasoning is treated more or less as a human being.”); Atiba R. Ellis, 
Citizens United and Tiered Personhood, 44 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 717, 722 (2011) 
(“Citizens United continues to blur the distinction between artificial persons and 
natural persons.”); see also Saru M. Matambanadzo, Embodying Vulnerability: A 
Feminist Theory of the Person, 20 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 45, 64 (2012) 
(“[E]fforts to expand legal recognition for fetuses and embryos—and the rights arising 
from it—may narrow the rights and reproductive choices of women.”). 
 428.  See U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 479 F. Supp. 2d at 607; Aracoma Coal Co., 
556 F.3d at 177.  
 429.  Adam B. Cox, Citizenship, Standing, and Immigration Law, 92 CAL. L. REV. 
373, 388 (2004). 
 430.  Black’s alternatively defines cognizable of as “capable of being known or 
recognized.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 427, at 316. 
 431.  Michelle Fon Anne Lee, Surviving Summers, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 381, 413 
(2010). 
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of legal documents via the annotations in the KeyCite citation 
functionality.
432
  This selection of cross-references is based on the editorial 
policies of Thomson Reuters.  While over one thousand five hundred law 
review articles are listed under KeyCite’s “Citing References” to CWA § 
404, just forty-five law review articles are organized under the “Context & 
Analysis” section.
433
  These forty-five highly vetted law review articles 
constitute those most likely to be used by the researcher
434
—but the 
overriding question is, by what criteria was this fraction of articles selected 
by the publisher? 
Under West’s broader “Citing References” section for CWA § 404, the 
researcher can view and search within all West-selected citing secondary 
resources.  But again, questions arise as to the selection criteria.  Therefore, 
through such citation channeling agents, West influences statutory-based 
research methodologies for mountaintop removal research. 
In retrieving the identical statutory section (33 U.S.C.S. § 1344) in Lexis 
Advance,
435
 the citing secondary resources are, of course, unique.  For 
example, similar to West, treatises published under the Reed-Elsevier 
umbrella are cross-linked via the statutory section’s citing secondary 
resources listed in the Shepard’s citator report.
436
  So too are over a 
thousand law review articles with an entirely different set of “most 
relevant” articles listed in the top results as compared to West, thus 
exemplifying the subjective nature of editorial discretion.
437
  That is, 
although Westlaw and Lexis draw from a nearly identical pool of law 
review journals, because the relevancy dictates and editorial policies differ 
on the two databases, the top or listed results (law review articles, in this 
context) often differ as well. 
2. Alternative Legal Resources 
To avoid such commercial channeling agents entirely, a researcher may 
consider utilizing alternative legal resources.  In searching for 
“mountaintop removal” on GPO FDsys, one can readily retrieve such 
                                                          
 432.  33 U.S.C.A. § 1344 (2014) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 113-209). Westlaw 
search performed on Dec. 14, 2014.  
 433.  Westlaw search performed on Dec. 14, 2014.  
 434.  Telephone interview with Westlaw Reference Attorney, Thomson Reuters 
(Oct. 4, 2014).  
 435.  33 U.S.C.S. § 1344 (2014) (LEXIS through P.L. 113-203). If the resources and 
time are available, the reformist-minded researcher might consider using the analytical 
materials from both premier legal databases (or on Bloomberg Law, etc.) in order to 
gain as broad a perspective as possible. 
 436.  Lexis search performed on Dec. 14, 2014. 
 437.  Lexis search performed on Dec. 14, 2014. 
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decisions as Ohio Valley Environmental Coalition v. Aracoma Coal Co. 
through the official “United States Courts Opinion Collection.”
438
  The full 
texts of such decisions are devoid of all elements from the West Topic and 
Key Number system, KeyCite, and so on.  Likewise, CWA § 404, as 
retrieved on the Cornell Legal Information Institute, is unencumbered by 
editorially selected cross-references within the KeyCite or Shepard’s 
citators.
439
  On these more neutral, alternative legal resources, a researcher 
may then analyze the retrieved primary authorities with the commercial 
channeling agents removed.  As the keyword searches performed on such 
alternative resources are free from West algorithm enhancements, so too 
will the researcher likely benefit from search results differing from those on 
high-end legal databases. 
3. Legal Scholarly and Multidisciplinary Research: Feminist Approach 
After thus internalizing the existing mountaintop removal landscape 
through doctrinal research methodologies and thereafter deconstructing and 
sidestepping as appropriate the channeling influence of commercial legal 
databases, the critical researcher may next turn to commentaries in 
scholarly legal and cross- and multidisciplinary resources.  For instance, a 
broad keyword search for “mountaintop removal & reform” in the “Law 
Reviews & Journals” sub-database in WestlawNext produces over nine 
thousand results—the top results of which, as selected by West’s relevancy 
dictates, are indeed of interest.
440
 
While many of the top retrieved articles from such a broad search are 
pertinent, the researcher ought to remember that such results are based on 
the subjective determinants of the West and Lexis systems.
441
  In other 
words, the critical researcher should consciously and continuously 
negotiate with online search systems; in exerting agency over retrieved 
results, as possible, through such means as targeted Boolean searching and 
sustained keyword innovation.  For example, the syntactical calculi 
generated through the Boolean search “mountaintop removal” /p 
“environmental justice” & income produces more focused results in 
WestlawNext (i.e., just seven retrieved articles), as compared to the broader 
search above.
442
  Additional law review articles (not available on the 
                                                          
 438.  United States Courts Opinions, GPO FDSYS, 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/browse/collection .action?collectionCode=USCOURTS (last 
visited May 2, 2015).  
 439.  U.S. Code: Table of Contents, CORNELL LEGAL INFO. INST., 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text (last visited May 2, 2015). 
 440.  Westlaw search performed on Dec. 14, 2014.  
 441.  See Part II(C).  
 442.  See Searching with Boolean Terms & Connectors, WESTLAWNEXT, 
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commercial legal databases) can be found through similar searches on 
SSRN, the Bepress Law Reviews Commons, HeinOnline, and Google 
Scholar.
443
  Accordingly, the material discussed below is based on such 
numerous and varied searches. 
a. Environmental Justice 
An overarching, particularly useful discourse as found by searching in 
law journal sub-databases and online law review repositories involves the 
intersection of environmental law and critical theory.
444
  In its first few 
decades, “environmental law took root as a reformist project that avoided 
the critical concerns of ‘race, class, and gender’ and the postmodern 
insights of late twentieth social thinking and practice.”
445
  However, in 
more recent years, scholars have begun examining environmental law in 
the context of “a larger critical theoretical base,” an immensely important 
project as “the exploitation of the environment with which environmental 




Like other contemporary critical movements, many scholars active in 
this vein are skeptical of internal, or traditional, law reform initiatives 
altogether, instead championing more revolutionary sociopolitical and 
economic “systemic re-formation.”
447
  Such projects, while certainly 
admirable, are largely beyond the scope of this Article—and, in any event, 
are not necessarily mutually exclusive with more incremental strategies of 
reform, as advocated in the general critical legal research literature.  
Therefore, the discussion here is concerned mostly with critical reform in 
the less radicalized context: that is, in crafting progressive, largely internal 
legal reforms (i.e., “intra-systemic ‘reform’”) through examining the 
intersection of environmental law and critical theory.
448
 
Environmental justice is a prominent sub-discourse within the broader 
critical environmentalist movement.  The basic tenets of environmental 
justice are as follows: 
 
The general thrust of environmental justice is a proportionate share issue 
                                                          
https://info.legalsolutions.thomsonreuters.com/pdf/wln2/L-362608.pdf (last visited 
May 2, 2015). 
 443.  See Arewa, supra note 49, at 809. 
 444.  See generally M’Gonigle & Takeda, supra note 158.  
 445.  Id. at 1107-10 (proposing a new movement entitled green legal theory). 
 446.  Id.  
 447.  Id. at 1027.  
 448.  Id. at 1113. 
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regarding environmental burdens. . . . Overall, the concept is that when 
living in an industrialized society, there are both benefits and burdens 
associated with environmental issues, and when environmental injustice 
occurs, those burdens are disproportionately thrust upon low-income 




Therefore, environmental justice advocates focus on the unjust societal 
distributions of environmental harms. 
Third wave critical scholars have built upon the pioneering work of 
environmental justice advocates.  Post-essentialist projects have included 
going “beyond treating race as fixed and biological.  It also entails 
expanding environmental justice to recognize that each racial group is 
differently situated according to its specific socio-economic needs, political 
power, cultural values, and group goals.”
450
  Such insights “enable[] 
scholars and activists to better grapple with varying forms of subordination 




The environmental justice movement has gained considerable traction 
not just within the academy, but also within the actual environmental 
regulatory framework.  Environmental Justice Executive Order (E.O. 
12,898), handed down by President Clinton, and reinvigorated by President 
Obama, “requires administrative agencies to evaluate the socioeconomic 
and racial characteristics of communities” located in close proximity to 




In the last half decade, the “EPA has relied on emerging science and 
President Clinton’s executive order on Environmental Justice to rigorously 
review permits for mountaintop removal mining, and to determine when its 
                                                          
 449.  Jeanne Marie Zokovitch Paben, Green Power & Environmental Justice-Does 
Green Discriminate?, 46 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1067, 1070-71 (2014). See generally 
Sheila Foster, Justice From the Ground Up: Distributive Inequities, Grassroots 
Resistance, and the Transformative Politics of the Environmental Justice Movement, 86 
CALIF. L. REV. 775 (1998); Omar Saleem, Overcoming Environmental Discrimination: 
The Need for a Disparate Impact Test and Improved Notice Requirements in Facility 
Siting Decisions, 19 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 211 (1994).  
 450.  Eric K. Yamamoto & Jen-L W. Lyman, Racializing Environmental Justice, 72 
U. COLO. L. REV. 311, 359 (2001). 
 451.   Id. 
 452.  John J. Fahsbender, An Analytical Approach to Defining the Affected 
Neighborhood in the Environmental Justice Context, 5 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 120, 202, 
207 (1996) (citing Exec. Order No. 12898, 76 Fed. Reg. 66,087, 66,087 (Oct. 25, 
2011)). 
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veto authority under CWA § 404(c) should be used to block a permit.”
453
  
Furthermore, as codified at 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a)(1), the Corps is required 
to conduct a pre-permit public interest review process that similarly 
accounts for the “needs and welfare of the people.”
454
  The environmental 
justice movement then has made substantial inroads in framing the 
debate—and even in influencing outcomes—on mountaintop removal 
mining regulation. 
The law review literature is rife with discussion on environmental justice 
in the context of mountaintop removal mining.
455
  Scholars have noted that 
mountaintop removal “creates problems for people living near blasting 
sites, sending debris into people’s homes, polluting the water, and causing 
noise and land disturbance,” and these citizens most often are from “poor, 
rural communities with high unemployment rates and low to moderate 
development, who have lived on the land for generations.”
456
  This dire 
situation has led one commentator to proclaim that in fact “mountaintop 




Critical attention has focused primarily on low-income Appalachian 
communities.
458
  Due to demographics, “mountaintop removal lacks the 
racial element of the paradigmatic environmental injustice cases.”
459
  
However, the prominent legal scholarly discourse on mountaintop removal 
conspicuously lacks a vitally applicable progressive strain: a dedicated 
                                                          
 453.  Bomyea, supra note 348, at 254. 
 454.  33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a)(1) (2014). 
 455.  See generally Pick and Shovel, supra note 38; Paben, supra note 449; Smith, 
supra note 29; Bomyea, supra note 348. 
 456.  James M. Auslander, Reversing the Flow: The Interconnectivity of 
Environmental Law in Addressing External Threats to Protected Lands and Waters, 30 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 481, 487-88 (2006). 
 457.  Smith, supra note 29, at 171. 
 458.  See sources cited supra note 455. 
 459.  Gersen, supra note 32, at 466. This is not to say that a CRT or related analysis 
ought not to have a role in mountaintop removal mining critiques—indeed, such an 
analysis would constitute a vital contribution to the literature. Barry writes more on this 
subject:  
Because West Virginia is largely white, and the grassroots component of the anti-MTR 
movement primarily consists of white women, racial distinctions intersect with class 
and gender in important ways in coalfield culture. Examining cultural stereotypes of 
Appalachians, particularly the long-standing “hillbilly,” and situating this symbol 
within cultural studies scholarship on whiteness, reveals complex racial and class-based 
identities that have interesting environmental justice connections. 
STANDING OUR GROUND, supra note 27, at 96-97; see also sources cited supra note 10 
and accompanying text.  
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feminist analysis.
460
  The addition of such an analysis could lead to crucial 
law reform initiatives. 
b. Feminism and Environmental Justice 
The reformist-minded researcher generally may be aware that feminist 
discourses exist within the broader critical work on environmental law.  
But when searching for the intersection of feminist thought and 
mountaintop removal mining, virtually no pertinent results return on the 
law journal sub-databases in Westlaw and Lexis.
461
 
Similarly, the mountaintop removal primary authority discussed above 
(e.g., the mandated public interest review criteria) eschews a substantive 
analysis that extends beyond low-income populations in Appalachia.
462
  
Therefore, the researcher discovers that feminist thought—among other 





 or queer legal theory
465
—is absent altogether from 
both primary authority and the scholarly legal literature covering critical 
reforms for mountaintop removal mining. 
As Delgado and Stefancic demonstrate, the requisite elements for new 
law reform initiatives may “lie somewhere in a database,” but putting such 
elements “together in a novel way must come from a human researcher.”
466
  
In this instance, conducting a broader search for feminism and 
environmental issues (i.e., beyond the specific context of mountaintop 
removal mining) yields beneficial results—that can, in turn, be applied to 
the law governing mountaintop removal. 
Robert R.M. Verchick, for instance, writes about “insights that derive 
from both feminism and the environmental justice movement.”
467
  As 
                                                          
 460.  But see Greener Voice, supra note 40, at 26 (1996) (explaining that a feminist 
“focus does not seek to minimize the role that racism, classism, and other forms of 
discrimination play in environmental justice issues. Rather, [such an approach may] 
acknowledge the relationship among many such biases.”).  
 461.  Westlaw and Lexis searches performed on Dec. 14, 2014.  
 462.  See sources cited supra note 351. 
 463.  See sources cited supra note 459.  
 464.  See generally Rebecca R. Scott, Dependent Masculinity and Political Culture 
in Pro-Mountaintop Removal Discourse: Or, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and 
Love the Dragline. 33 FEMINIST STUD. 484 (2007).  
 465.  See Bud W. Jerke, Queer Ruralism, 34 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 259, 305 (2011) 
(“Ruralism and queer metronormativity intersect to create a particularly pernicious 
form of discrimination for queer rural dwellers: queer ruralism; that is, structural 
discrimination stemming from being queer and residing in a rural area.”).  
 466.  Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 3, at 321.  
 467.  Robert R.M. Verchick, Katrina, Feminism, and Environmental Justice, 13 
CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 791, 792 (2008) [hereinafter Katrina]. 
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Verchick points out, the “most visible and effective environmental justice 
organizations in the country are led by and consist mainly of women.”
468
  
Therefore, while the environmental justice movement is “an environmental 
movement, a civil rights movement, and a public health movement, it is 




Environmental justice advocates “pursue[] goals important to many 
women,” because “women may be more vulnerable than men to many 
environmental dangers.”
470
  Such dangers include an increased “likelihood 
of suffering adverse health effects from exposure to certain pollutants,” due 
to the fact that women have a higher average body fat than men—and 
certain pollutants tend to “bioaccumulate in fatty tissue.”
471
  Environmental 
harms also “threaten[] women’s capacity to bear and nurse healthy 
children.”
472
  Finally, insofar as women “remain the primary caregivers in 
their homes and communities,” strong regard “for their own health and that 
of their family remains a primary concern.”
473
 
Many traditional feminist methodologies have been deployed within the 
environmental justice movement.  A central feminist methodology is 
“unmasking patriarchy” through demonstrating how supposedly neutral 
laws in fact perpetuate white male supremacy.
474
  Remedying such biases 
may involve taking into account “the lives or feelings of women” through 
“blending those outside experiences into the political or legal process.”
475
 
                                                          
 468.  Greener Voice, supra note 40, at 24. 
 469.  Id. at 25. 
 470.  Id. at 30.  
 471.  Id. at 64. 
 472.  Id.  
 473.  Id. at 30. 
 474.  Id. at 31-36. 
 475.  Id. at 32; NANCY LEVIT & ROBERT R.M. VERCHICK, FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: 
A PRIMER 46 (2006) (citing Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. 
L. REV. 829, 836-37 (1990)); Kathleen Kelly Janus, Finding Common Feminist 
Ground: The Role of the Next Generation in Shaping Feminist Legal Theory, 20 DUKE 
J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 255, 267 (2013) (“Katharine Bartlett’s work on feminist legal 
methodology has distilled the fundamentals of feminist methods to unmasking 
patriarchy, contextual reasoning, and consciousness-raising, all of which require 
incorporation of the personal experience.”). But see Levit, supra note 211, at 12 
(arguing that contemporary theorists ought to move behind traditional feminist 
methodologies and incorporate such movements as “complexity theory” that “looks at 
complex dynamics of relationships and their interactions with institutions.”); Adam P. 
Romero, Book Review: Split Decisions: How and Why to Take A Break from Feminism 
by Janet Halley Methodological Descriptions: “Feminist” and “Queer” Legal 
Theories, 19 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 227, 240 (2007) (“[W]ithout denying that many 
feminist projects are expressly concerned with patriarchal and, more generally, 
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In the environmental justice context, unmasked biases include 
identifying workplace contaminant laws that set minimum acceptable 
levels as being “safe for male workers, but not female workers.”
476
  Other 
examples include the “elevation of data crunching and technical jargon 
over common sense and community outreach,” as the former is associated 
with white male-dominated professions, while the latter reflects the self-
reported approach of many women grassroots activists.
477
  The focus that 
“mainstream environmental groups place on litigation and other win/lose 
methods of problem solving” also is associated with “male attitudes.”
478
 
Other feminist methodologies used within the environmental justice 
movement include contextual reasoning and consciousness-raising.  
Contextual reasoning pertains to notions of the personal being political, in 
that activism and reform efforts of all varieties ought to account for the 
“influence of personal experience on law.”
479
  This may involve thrusting 
“previously unheard ‘bottom-up’ perspectives” of subordinated groups to 
the forefront of environmental legislative, judicial, and administrative 
policymaking in addition to related activist movements.
480
 
Consciousness-raising is defined as “the commitment to collective 
engagement, the public significance of private matters, and the acceptance 
of individual perspective.”
481
  Consciousness-raising, in the context of 
environmental justice, also focuses on the importance of elevating the 
experiences of environmentally-affected subordinated groups.
482
 
A keystone discourse that likely can shed much light on mountaintop 
removal reform initiatives is the movement known as ecofeminism.  
Associated with such scholars as Ellen O’Loughlin, Val Plumwood, and 
Vandana Shiva, third wave ecofeminism, which “embraces strategic uses of 
                                                          
gendered inequalities and subordination, we might recast ‘unmasking patriarchy’ as 
‘asking the gender question.’ Cast as a question, the method is released from any 
substantive and prescriptive commitments attendant to a characterization in terms of 
patriarchy.”); Nancy Perkins Spyke, The Land Use—Environmental Law Distinction: A 
Geo-Feminist Critique, 13 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 55, 77 (2002) (“While 
traditional legal methodology seeks predictability and certainty, feminist legal methods 
value flexibility in legal rules and seek to identify missing points of view. Three such 
methods are often associated with feminism: asking the ‘woman question,’ feminist 
practical reasoning, and consciousness raising.”). 
 476.  Greener Voice, supra note 40, at 38.  
 477.  Id. at 40. 
 478.  Id. at 41. 
 479.  Id. at 43-44; see sources cited supra note 475.  
 480.  Greener Voice, supra note 40, at 46. 
 481.  Id. at 52. 
 482.  Id. at 52-54. 
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essentialism,”
483
 is a supremely multivocal movement.
484
  Ecofeminism 
explores the intersection of feminism and environmental concerns—but in 
accomplishing this, deploys a much broader analytical framework. 
 
Since the dynamic of oppression is similar (though not identical or 
interchangeable) among oppressed peoples, and since most women 
experience this dynamic in more than one way (that is, through the 
dynamics of racism, classism, heterosexism, and ageism, as well as 
sexism), ecofeminism, in order to fight the oppression of women and 





The crux of ecofeminism then is that all forms of subordination are, in 
crucial ways, interlinked, stemming from a “shared dynamic of separation, 
fear, and resentment”
486
 characteristic of “capitalist, patriarchal forces.”
487
  
Stated otherwise, core characteristics of these dominant paradigms include 
“hierarchical thinking, a logic of domination, and normative dualisms such 
as the separation of humans from nature.”
488
  This yields the conclusion 
that meaningful environmental law reform requires “a multi-layered 




All too often, the destruction of the environment and the subordination 
of marginalized groups are approached as inherently separate issues, each 
having its own causes and each requiring discrete solutions.  For instance, 
curtailing environmental destruction may not be viewed as a requisite for a 
                                                          
 483.  Maggie Ellinger-Locke, Food Sovereignty Is A Gendered Issue, 18 BUFF. 
ENVTL. L. J. 157, 188 (2011). See generally MARIA MIES & VANDANA SHIVA, 
ECOFEMINISM (1993); Ellen O’Loughlin, Questioning Sour Grapes: Ecofeminism and 
the United Farm Workers Grape Boycott, in ECOFEMINISM: WOMEN, ANIMALS, 
NATURE 146 (Greta Gaard ed., 2010); Chaone Mallory, Acts of Objectification and the 
Repudiation of Dominance: Leopold, Ecofeminism, and the Ecological Narrative, 6 
ETHICS & ENV’T 59 (2001); Val Plumwood, Ecosocial Feminism as General Theory of 
Oppression, in ECOLOGY: KEY CONCEPTS IN CRITICAL THEORY (Carolyn Merchant ed., 
1999).  
 484.  Greener Voice, supra note 40, at 55. 
 485.  O’Loughlin, supra note 483, at 148.  
 486.  Greener Voice, supra note 40, at 57. 
 487.  STANDING OUR GROUND, supra note 27, at 114.  
 488.  Heather McLeod-Kilmurray, An Ecofeminist Legal Critique of Canadian 
Environmental Law: The Case Study of Genetically Modified Foods, 26 WINDSOR REV. 
LEGAL & SOC. ISSUES 129, 138 (2009). 
 489.  Greener Voice, supra note 40, at 58. 
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more just distribution of environmental harms among humans.
490
  
Therefore, the “ecofeminist view of compound oppression contributes 
something new,” in that it “makes the avoidance of compound oppressions 
conceptually impossible: to take the ‘eco’ or the ‘feminism’ out of 
ecofeminism would, after all, negate the whole idea.”
491
  Ecofeminism then 
is a holistic approach that aims to “simultaneously us[e] the common goals 
of saving nature and ending oppression” to effect progressive change.
492
 
The researcher now has learned of pertinent legal scholarly discourses 
regarding potential avenues for feminist-based reform.  Novel ideas 
proffered by commercial legal databases and online repositories of legal 
scholarship have been, in this specific context, largely exhausted.  But what 
of any remaining insights proffered by cross- and multidisciplinary 
resources?  What of going beyond commercial legal databases? 
While Westlaw and Lexis fail to offer a feminist analysis of the law 
governing mountaintop removal mining, in searching “outside the system 
box” of these commercial legal databases, a researcher succeeds in 
discovering such materials that begin to fill the gap.
493
  In other words, a 
number of non-legal scholars indeed have proffered a feminist analysis of 
mountaintop removal, which may be of great benefit to the attorney 
searching for innovative ideas for feminist-inspired law reform 
initiatives.
494
  In actually locating such materials, the materials below were 
found via searches in such resources as Google Books and Scholar, 
EbscoHost, JSTOR, SSRN, and others. 
In Standing Our Ground : Women, Environmental Justice, and the Fight 
to End Mountaintop Removal , Joyce M. Barry “expands the EJ framework 
                                                          
 490.  See McLeod-Kilmurray, supra note 488, at 145 (“We do not seek to protect 
nature from all harm, because of its inherent value. Instead, we seek to regulate how 
much harm is done, stopping short only when we might harm our own self interests.” 
(quoting Elaine Hughes, Fishwives and Other Tails: Ecofeminism and Environmental 
Law 8 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 502, 515 (1995))). 
 491.  Greener Voice, supra note 40, at 58. 
 492.  Id. at 60. 
 493.  Farmer, supra note 3, at 403. 
 494.  See generally STANDING OUR GROUND, supra note 27; Mountaineers, supra 
note 41; Scott, supra note 464; SHANNON BELL, OUR ROOTS RUN DEEP AS IRON WEED 
(2013); REBECCA R. SCOTT, REMOVING MOUNTAINS : EXTRACTING NATURE AND 
IDENTITY IN THE APPALACHIAN COALFIELDS (2010); Rebecca Spence, Feminism, 
Mountain Top Removal, and Appalachian Identity, VOICES OF CLAREMONT GRADUATE 
UNIV. 258 (2011); Shannon E. Bell & Yvonne A. Braun, Coal, Identity, and the 
Gendering of Environmental Justice Activism in Central Appalachia, 24.6 GENDER & 
SOC’Y 794 (2010); Joyce M. Barry, “A Small Group of Thoughtful, Committed 
Citizens”: Women’s Activism, Environmental Justice, and the Coal River Mountain 
Watch, 1.1 ENVTL. JUST. 25 (2008). 
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by centralizing gender in this analysis of women’s involvement in the 
movement to end mountaintop removal coal mining in Appalachia.”
495
  In 
contrast to the primary and scholarly-analytical resources in the 
commercial legal databases and elsewhere, Barry argues persuasively that 
“[g]ender is at the heart of the anti-MTR movement in Appalachia.”
496
 
In localizing many of the feminist critical insights above to the 
Appalachian mountaintop removal context, Barry demonstrates that women 
in Appalachia share a disproportionate burden of the harms wrought by 
mountaintop removal mining.  In a general sense, “[w]omen in central 
Appalachia, particularly in the coalfields . . . lack social, political, and 
economic equality with men.”
497
  The root cause of these inequities in large 
part can be traced to the systemic forces undergirding the natural resource 
extraction industry. 
 
For West Virginians, it is the coal industry, or “king coal,” that has 
systematically arranged the state’s resources for its benefit, while leaving 
state citizens politically and economically powerless. . . . Economic 
insecurity is particularly devastating to rural women, many of whom 
head families living in poverty. It is these women who have the primary 
responsibility of maintaining the domestic sphere in incredibly trying 
circumstances. Ultimately, women, with their productive or social 
reproductive work, suffer the harshest effects of all social ills, whether 




In terms of deleterious health effects, women may be more vulnerable 
than men to some pollutants associated with mountaintop removal mining, 
because through higher fat ratios, “women are particularly vulnerable to the 
accumulation of chemicals.”
499
  Women also may “potentially pass these 
toxins on their fetuses and/or children.”
500
  That recent studies establish a 
link between mountaintop removal mining and birth defects only confirms 
“the ways in which the body, and biological differences between men and 




Barry also demonstrates that, in the “effort to end mountaintop removal 
coal mining in Appalachia, women activists are a vital part of the 
                                                          
 495.  STANDING OUR GROUND, supra note 27, at 41. 
 496.  Id. at 53. 
 497.  Id. at 20.  
 498.  Mountaineers, supra note 41, at 119. 
 499.  STANDING OUR GROUND, supra note 27, at 54. 
 500.  Id.  
 501.  Id. 
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movement—representing in large numbers and in some cases shaping the 
nature of EJ campaigns.”
502
  Women therefore occupy—and have long 
occupied—leadership and frontline activist roles in the anti-mountaintop 
removal movement, with self-reported motivations stemming from “a 
desire to keep their families, community, and natural environment safe and 
healthy for present and future generations.”
503
 
Barry also deploys an explicitly ecofeminist lens in her analysis of the 
anti-mountaintop removal movement.  She illustrates that for “[w]omen . . . 
who organize or join grassroots efforts” in Appalachia, “[c]oncerns for 
human health, particularly for the young” are of extreme importance.
504
  
However, women activists also “recognize links between both cultural and 
environmental annihilation,” and therefore “[i]n their efforts to end MTR, 
women environmental justice activists link local culture to the natural 
environment, particularly its mountains.”
505
 
c. Feminist-Based Reforms to Mountaintop Removal Law 
With such a complement of primary authority, legal-analytical, and 
critical cross- and multidisciplinary materials identified, the reformist-
minded attorney may now, as Delgado and Stefancic advise, unplug from 
research resources entirely and engage in “the free association of ideas, 
policies, and social needs.”
506
  Now is the time to “turn [the] system on its 
side” and ask what is missing, in terms of determining how, in this 
scenario, feminist insights might best inspire law reform initiatives for 
mountaintop removal mining.
507
  Of course, the aim of this Article is not to 
offer comprehensive reform strategies; rather, the purpose is to engage in a 
tentative analysis in order to showcase the transformative potential of 
critical research strategies—across diverse areas of Appalachian law. 
To begin, the researcher may speculate on how the law governing 
mountaintop removal—or even on how arguments proffered, to date, by 
mountaintop removal law reform advocates—may in fact perpetuate the 
patriarchy.  For example, the feminist analyses proffered by Barry and 
others demonstrate that women in Appalachia share a disproportionate 
burden of the harms caused by mountaintop removal.
508
  In terms of 
deleterious health effects, women indeed may be more susceptible to 
                                                          
 502.  Id. at 63. 
 503.  Id. at 50. 
 504.  Id. at 41, 55.  
 505.  Id. at 64, 116. 
 506.  Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 3, at 328. 
 507.  Id. at 224. 
 508.  See Part III(B)(3)(b).  
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certain mountaintop removal pollutants than men (although the science is 
still emerging),
509
 and the birth defects demonstrably caused by 
mountaintop removal surely are societal harms that affect women more 
substantially (i.e., as women historically have been the primary caretakers 
of children).
510
  In the broader sense discussed above (e.g., poverty, 
unemployment, familial hardships, etc.), Appalachian women “suffer the 




In the primary authority and legal analytical materials to date, this 
inequitable sex- and gender-based distribution of societal harms has not 
been identified as a prominent issue.  But regarding primary authority 
specifically, where might attorneys look to implement such reforms? 
For one, the EPA’s public interest review requirements for the issuance 
of mountaintop removal permits as associated with the pre-permit 
reviews
512
 could be targeted as a site for increased incorporation of such 
insights.  Through the public interest review process, the EPA specifically 
has “directed its regional offices,” prior to Corps permit approvals, to 
“analyze and provide comment to the Corps on such issues as ‘the potential 
for disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental 
effects on low-income and minority populations.’”
513
  The 
disproportionately economic effects may be targeted as well: “The Corps 
regularly considers the economic ramifications of a proposal in its public 
interest review.”
514
  These EPA public interest directives serve as an ideal 
site from which to require an analysis that explicitly and comprehensively 
accounts for the unique harms to Appalachian women.  In short, the EPA 
could direct the Corps to analyze the “disproportionately high and adverse 




                                                          
 509.  See COPELAND, supra note 321, at 17; STANDING OUR GROUND, supra note 27, 
at 54-55; Ahern et al., supra note 336, at 838. 
 510.  See Part III(B)(3)(b). 
 511.  Mountaineers, supra note 41, at 119. 
 512.  See sources cited supra note 348. 
 513.  Bomyea, supra note 348, at 235 (quoting Communities Against Runway 
Expansion, Inc. v. F.A.A., 355 F.3d 678, 688 (D.C. Cir. 2004)). 
 514.  FEDERAL REGULATION OF WETLANDS, ST051 ALI-CLE 933, 995 (2012). 
 515.  See also Greener Voice, supra note 40, at 87 (“Regulatory agencies could also 
be required to consider the distributional effects that their actions have on women and 
children.”); Rachel Kalman, EPA’s Mercury Cap and Trade Rule: An Environmental 
Injustice for Women, 13 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 111, 113 (2006) (“Executive Order 
12,898 requir[es] federal agencies to consider the effects of their programs, policies, 
and activities on minority and low-income populations . . . . Executive Order 12,898 
formalizes the principles of environmental justice and obligates federal agencies to 
79
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The EPA also could incorporate related reforms into its analyses 
regarding permit vetoes under CWA § 404(c).  In the last half decade, the 
public interest criteria based on E.O. 12,898 has been deployed by the EPA 
not just in its pre-permit directives to the Corps, but also “to determine 
when its veto authority under CWA § 404(c) should be used to block a 
permit.”
516
  Therefore, here too the EPA may incorporate the 
disproportionate health, environmental, and economic effects of 
mountaintop removal mining, as borne by Appalachian women, into its 
analysis of when a CWA § 404(c) veto is appropriate.  That the EPA’s 
CWA § 404(c) veto power recently has been affirmed in Mingo Logan 
Coal Co. v. U.S. E.P.A. only demonstrates the strengths of this tactic.
517
 
In National Min. Ass’n v. McCarthy, the D.C. Circuit also affirmed the 
EPA’s extra-statutory guidance prerogatives,
518
 in holding that the EPA 
could lawfully develop interagency coordination plans with the Corps in a 
process not expressly authorized by the CWA.
519
  In these extra-statutory 
guidance functions, the EPA may direct the Corps to adopt environmental 
review analyses that account for disproportionate sex- and gender-based 
environmental harms. 
In terms of contextual reasoning and consciousness-raising in 
Appalachia, additional strategies may involve ensuring a strong influence 
of personal experience in mountaintop removal law reform initiatives.  
Appalachian women long have been at the forefront of grassroots anti-
mountaintop removal efforts—but questions remain over whether such 
“‘bottom-up’ perspectives” are prominent components of all legal and 
related socio-institutional sites for change.
520
 
Personal experience already plays a role in the public interest review 
                                                          
adhere to them, yet it makes no mention of gender as a factor to be considered in 
agency decisions.”) (emphasis added). But of course, we also should be wary any such 
universalized sex- or gender-based characterization or analysis: an “integrated 
particularized approach” ought to be highlighted in Appalachia, which exhibits “greater 
complexity based on each community’s cultural, historical, and political experience and 
its specific needs and goals.” Yamamoto & Lyman, supra note 450, at 360. Rather 
presciently, Marx once defined critical theory as the “self-clarification of the struggles 
and wishes of our age.” Karl Marx, Letter to A. Ruge, September 1843, in KARL MARX: 
EARLY WRITINGS 209 (Rodney Livingstone & Gregor Benton trans., Vintage Books 
1975) (emphasis added). Individual “struggles and wishes” of Appalachian coalfield 
residents must be taken into account. Id.   
 516.  Bomyea, supra note 348, at 254. 
 517.  Mingo Logan Coal Co. v. U.S. E.P.A., 714 F.3d 608, 613 (D.C. Cir. 2013) 
cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1540 (2014). 
 518.  Nat’l Min. Ass’n v. McCarthy, 758 F.3d 243, 249 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 519.  Id. at 253. 
 520.  Greener Voice, supra note 40, at 46. 
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process associated with the EPA’s pre-permit directives.  E.O. 12,898 
“compels agencies to increase opportunities for public participation in 
federal decision-making, giving potentially impacted people better access 
to the lawmaking process before major decisions are made.”
521
  In 
accordance with this mandate, the EPA has established an Office of 
Environmental Justice to “oversee the agency’s implementation of the 
order,” which involves, among other functions, providing “low-income and 
minority communities in Appalachia” with an “adequate opportunity to 
participate in the permitting process.”
522
  A feminist-based approach might 
attempt to broaden and deepen the participation of coalfield communities—
and to concurrently ensure that a full spectrum of voices is heard within the 
review process. 
But how might such contextual reasoning and consciousness-raising 
approaches be further expanded in mountaintop removal reform efforts?  
Public health science on mountaintop removal mining is still emerging
523
 
and successful reform efforts likely will depend on the eventual findings—
but who collects such data and how?  Verchick directly addresses this 
issue: “community activists [argue not only] for greater research into toxic 
susceptibility,” but they also demand “gain[ing] more control over how the 
evidence is collected and applied.”
524
  As an example in a different regional 
context, a California community demanded that a traditional toxic exposure 
study conducted on its residents be tempered with a “context-based survey” 
devised through “group discussion” by the residents themselves.
525
  In 
adopting such a methodology, the “community’s participation in solving 
the problem places them on a more equal footing with the outside 
researchers,” and such an active community role may “discourage 
researchers from viewing them as mere ‘victims’ or sources of raw data in 
the future.”
526
  Similarly, coalfield residents in Appalachia also might adopt 
a more proactive approach in pertinent public health research—the findings 
of which surely will impact future mountaintop removal reform efforts. 
Such are examples of potential feminist-based reforms to the permitting 
scheme governing mountaintop removal and to related sites for change, like 
the public health complex. However, mountaintop removal mining may 
also be governed through “the common law of torts and property,” among 
other primary authority alternatives.
527
  How might an attorney explore 
                                                          
 521.  Bomyea, supra note 348, at 234. 
 522.  Id. at 235.  
 523.  See COPELAND, supra note 321, at 17.  
 524.  Greener Voice, supra note 40, at 72.  
 525.  Id. at 74. 
 526.  Id. 
 527.  Smith, supra note 29, at 178. 
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these legal avenues of reform? 
Developing strategies to seek direct compensation for economic 
damages—perhaps through toxic tort actions or legislative compensation 
schemes
528
—are compelling options.  As Verchick points out in Katrina, 
Feminism, and Environmental Justice, “Feminists . . . are concerned with 
exposure and vulnerability,” but “[v]ulnerability is a tricky concept for 
feminists because, in the past, women were denied many opportunities in 
the public sphere because of false notions of female delicacy.”
529
  
Nevertheless, through strategic uses of essentialism, many “feminists 




Verchick then introduces a rudimentary calculus illustrating how 
economic compensation is appropriate for environmental harms suffered 





If women are indeed suffering more health and economic harms, justice 
demands that they be compensated. “H = A + E + V where H is 
“environmental harm,” A is “agent,” E is “exposure,” and V is 
“vulnerability.” Neither feminists nor environmental justice advocates 
put the idea in such formulaic terms, but both pay close attention to 
harmful agents, exposure, and vulnerability. Both kinds of activists are 
concerned with identifying agents of harm and demanding accountability 




In applying this calculus to mountaintop removal, potential agents 
include the mechanisms through which health and economic harms are 
wrought on coalfield communities (e.g., toxins released during the mining 
process), exposure as the coalfield communities’ various forms of damages 
suffered from these harms, and vulnerability in part relates to women’s 
increased susceptibility to many such forms of damages.
533
  Justice may 
                                                          
 528.  See ANN SCALES, LEGAL FEMINISM: ACTIVISM, LAWYERING, AND LEGAL 
THEORY 59 (2009) (discussing toxic tort litigation); Katrina, supra note 467, at 799 
(discussing legislative compensation schemes). 
 529.  Katrina, supra note 467, at 792–93. 
 530.  Id. at 793. 
 531.  But see McLeod-Kilmurray, supra note 488, at 144-45 (“Feminist 
jurisprudence emphasizes how the law, its processes and creators misunderstand and 
undervalue the kinds of harm women experience . . . . [Existing law] emphasizes 
individual and pecuniary harms while failing to ‘see’ collective and non-pecuniary 
harms.”). 
 532.  Katrina, supra note 467, at 792. 
 533.  See Part III(B)(3)(b).. 
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then demand imposing economic accountability on the actors responsible 
for these harms: mountaintop removal operators.  As Verchick states: “This 
emphasis on compensatory liability echoes the sentiment of the early 
feminist Mary Wollstonecraft that ‘[i]t is justice, not charity, that is 
wanting in the world!’”
534
 
In considering more transformative strategies, the core tenets of 
ecofeminism also might assist in radically “imagining new worlds” of 
mountaintop removal reform—in terms of both ending mountaintop 
removal mining and in pursuing strategies of post-coal Appalachian 
societal reconstruction, which, in the end, may be one in the same issue.
535
  
As an example of such a “re-visioning” strategy in another context, 
Delgado and Stefancic posit: “what if one imagined a world where the duty 
to make good for old injuries increased, rather than decreased, over 
time[?]”
536
  One may begin asking similar such novel questions in “re-
visioning” the law governing mountaintop removal mining.
537
 
Ecofeminism aims to “simultaneously us[e] the common goals of saving 
nature and ending oppression” to effect progressive change.
538
  Much in 
line with the key critical research methodologies outlined by Delgado and 




In the context of mountaintop removal mining, such legal 
reconceptualization efforts may begin with an examination of how 
compound oppressions associated with the mining industry (i.e., the 
common domination of nature, women, minorities, low-income 
populations, non-human animals, and other subordinated groups) have not 
been sufficiently addressed in a holistic sociolegal fashion. 
Reform efforts might highlight the connections among these multiple 
forms of domination at work in mountaintop removal mining—and then 
“uncover their common systemic causes.”
540
  Indeed, any law reform 
efforts that fail to uncover—and to then account for—such common 




                                                          
 534.  Katrina, supra note 467, at 792 (quoting MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT, A 
VINDICATION OF THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN 71 (1792) (Carol H. Poston ed., 1975)). 
 535.  Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 3, at 322. 
 536.  Id. 
 537.  McLeod-Kilmurray, supra note 488, at 178. 
 538.  Greener Voice, supra note 40, at 60. 
 539.  McLeod-Kilmurray, supra note 488, at 133. 
 540.  Id. at 136. 
 541.  Id. at 137 (quoting Karen J. Warren, The Power and the Promise of Ecological 
Feminism 12 ENVTL. ETHICS 125 (1990)). 
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The dominant patriarchal and liberal paradigms that undergird the 
natural resource extraction industry surely constitute such common 
systemic harms in Appalachia.  Is it so surprising the paradigmatic forces 
of Westernism simultaneously drive such widespread acts as the wholesale 
poisoning of low-income coalfield communities, a disproportionate 
burdening of Appalachian women, the obliteration of Appalachian 
ecosystems, and the other devastating societal and ecological harms 
wrought on the region as a whole?  Perhaps not.  Therefore, in Delgado and 
Stefancic’s terms, the question becomes: can one imagine a world in which 
mountaintop removal mining reform encompasses the common systemic 
causes at work in the Appalachian region?  What might such reforms 
entail? 
It seems likely that deep reforms of this nature will require a radical 
social and economic restructuring of Appalachia—based largely along 
ecofeminist lines.  Hearteningly, as Barry reports, an overarching vision of 
such reforms, already shared by many women activists in Appalachia, is 
aptly characterized as an ecofeminist one.  That is, “[w]omen 
environmental justice activists,” in fighting the coal industry in Appalachia, 
have provided “an alternative vision that understands and critiques” the 
excesses of late capitalism—and its systemic forms of subordination.
542
  
Such activists “in West Virginia promote living economies through 
sustainable development of the area’s renewable natural resources,” which 
may be defined, in large part, by “co-ownership and coproduction, on 
sharing and participation.”
543
  Through pursuing such transformative ends, 
                                                          
 542.   STANDING OUR GROUND, supra note 27, at 149.  
 543.  Id.; see also Greta Gaard, Toward New EcoMasculinities, EcoGenders, and 
EcoSexualities, in ECOFEMINISM: FEMINIST INTERSECTIONS WITH OTHER ANIMALS AND 
THE EARTH 225 (Carol J. Adams & Lori Gruen eds., 2014) (“For any egalitarian 
socioeconomic and eco-political transformation, such as that advocated by 
ecofeminism to be possible, both individuals and institutions need to shift away from 
overvaluing exclusively white, male, and masculinized attributes and behaviors, jobs, 
environments, economic practices, laws and political practices, in order to recognize 
and enact eco-political sustainability and ecological genders.”); DAVID PEPPER, ECO-
SOCIALISM: FROM DEEP ECOLOGY TO SOCIAL JUSTICE 218-22 (2002); Patricia E. 
Perkins, Feminist Ecological Economics and Sustainability, 9.3 J. OF BIOECON. 227, 
228-39 (2007); Mary Mellor, Ecofeminist Political Economy 1.1 INT’L J. OF GREEN 
ECON 139, 145-48 (2006); For concrete Appalachian reform proposals to date see 
Patrick C. McGinley, Collateral Damage: Turning A Blind Eye to Environmental and 
Social Injustice in the Coalfields, 19 J. ENVTL. & SUSTAINABILITY L. 305, 414-15 
(2013) (“[Appalachian revitalization efforts include] a proposal to create a permanent 
mineral severance tax trust fund and suggestions for growing ‘green collar’ jobs 
through creation of a sustainable forestry industry . . . . [in addition to] economic 
diversification in ‘the arts, education and workforce development, entrepreneurship, 
environmental restoration, health and community-based services [etc.] . . . ‘“ (quoting 
Randal A. Strobo, The Shape of Appalachia to Come: Coal in a Transitional Economy, 
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a more just and eco-viable future may be possible for the region. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For over a century, dedicated grassroots activists, legal reformers, and 
ordinary citizens have struggled to free central Appalachia from the natural 
resource extraction industry and its seemingly eternal pact with the region’s 
captured ruling elites.  Much good work has been done, but the purpose of 
this Article is to bring to light a novel set of critical methodologies that 
may assist in ushering in a new era of change and renewal. 
The manner in which our laws and legal discourses are organized, 
accessed, and analyzed has a vital impact on research outcomes.  As 
outlined in this Article, the research paradigm by which such outcomes are 
reached is defined wholly by insidious systems of constraint.  In 
examining—and transcending—such systems, and in adopting approaches 
that maximize creative law reform potential, a great deal may be 
accomplished by the reformist-minded attorney. 
This Article puts forth just one such version of a reconstructed legal 
research process, and an accompanying illustration of how it might be used 
to shape new reforms.  However, the overarching aim is for activists and 
reformers to creatively engage with, critique, expand upon, and ultimately 
deploy such critical legal research strategies to effect meaningful change in 
Appalachia—and beyond. 
 
                                                          
4 DUKE FORUM FOR LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE 91, 105 (2012), available at 
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/dflsc/vol4/iss1/5/.)). 
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